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Abstract
In recent years, derived pensions for housewives have drawn criticisms in Japan as a 
gender bias for the male breadwinner/ female homemaker households. Many 
prominent feminists support measures to remove or curtail these arrangements in 
favour of a gender neutral pension system. Nonetheless, it is an open question 
whether redressing gender assumptions in the pension system can help redressing 
another form of gender inequality, that is, gender gap in pensions and women’s 
greater vulnerability to poverty in old age.
The purpose of this study is to reconsider the ‘women’s pension problem’ by 
unravelling the ways in which it is perceived and to reffame the policy issue so that 
the definition of the problem can better accommodate concerns about economic 
security in old age for women. Building on the insights of feminist scholarship on 
women’s social citizenship, this study explores, firstly, why concerns about gender 
inequality in pension outcomes have failed to impinge on the political agenda as a 
primary problem to be tackled in Japan, despite increasing cries for gender equality 
in the nation, and secondly, what are the implications of this neglect for women’s 
economic welfare in old age and gender equality in outcome.
In so doing, published governmental documents, deliberations in the Diet and reports 
from key advisory committees are closely analysed in order to examine the changes 
and continuities of the ‘women’s pension problem’. In the latter part of the thesis, 
income statistics and pension simulations are used to explore the implications of 
recent pension reforms for women’s equal pension rights and women’s economic 
welfare in old age.
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The findings caution against the moves to remove or curtail derived benefits for 
dependent spouses as well as point to the need to distinguish gender neutralisation 
and assimilation to male gender model in the pursuit of greater gender equality.
4
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Introduction: Ageing Population and Women’s Old-age Pensions
Housewives are unfairly privileged in the Japanese pension system. This criticism 
has been repeatedly put forward since the 1985 pension reform in Japan, which has 
granted an individual pension entitlement to non-employed spouses who are exempt 
from paying social security premiums1. Many Japanese regard this arrangement as 
an anomaly, but their evaluations vary. Some problematise the arrangement from a 
gender equality perspective, drawing attention to its gender reinforcing effect (Ida 
1998; Takenaka 1989; Yokoyama 2002). Others regard it as problematic from a 
perspective of equality between households and its regressive nature, pointing out the 
inverted relations between the level of household incomes and the probability of 
wife’s employment (Shiota 2000). On the other hand, some accept the arrangement 
as fair, arguing that housewives do not earn enough incomes of their own, but that 
they also should be guaranteed their own pension rights (Hori 1997). Surveys also 
demonstrate that some defend the arrangement on the basis of equal value of paid 
and unpaid work, claiming that housewives contribute to the pension system through 
their unpaid work, especially through care work (for example, see MHW 1999).
With these conflicting views rigorously expressed, calls for reforming women’s 
pensions in Japan are increasingly centred on ‘housewife privileges’ in the system. 
Problematisation of women’s pensions in this way has led many proponents of 
gender equality to demand gender neutralisation of the system by removing the 
underlying bias towards the male breadwinner/ female homemaker households. As a 
result, issues of gender equality in pensions are often framed in popular discourses as
1 In the thesis, the money paid for the coverage of the Japanese public social security system is 
referred to as ‘premiums’ rather than ‘contributions’. This is because the Japanese word ‘hoken ryd’ 
is closer to the former in the meaning and this difference has important implications for the 
discussions in the thesis.
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issues of inequality between ‘housewives’ and ‘working women’ rather than of 
inequality between women and men in Japan (for example, Chuko Shinsho Rakure 
Henshubu 2002).
Nonetheless, it is an open question whether redressing gender assumptions in the 
pension system can help redressing another form of gender inequality, that is, the 
gender gap in pensions and women’s greater vulnerability to poverty in old age. It is 
well documented that there is a significant pension gap between women and men in 
Japan (MHW 2000). International comparisons also indicate that the average 
economic status of Japanese older women is often worse than their counterparts in 
other major OECD countries (OECD 2001b). With the government’s current moves 
to limit the level of public pension benefits, older women’s economic situations may 
be further aggravated. On the other hand, the prospect of better pensions in their 
own right does not look promising for today’s working-age women, either. Their 
levels of earnings -  a good predictor of future pension levels -  remain much lower 
than that of men. Cross-national comparisons confirm that the Japanese gender gap 
in wages is still one of the widest (Japan Cabinet Office 2007a).
The tension between policies to redress embedded gender bias and gender inequality 
in outcomes is one of the greatest dilemmas which divide those who advocate 
equality between women and men (Pateman 1988). This raises the multifaceted 
nature and dynamic meaning of the concept of gender equality.
Aim of the research
The notion of gender is now widely recognised as a valuable analytical tool. This is 
especially the case now that the very foundation of post-war welfare systems, namely
20
the male breadwinner/ female homemaker family model, is crumbling. Nonetheless, 
many policy discussions on actual welfare reforms do not always take gender 
perspectives into account. While the need for the shift of the boundaries between the 
state, the market and the family for welfare provision is widely discussed, policy 
makers often fail to pay enough attention to the changing family and gender roles. 
Nor are the implications of reforms well explored in terms of inequalities between 
women and men. A case in point is pension reforms. Although the increasing role 
of private pensions has significant gender implications to the detriment of women 
(Ginn and Arber 2001b), this dimension of privatisation is often neglected. The 
research presented here brings the issues of gender equality to the centre and aims to 
provide this often-neglected link of a gender perspective in the debates on pension 
reforms in Japan. The study explores the meaning of gender equality in the context 
of pension reforms in Japan and its implications for women’s economic welfare in 
old age.
The purpose of this study is to reconsider the ‘women’s pension problem’ by
unravelling how the issue of gender equality has been perceived and to reframe the
policy issue so that it can better accommodate concerns about economic security in
old age for women. The focus of the thesis is changes and continuities in the notion
of ‘women’s pension problem’ in Japan and the way concerns about gender equality
have been addressed in the history of the Japanese public old-age pension system. In
the study, embedded assumptions in the policy debates and in pension reforms are
extracted not only about gender relations but also about inter-generational relations
and about the state’s role for welfare provision because of their significance in
determining women’s economic welfare in old age. In so doing, published
governmental documents as well as the deliberations in the Diet and reports from key
21
advisory committees are closely examined. The research also considers the pension 
outcomes for women under a certain balance of competing equality claims. In the 
latter part of the thesis, income statistics and pension simulations are used to explore 
the implications of certain pension arrangements for women’s equal pension rights 
and women’s economic welfare in old age.
This study is therefore relevant to policy makers who support the cause for gender 
equality in the pension system as well as for those who share the general concerns 
about economic security of the major population in the aged society, that is, older 
women. Although the study is focused on Japan -  a non-Westem post-industrial 
state, the findings of this study may still be relevant to policy makers of the West 
(see, for example, Doling, Jones Finer, and Maltby 2005).
The research questions and methods are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The 
rest of this chapter reviews the background of this research and outlines the structure 
of the thesis.
Population ageing and trends in pension reforms
Population ageing and its associated ‘problems’ are by now familiar issues in many 
post-industrial democracies. However, the context differs and the extent varies 
across countries. In order to situate one of such ‘problems’, that is, women’s old-age 
pensions, in the country-specific setting of Japan, and present a relative picture about 
them, this section compares the Japanese situations with those of other major OECD 
countries.
For more than half a century, many policy makers in Japan have expressed their 
concerns about ageing of the population. As early as 1956, the Ministry of Health
22
and Welfare (MHW) pointed out the need to prepare for the advent of an ageing 
society in its annual report (MHW 1956). Nonetheless, population ageing has not yet 
lost its value as news in Japan, occasionally hitting headlines with much impact. 
This unabated interest partly stems from uncertainties about the extent to which the 
population ageing may proceed. According to the 2005 census, Japan has become 
the oldest nation in the world, surpassing Italy in the proportion of the population 
aged 65 or over. Yet, there are many signs that the population ageing in the country 
will advance further. The birth rate is still on the decline, while the life expectancy 
remains longest in the world. In 2005, the total fertility rate hit the record low of
'y
1.26 and the life expectancy at birth was 85.5 for women and 78.6 for men .
Moreover, Japan has one of the fastest and largest ageing populations. As Table 1.1 
shows, as recent as in 1950, the proportion of those aged 65 and over in Japan was 
the smallest among the major OECD countries -  just below 5 per cent. By the end of 
the 20th century, however, the country became one of the most aged societies along 
with Italy and Sweden, and by the mid-21st century, more than one third of the 
Japanese population, or about 36 million people, is expected to be classified as the 
elderly (IPSS 2002).
2 MHLW (Ministry o f Health Labour and Welfare). 2005b. Kan’i Seimei Hyo.
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Table 1 .1 The proportion of the population aged 65 and over
Japan Italy Germany France Sweden UK USA
1950 4.94 8.26 9.72 11.38 9.41 10.73 8.26
2000 17.34 18.24 16.37 16.31 17.27 15.86 12.3
2010 22.54 21.12 20.39 16.90 18.56 16.49 12.79
2030 29.57 29.14 26.55 24.24 23.11 21.44 19.25
2050 35.65 35.53 28.41 27.11 24.74 23.17 20.65
Note: The figures for 2010 onwards are projections.
Source: IPSS 2002
As elsewhere, population ageing is associated with a series of ‘problems’. With this 
rate and extent of changes in the population profile, these ‘problems’ may manifest 
themselves in more pronounced forms in Japan than in others countries. What is 
often forgotten, however, is that the majority of the elderly3 are female, and hence 
these ‘problems’ are more likely to be experienced (or caused, depending on the 
perspective) by women. Yet, curiously, issues associated with ageing population are 
often discussed with men in mind or in a gender neutral way at best. This would not 
be problematic if old age is experienced in a similar way by both women and men. 
However, many studies indicate otherwise (for example, Arber and Ginn 1991; 1995). 
Since how an issue is construed as a problem forms the basis of policy 
recommendations to address the issue (Bacchi 1999; Gusfield 1981), apparent gender 
neutrality in the policy discussions may lead to women’s disadvantages or their 
issues remaining unresolved where there is a significant gender gap in situations. 
The neglect of gender difference in mainstream policy discussions is certainly the
3In this thesis, the age 65 is used as a line over which people are addressed as ‘the elderly’ or ‘older 
people’ unless otherwise noted.
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case with old-age pensions, one of the most explicit areas of concern in the aged 
society.
The declining proportion of the population in the labour market means that the cost 
per person to support those outside the labour market increases. Using the concept of 
dependency ratio4, the increase in the proportion of the elderly prompted heated and 
recurrent debates about the affordability and sustainability of the current pension 
system in the aged society (for example, Takayama 1998). Against this background, 
the Japanese government has rigorously pursued policies to ‘adjust’ the public 
pension system to the aged society at least since the 1980s. The premium rate was 
repeatedly raised as the population ageing proceeded, which in turn encouraged 
younger generations to support policies to contain the pension level in order to 
moderate further increases in payment. In contrast to the reforms in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s, major pension reforms every five years5 in the following 
decades became almost synonymous with pension retrenchment.
International trends for the promotion of private pensions and the rise of neo­
liberalism in the 1980s also facilitated the pursuit of these policies for the 
government. Indeed, international organisations such as the World Bank actively 
encouraged governments to limit their role in the provision for old age, taking 
advantage of, as well as by contributing to, the scaremongering discourses of ‘old- 
age crisis’ or ‘demographic bomb’ (World Bank 1994). While the extreme views
4 While the dependency ratio is widely used in policy debates, the concept has been extensively 
critiqued for depicting a misleading picture. For a critique o f the concept, see, for example, Johnson, 
Paul, and Jane Falkingham. 1992. Ageing and Economic Welfare. London: Sage.
5 The government is required by law to conduct the Financial Adjustment every five years to re­
calculate the actuary balance o f public pension schemes and adjust the levels o f premium and annuity 
accordingly. In the past, the Financial Adjustment was often brought forward due to socio-political 
reasons. The year o f the Financial Adjustment often sees other major changes in the pension system.
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which called for the total privatisation of pension schemes has been somewhat 
subdued in the international arena since then, unabated population ageing and 
prolonged weak economy in Japan still provided enough impetus for the government 
to further retrench the public provision for old age without much resistance from its 
citizens.
However, when these moves of the government are examined from a perspective of 
individual pensioners’ economic security, there are many unaddressed issues. One of 
these issues is poverty and inequality in old age. In Japan, as elsewhere, the older 
population is disproportionately represented in the lowest income group6. If today’s 
level of provision is not enough to prevent poverty for many older people, what 
would be the consequences of the government’s recent welfare retrenchment for 
future pensioners? This question is especially relevant to women, whose life 
expectancy is longer while their lifetime earnings are generally lower than men. 
Issues of ageing are indeed women’s issues.
Changing families
Lower pension benefits, or lower individual incomes in general, do not necessarily 
mean economic hardship for the recipients. Lower individual incomes can be 
supplemented by the pooling and sharing of incomes within the household. While 
this basic unit is usually understood as a couple in the West, in the case of Japan, 
where the multi-generational living arrangement has not been uncommon, the picture 
can be more complicated. In Japan, families of descending line have been playing an 
important role as a buffer against the risks associated with old age such as low
6 See Chapter 6 for details o f older people’s economic situations.
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incomes. Research suggests a strong link between older people’s incomes and their 
living arrangements. The lower their own or their spouse’s incomes are, the more 
they are likely to live with their adult children (Fukawa 2000; Funaoka and Ayusawa 
2000).
However, the situation of household structure is fast changing in Japan. The strong 
correlation between living arrangement and income level means that if older people 
can afford to live separately from their children, many people may do so. Moreover, 
the other two major factors which affect the decision on living arrangements -  norms 
on family obligations and care needs (ibid.) -  are also fast changing to facilitate 
separate living. The government survey shows that, in 1981, about 59 per cent of 
people aged 65 and over thought it preferable to live with their adult children and 
grandchildren, while the equivalent rate declined to 35 per cent by 2005 (Japan 
Cabinet Office 2007b: 24). The positive attitudes towards separate living may be 
further encouraged by the introduction of long-term care insurance in 2000.
Against this backdrop, the proportion of multi-generational households is decreasing, 
while that of couple households is on the increase. Figure 1.1 shows the trend in 
living arrangements for those aged 65 and over since 1980. In 1980, about half of 
the households with older person(s) were multi-generational households. However, 
by 2005, the proportion declined to 21.3 per cent. On the other hand, the proportion 
of those who lived only with their spouse significantly increased. Between 1980 and 
2005, the proportion of couple households in which either one or both of them were 
aged 65 and over increased from 16.2 per cent to 29.2 per cent. Moreover, the solo- 
living of older persons is also fast increasing. In 1980, 10.7 per cent of households 
with elderly were single households. By 2005, the proportion rose to 22 per cent.
Figure I. 1 The proportion of types of households with those aged 65 and over
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These changes have significant gender implications. Given the generally longer life 
expectancy o f  women, households consisting o f an elderly couple are likely to 
become households o f a widow who lives alone. Whether elderly widows would 
eventually move to their child’s household or remain as a single household is an 
empirical question out o f the remit o f this thesis. At least, the available statistics 
show the significant increase in the number o f elderly women who live alone. In 
1980, 11.2 per cent o f older women (about 0.7 million women) lived alone, while the 
equivalent proportion in 2005 was 19 per cent (about 2.8 million women) (Japan 
Cabinet Office 2007b: 25)7. Moreover, against a background of increase in divorce 
and non-marriage, the number o f women who would find themselves living alone in 
old age is expected to increase.
Out o f choice or otherwise, older women who live alone are often in the lowest 
income group in Japan as will be seen in Chapter 6. Whether today’s younger
7 The equivalent proportions o f  men were 4.3 per cent (0.2 million men) in 1980 and 9.7 per cent (1.1 
million men) in 2005.
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women are likely to experience disadvantaged economic status in old age like 
today’s female pensioners is a grossly neglected question.
Gender inequality in paid work
The level of earnings and the status in the labour market have significant 
implications for the economic welfare in old age in Japan (Seike and Yamada 1998). 
This section looks at changes and continuities in the situations of Japanese women’s 
paid work. Where relevant, the situations in Japan are compared with other major
o
OECD countries, but especially with Britain and Germany , in order to depict a 
relative picture.
Despite the recent increase in female paid employment, there is still a significant 
difference between women and men in the labour market participation rate. In 2005, 
65 per cent of Japanese women aged between 15 and 64 were in the labour market, 
while the equivalent rate for Japanese men was 92 per cent (OECD 2006). Although 
this gender gap has been narrowing since the late 1970s, the change is much slower 
in Japan than in other major OECD countries, including Britain and Germany. As 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates, the gender gap in the labour force participation rate in 
Britain and Germany was much larger than in Japan until the mid-1970s. However, 
by 2005, the gender difference in the former two narrowed to less than 15 percentage 
points. This rapid change in Britain and Germany was partly due to the declining 
male employment rates. While the increase in female participation rate in these two 
countries was indeed significant9, the decrease in male rate was equally substantial.
* For the rationale for the choice of Britain and Germany as a reference point, see Chapter 2.
’Caution should be employed to interpret these statistics. As regional differences cannot be captured 
by national level statistics, discussions on the dominant gender model in Germany are especially 
difficult after the unification due to the significant difference in the norms on female labour.
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In contrast, Japanese m en’s participation rate remained relatively constant for the last 
four decades, and by 2005, it became the highest of the three. As a result, although 
female participation rate in the three countries became more or less similar, the 
gender gap in Japan became the largest of the three countries. Considering the 
relative stability o f the male participation rate and the slower increase in female rate 
in Japan, the relatively wide gender gap in the labour market participation rate is 
likely to persist for some time in the future in the country.
Figure I. 2 Labour force participation as percentage of population aged 15-64
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Source: OECD (2006) Labour Force Statistics
Moreover, the largest rise in the female labour market participation in the past three 
decades is to be observed in part-time employment. In 2005, 42 per cent of female 
employees in Japan worked part-time, while the equivalent rate was 40 per cent both 
in Britain and in Germany10 (OECD 2006). Although the number o f male part-time
10 Part-time work is defined as work less than 30 hours per week for Britain and Germany, and less 
than 35 hours for Japan.
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workers is also on the increase, the proportion is much lower. In the same year, 14 
per cent of male employees worked part-time in Japan, while 10 per cent and 7 per 
cent did so in Britain and in Germany respectively (ibid.).
Another gender difference in working patterns is disruption of careers. Being often a 
main carer, many women have to compromise their position in the labour market in 
order to fulfil their care responsibilities. This manifests itself not only in the lower 
female labour market participation rate and atypical working hours but also in gender 
differences in working patterns over lifetime. More women than men disrupt their 
career for care-related reasons. Figure 1.3 shows the changes over time in the labour 
market participation rate of women by age in Japan. With all years, the overall curve 
forms an M-shape with the rate dropping sharply in a narrow age group in the mid­
life. This implies that many Japanese women withdraw from the labour market at 
their marriage or childbirth, and re-enter the labour market after their children have 
grown older. While the participation rate of the lowest point in mid-life years is 
gradually rising, the M-curve is still noticeable.
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Figure I. 3 Female Labour M arket Participation Rate, Japan
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Source: MIC (2001) Labour Force Statistics
This kind of employment pattern is not particular to Japanese women. Indeed, 
women in Britain and then West Germany, for example, also had M-shaped working 
patterns until the 1990s. However, by the mid-1990s, they started showing 
continuous employment patterns similar to men’s11. As o f 2006, Japan remains to be 
one o f the few advanced economies in which women’s participation rate by age 
shows an M-shaped pattern.
The effects o f disrupted career can also be seen in women’s generally shorter job 
tenure. Although the average tenure o f female employees is on the gradual increase
11 As those on maternity and parental leaves are treated as part o f  the labour force, the national 
differences in the length o f  leaves could affect women’s participation rate during the childbearing and 
childrearing period. However, these periods are also treated as qualifying period for pension 
calculation purposes in many public pension systems. Thus, it should not be a problem to take the 
rates at face value for the purpose o f the discussion here.
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in Japan, this is also true with male employees, thus, the gender gap remains. In 
2005, the average tenure of full-time female workers was 9.8 years, while that of 
men was 14.2 years (MHLW 2006). Another survey showed that, in the mid-1990s, 
less than 5 per cent of female employees in their 40s had worked in a same company 
since they had started as graduate recruits, while more than one third of male 
counterparts had done so (Economic Planning Agency 1997).
Once having left the labour market, it is often quite difficult for middle-aged women 
to re-enter it on a full-time basis. In 2005, of mothers who returned to the labour 
market with children aged between 4 and 5, more than a quarter had originally hoped 
to get a full-time job. However, only half of them successfully found one (Japan 
Cabinet Office 2006: 23). Looking from the demand side, most companies in Japan, 
especially large ones, prefer recruiting graduates fresh from schools for full-time 
positions. Even companies which recruit those in mid-career tend to be reluctant to 
hire on a full-time basis mothers who have been absent from the labour market for a 
period. According to a survey in 2000, only 19 per cent of companies which 
recruited people of mid-career for full-time positions employed mothers who 
interrupted careers for childrearing (ibid: 25). As a result, many female returnees to 
the labour market take up part-time jobs.
These gender differences in working patterns have significant implications for the 
gender gap in wages. Firstly, shorter job tenure often results in lower job positions 
and lower pay in Japan (Koike 2005). In 2005, only 10 per cent of managerial 
positions were taken by women in Japan (Japan Cabinet Office 2006). Moreover, 
women’s average shorter job tenure has a considerable negative effect on their pay. 
According to the estimate by the government in the mid-1990s, women who
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withdraw from the labour market for five years between age 27 and 32 would reduce 
their lifetime earnings by 27 per cent. If the returnees work part-time and adjust their 
annual earnings in order to keep their status as dependants of their husband for the 
coverage of social security and other benefits12, the loss reaches as high as 78 per 
cent (Economic Planning Agency 1997).
Secondly, part-time workers are generally paid lower wages than regular full-time 
employees. Indeed, in Japan, the distinction between part-time workers and regular 
workers is often due to the difference in job security and remunerations rather than 
working hours or job content (Bishop 2000). In 2005, the hourly wage of female 
part-time workers was 46 per cent of full-time male workers13 (Japan Cabinet Office 
2006). The pay gap is more significant in annual earnings. In 2006, part-time 
female employees earned only 20 per cent of full-time male employees (MHLW 
2006).
In addition to these factors, there are also other possible causes for the gender pay 
gap in Japan. One is a well-known phenomenon across countries: horizontal 
segregation. Women are more likely to be found in lower paying industries. Other 
factors are more relevant in the employment practices in Japan such as company 
sizes and fringe benefits. In Japan, wage levels and the scope of fringe benefits are 
significantly different across different scales of companies (Tachibanaki 1996). 
Generally, employees in large companies enjoy higher wages and more generous 
fringe benefits than those in small or medium-sized companies. Women are more 
likely to be found in smaller-sized companies. Moreover, fringe benefits such as
12 The earning level used in this simulation was 1 million yen.
13 The average wage for male part-time workers was 53 per cent o f the full-time male workers in the 
same year.
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dependant allowances and housing allowances, which constitute a significant part of 
the total salary (Peng 2000: 107; Tachibanaki 1996), are often paid only to male 
employees on the assumption that they are the breadwinner in a household. In the 
case of part-time workers, of which women are the majority, they are usually 
excluded from these benefits because of their employment status.
These factors combined, the average hourly earnings of full-time female employees 
in Japan was only 65 per cent of male equivalents in 2001 (Davies 2003). This 
gender gap is much wider than other major OECD countries. For example, full-time 
female employees’ average earning was 74 per cent of men’s in Germany (in 
manufacturing) and 82 per cent in Britain in 2001 (ibid.). Moreover, gender 
inequality is generally much wider in respect of annual earnings than hourly wages in 
Japan, where annual bonuses usually amount to several-months worth of salary. In 
2006, the average annual earnings of full-time female employees in Japan were 62 
per cent of full-time male employees’ earnings (MHLW 2006).
While the above contributing factors to the gender wage gap in Japan could be 
argued as the gender neutral results of women’s choices in the labour market as well 
as their abilities as human resources, research also suggests the effects of rigid 
gender assumptions and persisting discrimination against women (Tachibanaki 1996: 
170-199). Moreover, in many cases, women’s choices in the labour market are 
arguably constrained ones, especially with regard to the disruption of careers and 
working hours. Various surveys suggest that if conditions allowed, many women 
would continue employment and/ or work full-time (see below). One of the major 
factors for this disparity between preference and reality is unpaid work as the 
following section demonstrates.
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Gender inequality in unpaid work
Despite the significant advancement of gender equality movements and policy 
developments, women across countries still spend longer hours on unpaid work than 
men within a household. Although men’s absence from unpaid work is increasingly 
problematised with the rise in women’s paid employment, inequality in unpaid work 
has been slower to change than that in paid work.
This is certainly the case in Japan. While the number of people who subscribe to the 
rigid male breadwinner/ female homemaker model is decreasing, there are still many 
people who support the model. In an opinion poll in 2004, while 49 per cent of the 
people surveyed strongly or relatively disagreed with the statement that ‘men should 
work outside and women should stay at home’, 45 per cent of the people strongly or 
relatively agreed (Japan Cabinet Office 2004a). Among the respondents, more men 
than women agreed with this gender division of labour. About half of the male 
respondents agreed with the statement compared with 41 per cent of female 
counterparts (ibid). Moreover, men’s disagreement with the statement did not 
necessarily mean their willingness to shoulder the share of unpaid work. According 
to a survey in 1997, more than half of the husbands in dual-earner couples replied 
that they were not prepared to do household chores, while half of their female 
counterparts said the household chores should be equally divided within a couple 
(Economic Planning Agency 1997).
The actual division of labour within a household reflects these at best lukewarm
attitudes of men towards sharing unpaid work. In 2001, the average share of men’s
unpaid work measured by time was almost similar between male-breadwinner
households and dual-earner households; about 30 minutes per day (Japan Cabinet
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Office 2006: 65). On the other hand, in the same year, the time spent on unpaid 
work by employed wives (both full-time and part-time) and non-employed wives was 
4.2 hours and 7 hours respectively. Furthermore, the time men spent for unpaid work 
did not change much for more than three decades. In 1970, employed men spent 26 
minutes for unpaid work on weekdays (Economic Planning Agency 1997). This 
continued absence of men from unpaid work is in a stark contrast with the increased 
presence of women in paid work. With continuing unfair distribution of unpaid work 
within the household, employed women are significantly overworked.
International comparison demonstrates that the time Japanese men spend for unpaid 
work is one o f the shortest among major OECD countries (see Figure 1.4). While 
men in all the five countries spent much shorter time than their wives for unpaid 
work, the extent was more extreme in Japan than in other countries.
Figure I. 4 Time spent on paid and unpaid work by men in couple households 
with children under 5, Average hours per day
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The shorter time spent by Japanese men on unpaid work is often explained by their 
physical absence from home. Their working hours and commuting time are 
notoriously long among major advanced economies. Especially, male employees in 
their 30s generally work the longest hours. In 2005, they worked about 50 hours per 
week on average (Japan Cabinet Office 2006: 12)14. The proportion of male 
employees whose average weekly working hours exceed 60 hours is also the highest 
in this age group; about 23 per cent (ibid.). If the commuting time is combined, the 
time left for unpaid work is indeed limited. Also, general corporate culture strongly 
discourages employees from taking paid holidays and leaves, even if it is a statutory 
right. Moreover, long-distance transfers which would necessitate relocation are not 
uncommon among Japanese companies.
However, this is in a way made possible by the (assumed) provision of unpaid work 
by women in the household (Osawa 1993). With the influx of women in the labour 
market and the introduction of new care-related laws in the 1990, businesses began 
introducing some family friendly policies and working arrangements. However, the 
corporate culture has been slow to change. Moreover, family friendly policies alone 
do not challenge the norms on women’s role in care work. Reflecting the persisting 
gender norms which allocate main care responsibilities to women, there is a 
significant gender gap in the usage of parental and care leaves. In 2005, 98 per cent 
of employees who took parental leave were women. Moreover, among employees 
who became parents in the surveyed year, 72.3 per cent of female workers took 
parental leave, while only 0.5 per cent of male counterparts did so (MHLW 2005a). 
Although the rate of male workers who take the leave is on the gradual increase, the
14 The figure excludes commuting time.
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low replacement rate of cash benefits (40 per cent of the salary) as well as the 
inflexibility of the leave (only one parent can take the leave and not interchangeable 
between the parents) make it more economical for a couple to choose wives to take 
the leave, given the general gender gap in wages.
Against this backdrop, despite the rise in the proportion of married female employees 
in the labour market, the participation rate of mothers with young children has not 
changed much throughout the 1990s. In 1992, the labour market participation rate of 
married women aged between 25 and 49 with children under 3 was 32 per cent, 
while the percentage in 2002 was 30 per cent (Japan Cabinet Office 2006: 9). These 
rates were about half of those for married women in the same age group without 
children. Indeed, many women still cite care responsibilities as the main reason for 
resigning jobs. In 2003, 76 per cent of previously employed mothers with pre-school 
children cited child care and other home responsibilities as the main reason for their 
resignation, about one third of whom suggested they would have continued 
employment if circumstances had allowed (ibid: 9). In 2003, only 23 per cent of 
mothers remained employed throughout their pregnancy and the first year and half 
after the childbirth (MHLW 2003).
Care work assumed mainly by women is not only for children. This is especially the 
case in Japan. Although the situation is changing, social norms oblige married 
women to give direct care for their parents-in-law, especially if their husband is an 
eldest son (Someya 2000). As leaving the care for ageing parents (-in-law) to social 
services is often frowned upon, the care provided by these women is quite intensive 
and intimate in nature. Moreover, as the three-generational households are not 
uncommon, many married women live with their parents-in-law, giving
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uninterrupted care. Although this household type is decreasing, daughters-in-law are 
still the primary carers. In the mid-1990, 33.4 per cent of the bed-ridden elderly 
were cared for mainly by the spouse of the child (most likely daughters-in-law) 
compared with 27.9 per cent by the spouse and 20.6 per cent by the adult children 
(MHW 1996).
With the population ageing, however, how to finance and provide long-term care for 
the growing number of the elderly with diversifying needs became an urgent political 
issue. Since the late 1980s, but especially in the 1990s, socialization of care for the 
elderly progressed rather rapidly. Both domiciliary care services and institutional 
care facilities were significantly expanded under the inter-ministerial long-term plans 
(the Gold Plans in 1989, 1994 and 1999), and access to these services became 
ensured as citizens’ rights rather than being at the state’s discretion with the 
enactment of the Long-Term Care Insurance Law in 1997 (enforced in 2000). 
Statutory care leave was also introduced in 1995 (enforced in 1999), which entitled 
employees to a leave to care for their families for up to three months with cash 
benefit of 40 per cent of ones’ previous earnings. Behind these moves towards the 
socialisation of care was the widely publicised plight of carers and the cared for and 
gradual awareness that similar situations could be found close to home15.
Nonetheless, long-established norms on gender and intergenerational relations are 
slow to change in reality. In 2004, 66 per cent of the principal carers were the family 
members who lived in the same household, and only 14 per cent were professional 
carers. Among these live-in family carers, 24.7 per cent were the spouse, 20.3 per
15 One of the early and most influential was a novel by Ariyoshi, Sawako. 1972. Kokotsu no Hito. 
Tokyo: Shincho sha. In this novel, Arisawa depicted a working wife who had to care for her father- 
in-law with dementia (in English translated version ‘The Twilight Years’).
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cent were the spouse of the child (most likely daughters-in-law) and 18.8 per cent 
were the child (Japan Cabinet Office 2006: 70-72). It remains to be seen to what 
extent the new legislative developments will defamilialise the care for the frail 
elderly.
Despite the significant contribution made by women through their unpaid work, it is 
not reflected in the ‘contribution-based’ pension system in Japan. On the contrary, 
those who take the main responsibilities for care work are penalised by lower 
pension benefits in their own right or by the precariousness of their entitlement as 
dependants.
The structure of thesis
This thesis is comprised of four parts. Part 1 (Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2) 
introduces the research and its key concepts, locates the research within a broader 
theoretical framework and introduces the method to be used. Chapter 1 reviews the 
existing literature on the role of ideas on policy making and on the relations between 
welfare states, families and women. In Chapter 2, the research questions are 
identified and an analytical framework for the research is developed. This is 
followed by the description of the data and method utilised and the explanation of 
reasons for the choice of these data and method. In Part 2 (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), the 
development of old-age pensions for women in Japan is examined with a focus on 
the debates on equality and fairness as well as on rights and obligations for welfare 
provision. In Part 3 (Chapters 6 and 7), the actual and simulated economic situations 
of women in old age are examined with several criteria and the pension reforms are 
evaluated from a gender equality perspective. Part 4 (Chapter 8) summarises the
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findings and contributions of the research and presents the conclusion and 
discussions.
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Chapter 1 Gender Equality and Women’s Social Citizenship
The role of the state in welfare provision has been constantly redefined, reflecting 
and affecting the definition of the role of the market, civil society and the family. In 
a way, state welfare is based on the changing assumptions and norms about the roles 
of individuals in various spheres of a society. Yet, individuals do not benefit from 
state welfare in the same way to the same degree. On the contrary, resources are 
often distributed to them unequally. This necessitates another ingredient of state 
welfare, namely, legitimacy of the recipients’ eligibility. In a democratic society, 
where individuals are understood as fundamentally of equal worth in principle, this 
should be based on the common belief that beneficiaries of the state welfare deserve 
what they are receiving, that is, fairness.
The other side of this coin, however, is that once a system is accepted as fair, certain 
inequalities can be regarded as legitimate. For example, the difference in the level of 
unemployment benefits between recipients can be legitimised when the inequality is 
presented as a fair result of differential levels and period of past contributions of the 
unemployed under a social insurance system. On the other hand, the difference in 
the level of benefits can be challenged by those who emphasise equality in economic 
security guaranteed by the state during unemployment. Yet, an equal level of 
benefits regardless of the level of past contribution can be criticised as unfair or as 
unequal in the level of contributions. As this example illustrates, the legitimacy of 
certain ways of redistribution can be constantly under challenge from competing and 
conflicting claims for different kinds of ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’. As a result, 
discourses of equality and fairness abound in most reforms in state welfare systems.
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This point is certainly true of various pension reforms in Japan. Since its inception, 
the Japanese pension system has gone through a series of reforms under the banner 
of equality and fairness, be it between occupations, households, generations, or paid 
and unpaid workers. However, the content of rights and the definition of equality are 
constantly contested and compromised by ideas such as obligations and difference.
In this chapter, these related but sometimes competing concepts are considered from 
a viewpoint of women’s social citizenship rights. The main focus is the concept of 
gender equality and its application to women’s access to state welfare. First, the 
chapter briefly reviews recent emphasis on discourses in the analysis of welfare 
reforms to provide the theoretical background of the thesis. This is followed by an 
overview of debates on social citizenship. Especially, this section looks at various 
meanings of gender equality and women’s citizenship. The final section reviews 
feminist literature on state welfare with a focus on Japan. Drawing on the insights of 
feminist literature on social citizenship and welfare states, this section offers a 
critical appraisal of the existing literature on public pensions in Japan and presents 
the rationale for this study.
1.1 Ideas, discourses and policy changes
A growing body of literature on welfare reforms points to the central role played by
ideas and discourses in policy-making processes and policy outcomes. Policy
problems are understood not as something to be identified by reform-minded policy
makers but as issues discursively constructed as such (Bacchi 1999; Fraser 1989;
Gusfield 1981). Moreover, once certain ways of problematisation become dominant,
reform proposals on the issues are more likely to be framed in that context,
constituting policy paradigms (Hall 1993) or cognitive locks (Blyth 2001). Thus, a
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set of ideas and discourse serves as a framework for constructing certain situations as 
problems as well as for determining conceivable policies to respond to the situations.
With this insight, discourse analysis has become an important research approach to 
understand changes and continuities among welfare states. Among the studies which 
take this approach, two broad strands are noticeable, resulting from differential 
emphasis on the role of discourses. In one of the strands, discourse analysis is 
situated as a complement to institutional accounts or interest-based analyses of policy 
making by incorporating a hitherto marginalised factor of ‘legitimacy’ (for example, 
Beland 2005; Cox 1998; 2001; Schmidt 2001). In these studies, discourses are 
equated with rhetorical strategies consciously deployed by political actors to frame 
issues in such a way to legitimise their version of reforms. In this sense, claims to 
greater equality and fairness -  two often employed concepts in welfare proposals -  
may well be understood as weapons of political actors in distributional struggles 
(Blyth 2001) rather than as attempts to enhance the democratic ideal.
On the other hand, other studies draw attention to power relations embedded in 
discourses on policy problems (for example, Bacchi 2004; Bacchi 1999; Fraser 1989). 
Rather than seeing the dominance of certain problem representation as a success of 
certain political actors, these studies question which power relations are challenged 
and which are left intact in the problematisation. At the basis of these questions is 
the understanding that no discourses on policy problems can exist independent of 
existing discourses of social institutions such as the family, the law, the capitalist 
economy to name but a few. With this understanding, those in this position express 
their scepticism about the ease with which people can ‘choose’ discourses according 
to their political interests. According to them, it is difficult for individuals, who are
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located in existing institutions in one way or the other, to perceive and challenge the 
embedded power relations which are legitimised and obscured by the dominant 
discourses of these institutions (ibid.). Indeed, political compromises between 
proponents and opponents of certain policy proposals may be possible because both 
sides accept certain prevailing power relations as given (Bacchi 2004). Nonetheless, 
many theorists of this strand still believe the possibilities of contestations, pointing 
out the multiplicity and incoherency of any discourses (Bacchi 2004; 1999). In this 
sense, demands for greater equality and fairness need careful analysis of their 
implications for the existing power relations.
These differences in the two strands have significant implications for the question of
why some ways of problematisation prevail as ‘legitimate’ while others do not, one
of the key questions of the research presented here. Studies which view discourses
as rhetorical strategies suggest th at ce rtain ways of problematisation succeed in
prevailing because they are conducive to dominant norms and principles in the
society (Cox 2001). Others also argue that new ideas are accepted only after being
adjusted to compromise with the prevailing norms and principles (Elgstrom 2000).
However, when norms and principles are understood as another set of discourses
which legitimise certain power relations in the society, the above suggestions raise
questions about the extent to which newly introduced reforms can challenge the
existing power relations. If introduced reforms are based on the already prevailing
frameworks of meaning embedded in ‘norms and principles,’ are they not merely a
status quo with a new guise? Or, can incremental changes bring eventual
transformation of power relations as they can apparently change distributional
balance (Streeck and Thelen 2005)? Focused mainly on the ‘intellectual path
dependency’ (Blyth 2001) and rhetorical analysis, however, these studies do not
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explicitly examine the possibilities of changes and continuities in the power relations 
unless they are directly challenged by political actors.
In contrast, for the studies which are focused on power relations embedded in 
discourses, unravelling taken-for-granted assumptions in reform proposals is as 
important as examining explicitly made political challenges because that is where 
power relations reside without being questioned (Bacchi 2004; 1999; Fraser 1989; 
Miller 1993). This is true of the well-established democratic ideal such as equality 
among citizens. While equality is one of the most often cited principles in welfare 
reforms, certain inequalities are usually left unsolved or unproblematised in reforms. 
Furthermore, reforms introduced in the name of certain equality are not necessarily 
empowering for the targeted disadvantaged groups (see, for example, Bacchi 2004). 
According to this strand of analysis, this may be because newly introduced reforms 
are based on certain assumptions which endorse and reproduce the very power 
relations the reforms purport to challenge.
Concerned with neglected dimensions of gender inequality in pension reforms in 
Japan, the thesis takes an approach closer to the latter group of research. Before 
turning to the research design of this study, its key concepts -  equality and social 
citizenship rights -  are examined in the next two sections.
1.2 State welfare and women’s social citizenship
Since T.H. Marshall (1950) theorized the welfare state in terms of the development 
of citizenship rights, the concept of social rights has become a cornerstone of welfare
thstate analysis. According to Marshall, with the attainment of social rights in the 20 
century, citizens’ civil and political rights are not only protected but also
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substantiated (ibid.). While his evolutionary view of citizenship rights and optimistic 
understanding of state welfare have been widely critiqued (for example, Fraser and 
Gordon 1998), the concept of social rights is still useful in the analysis of the welfare 
state. This is because the idea of social rights has gained real currency in the 20th 
century, based on the firm belief in fundamental equality among members of a 
society (Pierson 1998: 33). Indeed, the concept of social rights historically provided 
powerful ammunitions to argue for the redistribution of resources through the state to 
redress social, economic and political inequality not only of class but also of many 
other forms of subordination.
However, it is problematic to celebrate state welfare simply as a manifestation of the 
advancement of citizenship rights. This is firstly because citizenship is about 
exclusion as much as about inclusion16. Defining the access to certain state welfare 
as citizenship rights entails questions who are eligible citizens, and offers legitimacy 
for the exclusion of other social groups. Thus, once certain social groups are 
accepted as different from fully-fledged citizens because of their certain attributes, 
the former are no longer considered to be eligible for equal rights guaranteed to 
citizens. While this point is easy to recognise with ‘foreigners’ within a country, this 
is also relevant to those whose nationality is of the country they live in but are 
considered to be different because of their sex, age, disability, ‘race’ or ethnicity to 
name but a few.
Secondly, the nature of social rights is not a pre-determined end state but a constantly 
contested one (Barbalet 1988; Pierson 1998: 34; Turner 1986). As citizens are not a 
monolithic group and their interests are diversely formulated, citizens of various
16 See Chapter 2 in Lister (1997) for a concise review on this dual dimensions o f the concept.
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social groups are in effect constantly competing with each other to legitimise their 
claims to resources as citizenship rights. Research also implies the vulnerability of 
citizens’ entitlements to state welfare based on needs instead of rights (Nelson 1990). 
Theorising the politicisation of claims to state welfare as struggles over the definition 
of needs, Fraser suggests the importance of establishing justified needs as social 
rights (Fraser 1989: 183). Far from being uniform and static, therefore, the concept 
of social rights is both diverse and fluid.
Lastly, the definition of social rights is not free from prevailing discourses of the 
existing institutions in a society. Claims to state welfare are inevitably brought 
forward based on various assumptions on the role of the state, the family and the 
market, whether to challenge them or to endorse them. Moreover, this is a bi­
directional process. While these assumptions help to legitimise certain welfare 
systems and policies, these systems and policies in turn define the meaning of social 
rights. Indeed, welfare reforms in many countries have been pursued resulting in and 
from the changing meaning of social citizenship (Cox 1998). Thus, what are 
considered to be as legitimate social rights are intrinsically bound up with social 
relations, and power relations within it, of a society.
These points suggest two issues. One is the importance of the context in which 
particular state welfare systems emerge. The definitions of rights and obligations of 
citizens differ over time and place, responding to ideology, historical legacy and the 
social struggle fought by various social groups in a given society, resulting in the 
diversity of welfare states (Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990; Myles 1984). 
This manifests itself in the cross-national differences in views with regard to what is 
the basis of the public provision (individual entitlement/ solidarity), to what extent
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the state should provide (social minimum/ income maintenance) or to whom benefits 
and services should be provided (targeting/ universality). These views are reflected 
in turn in the bases of entitlement such as needs, contribution, marriage or residence. 
Where the system takes a contribution principle, this inevitably lead to the judgement 
of what is considered to be contribution and who should contribute.
The other issue implied by the above three points is that state welfare is another form 
of legitimised unequal distribution of resources among citizens. If the legitimacy for 
the inequality in the market is merit, that for differential levels of resources from the 
state is contributions and/or needs defined by set criteria. The state distributes 
resources according to the set criteria in the name of social citizenship, but the levels 
of allocated resources are usually differentiated among individuals. Indeed, the 
objectives of resource distribution by the state are usually not sameness in the levels 
of resources available to individuals in a society, even when the notion of equality is 
invoked. In order to understand this legitimation, the paired concept of rights -  
namely, obligations -  is useful. Citizenship rights are often understood to entail 
citizenship obligations17. Thus, claims to state welfare without fulfilling perceived 
obligations often fail to legitimatise themselves as social rights or even fail to form 
themselves. As both rights and obligations are bound up with prevailing norms and 
principles, they are not free from power relations of a society any more than is state 
welfare.
The dynamic nature as well as socio-historic specificity of state welfare is well 
captured by various cross-national comparisons and historical accounts of welfare 
states (for example, Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990; Myles 1984). However,
17 For a brief review on the relationship between the two, see Lister (1997: 20-22).
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many of these studies are focused on only one of many power relations -  class -  and 
try to explain changes over time and cross-national diversity in the scope and design 
of state welfare in terms of political struggles by labour. The sole focus on class 
often results in lack of questioning of the assumption that paid employment should 
be the base of the entitlement for rights-based state welfare. Ignored in these 
accounts are those who are often marginalised in paid employment such as women, 
the elderly, the disabled or ethnic minorities. Analyses sensitive to these factors 
paint a different picture of state welfare and social rights as demonstrated by 
feminists’ analyses of social citizenship.
1.2.1 Women’s exclusion and inclusion
Fundamental equality among citizens is perceived as one of the most 
unchallengeable principles in democratic societies. Yet, it is long acknowledged that 
women are excluded as full citizens in both theory and practice (Lister 1997). In 
many societies, women attained their civil, political and social rights at different 
times and in different forms from those of men. Indeed, the concept of citizenship 
itself has developed while grossly neglecting women’s experience. Although 
women’s rights and obligations as citizens have been differently defined from those 
of men in many societies, classic theories about citizenship either ignored the 
differential treatment of women or rationalised it. In his early work on citizenship 
development, Marshall (1950) did not take account of the distinct path women’s 
citizenship had followed. Women were simply non-existent in his theory. On the 
other hand, when women appeared in a citizenship theory at all, they tended to be 
considered in terms of their particularity. Hegel believed that women could not be 
independent citizens in the same way as men. In his view, women ‘naturally’
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belonged to the sphere of the family, which required attributes and principles 
different from those of civil and political spheres. Thus, he argued, women should 
be incorporated into a society as members of the family, which was headed by a male 
citizen (cited in Pateman 1988).
Women’s exclusion, however, needs to be understood in the light of their differential 
inclusion in practice. Pateman (1988; 1992) suggests that women are both excluded 
and included on the same basis, that is, motherhood. Women are excluded as 
citizens because the attributes associated with motherhood, namely, caring and 
nurturing, run counter to the image of a citizen as an autonomous economic and 
political being or a soldier. On the other hand, women’s contribution to a society is 
valued in terms of these maternal virtues. Thus, women are included as mothers who 
also contribute to the society. Indeed, devoting oneself to economic and political 
activity or bearing arms is only possible with the availability of unpaid work in the 
family undertaken by others. Under the modem welfare state, full participation in 
paid employment has become an important citizenship obligation (ibid.). While 
unpaid work often hinders women from fulfilling this condition, and thus 
marginalises them as fully-fledged citizens, it can also lead to their accmal of certain 
entitlements as citizens. To the citizenship tradition, therefore, women’s exclusion 
and special inclusion has been a necessity rather than an underdeveloped phase of the 
concept (Fraser and Gordon 1998; Lister 1997; Pateman 1988; 1992).
Women’s contributions through motherhood are, however, often not counted as of 
equal value of contributions through paid employment, leaving women with lesser 
citizenship rights as dependants of male citizens. Thus, the problem with women’s 
citizenship is not simple exclusion as earlier liberal feminists assumed, but the male-
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oriented nature of the concept, which is based on the opposite of what women 
represent -  namely, the private sphere, motherhood and care (Pateman 1988). Unless 
the traditional meaning of citizenship is challenged, the mere extension of the 
concept to women can only confirm women’s second-class citizenship, demanding 
them to become like men, and denying their experience and difference. Thus, 
women have had to fight not only for their full citizenship rights but also for the 
transformation of the meaning of citizenship itself.
In the quest for a more inclusive concept of citizenship, the meaning of being a
citizen has been re-examined. If the image of citizens based on dichotomous values
of the genders is something to be denied, what value still remains for the image of
citizens regardless of their sex? Feminists’ answers vary, but one of the most
recurrent values is autonomy. Women’s constrained autonomy has been long
pointed out as evidence of women’s second-class citizenship. Indeed, women’s
economic independence has long been the focal point of feminist movements
because it is regarded as the key element for the existence or the exercise of an
autonomous voice (Hobson 1990; Orloff 1993). Moreover, in the attempt to
substantiate women’s autonomy, the concept of autonomy itself is being
reinterpreted to include gender-sensitive rights. Most feminists now agree that rights
to physical independence should include bodily integrity such as reproductive rights
(Shaver 1993/4). Related to the tension between interdependence and independence
in care relationships, Susan James (1992) argues for emotional independence and the
importance of enhancing women’s self-esteem. Yet other feminists focus on time as
a resource, and problematise the unequal allocation and rewards of time usage
between women and men (Bryson, Bittman, and Donath 1994; Scheiwe 1994).
Against a backdrop of growing demand for the reconciliation of paid work and
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unpaid activities, the allocation of time for certain activities between citizens and 
across one’s life-course is becoming one of the key issues. Introducing various 
embryonic attempts and policy proposals in welfare states, Bussemaker (1999) 
argues for time-autonomy as citizenship rights.
These attempts to incorporate new dimensions of citizenship rights can be 
understood as a manifestation of continuing belief in the potential of the concept of 
citizenship to enhance the ideal of equality among citizens. However, equality 
between women and men itself is not straightforward as will be explored in the next 
section.
1.2.2 Equality between women and men
Most feminists now reject assimilation into the male image of citizens as a route to 
gender equality. However, how to conceive equality and difference between women 
and men has been a heated debate. The tension between equality and difference has 
sometimes been interpreted dichotomously, forcing women to choose one or the 
other route to full citizenship. Although, at least in theory, the dominant feminist 
claims have been for both equality and difference (Bock and James 1992), 
differences in the emphasis can lead to conflicting approaches and strategies in 
practice, such as maternity protection versus equal treatment at a workplace.
Shared demands for women’s full citizenship notwithstanding, feminists differ 
widely in their visions and approaches to full citizenship. Although feminists’ 
positions regarding women’s citizenship are diverse, it is still helpful to categorise 
them into three strands in order to grasp an overall picture. One strand of the 
arguments is that women be valued for their difference from men. The proponents,
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whom Dietz (1987) calls matemalists, believe that the revaluation of motherhood is
i
the key for women’s citizenship. It is argued that qualities associated with 
motherhood and women are intrinsically of equal value with those associated with 
traditional citizenship and men. Thus, the problem is undervaluing of ‘female’ 
attributes, and stratification of masculinity and femininity. Some feminists go further, 
and suggest the superiority of ‘female’ attributes and the positive function of 
women’s difference for the public sphere (for example, Elshtain 1998). According to 
them, female attributes, which manifest themselves in ‘maternal thinking’, are of 
superior quality as the basis of a true citizen. Thus, it is argued, women must seek to 
incorporate the maternal thinking into the public sphere and humanise it (ibid.). 
Women’s difference is thus understood as the basis on which equal citizenship is 
formed rather than as a hindrance.
That women should be valued as women, who represent different values and 
functions from men, is not a new argument. Indeed, it can be traced back to very
| L
early feminists. In Britain at the end of the 18 century, for example, Mary 
Wollstonecraft argued for sex equality on the grounds of women’s social role as a 
mother (Pateman 1992). In Japan, ‘motherhood protection debates (bosei hogo
thronsdy erupted at the beginning of the 20 century, in which feminists such as
Hiratsuka Raicho argued that women’s contribution as mothers was equally as
important as men’s contribution in the public sphere and thus it should be explicitly
acknowledged by the state (Mackie 1997: 86-91). In both countries, some suffragists
demanded an equal vote for women on the grounds of the social benefits ‘women’s
distinctive nature and social role’ could bring to the public sphere. Although the
claims of ‘maternal thinking’ being women’s attributes have been vigorously
challenged as ahistorical and being based on false distinction between the public and
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the private (Dietz 1987; Siim 2000), this line of argument has been recurrent since 
then.
On the other hand, another strand of feminists emphasise women’s economic 
independence and equal treatment with men in the public sphere. This position was 
represented by Yosano Akiko in the above debates on motherhood protection in 
Japan. She argued that women’s lives should not be reduced only to motherhood and 
that women should be economically independent without depending on the state or 
on men (Mackie 1997: 86-91). She herself was not only a mother but also a wife, a 
breadwinner, a poet and an activist to name but a few. This position would be shared 
by many feminists today who problematise the gender division of labour. To the 
eyes of feminists in this strand, the arguments of maternal feminists risk the danger 
of perpetuating women’s marginalised position by endorsing the gendered 
boundaries between the public and the private (Dietz 1985). Contrary to matemalists, 
feminists in this strand are generally positive towards deconstructing ‘women’s 
attributes’ and thus are willing to demand measures which would enable women to 
participate in the public sphere on an equal footing with men such as maternity leave 
and childcare services.
As can be seen in these gender specific demands, feminists in this strand do not 
necessarily deny women’s difference from men. Nonetheless, for matemalists who 
argue for equal value of ‘women’s attributes’, the demand for equal treatment of 
women and men risks the danger of women’s assimilation to a male citizen model, 
endorsing ‘male’ value at the cost of the marginalisation of ‘female’ value as a valid 
basis for full citizenship (Elshtain 1998).
This longstanding tension between the two strands is increasingly viewed as an issue 
of gender relations rather than a women’s issue. With women’s influx into the 
labour market together with the equalization of formal rights between women and 
men, questions have been raised about the absence of men in unpaid work. 
Reconsidering citizenship rights and obligations on the basis of gender equity, Fraser 
(1999) suggests that an ideal model of a citizen is the universal caregiver, who 
participates in both paid employment and care-giving. It is now generally 
acknowledged that the gendered division of paid and unpaid work is an issue not 
only for women but also for men.
Arguments based on this recognition are the tenet of the third strand of feminists. 
Those in this position regard equal treatment of women and men as a basic principle 
for equal citizenship. However, their demands also include measures which 
encourage women’s paid work and men’s unpaid work. Thus, from this viewpoint, 
social institutions which are based on the assumptions of the gender division of 
labour are problematic because they explicitly or implicitly reinforce the gendered 
social roles. The goal, therefore, is a gender neutral social system which recognises 
citizens’ rights to and responsibilities for both paid and unpaid work.
Theoretical advancement notwithstanding, this position faces serious dilemmas when 
it encounters with women’s ‘traditional’ entitlements as wives and/or mothers. On 
the one hand, these entitlements are often gender reinforcing, and therefore can be 
understood as the evidence of gender bias in state welfare. On the other hand, they 
can also be regarded as practical measures to mitigate women’s generally lower level 
of benefits by better accommodating women as carers in practice or by compensating 
for women’s marginalisation in a real world which is gender unequal. Some
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examples are maternity leave and derived benefits such as survivor’s pensions and 
old-age pensions for dependent spouses. Moreover, gender neutralisation -  
removing provisions based on the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model -  
does not necessarily provide a consideration of how to narrow inequality in outcome 
between women and men here and now (Sainsbury 1996). Thus, when women’s 
generally disadvantaged position vis-a-vis men in reality is problematised, the 
proposals for redressing measures often go back to arguments on ‘equality (equal 
treatment with men)’ and ‘difference (women’s specific rights)’.
In practice, however, all the three perspectives of equal treatment, women’s rights 
and gender equality are necessary to achieve equality between women and men 
(Booth and Bennett 2002). The question is more about which perspective should be 
applied to a specific case. In the attempt to transcend the impasse, it is useful to 
employ the differentiation of interests proposed by Molyneux (1998). According to 
her, women’s interests can be differentiated between practical and strategic interests. 
Practical interests are formed on the basis of the existing gender relations, while 
strategic interests are formulated from challenging these relations (ibid.).
The practical and strategic interests suggested by Molyneux can be re-formulated as 
dual strategies for short-term and long-term gains respectively. Indeed, considering 
the slow pace of changes in reality, both changes for immediate effects and for future 
better prospects should be considered. Thus, fair shares of access, rights and 
responsibilities in public and private sphere for both women and men can be 
understood as strategic interest of a long term. Even if this strategic interest is 
agreed, it may also be acceptable, and sometimes necessary, to demand civil, 
political and economic resources based on the recognition of women’s role in the
58
private sphere as a short-term practical interest, so that women’s welfare can be 
enhanced even in the existing gender relations.
Nonetheless, the real dilemma of choice between these different interests in actual 
policies remains. This is because women are not a monolithic group, and the extent 
and the forms of disadvantages as women differ between individual women. Indeed, 
gender is not a sole identity which informs individuals’ interest. The class and ‘race’, 
for example, can still be major factors which may diversify interests among women 
in welfare states (Meyer 1996). Moreover, as the next section further explores, the 
perceived interest of full-time housewives and that of full-time working women, for 
example, can be vastly different from each other. This confirms possible diverse and 
conflicting interests among women, which make it difficult to talk about ‘women’s 
interest’ and ‘gender equality’ in a real policy context without reservations.
The next section reviews feminist critiques on state welfare and how these dilemma 
with regard to women’s social citizenship are played out in the context of old-age 
pensions in Japan.
1.3 Women and welfare state
The structural bias for a certain family model in state welfare has long been pointed 
out by feminists. As classic theorists argued, the welfare state may indeed be based 
on class arrangements, but it is also based on gender arrangements, often called 
gender contracts, of which the male-breadwinner model is the dominant model 
across welfare states (Duncan 1995; Land 1994; Lewis 1992; Lister 1992). This 
recognition is part of the achievement of scholars inspired by second-wave feminism. 
While the first-wave feminists demanded women’s equal civil and political rights,
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the second-wave feminists challenged the socially constructed sex roles and their 
stratifying effects despite the attainment of statutory equality in civil and political 
rights. One of the most noticeable differences between the first and the second-wave 
feminism can be found in the attitudes towards the state. In contrast to the earlier 
feminists who regarded the state as more or less a neutral institution and thus 
generally had more optimistic views on the state’s intervention, feminists in the 
1970s onwards often challenged the state as a part of a large system which
1 Rsystematically subordinated women to men .
It is not surprising, therefore, that early attempts to theorize the welfare state from a 
gender perspective were mainly focused on its oppressive nature towards women. 
Criticising the welfare state as a manifestation of interests of both men and capitalists, 
it was argued that state welfare was constructed in such a way that it encouraged a 
particular family form and work arrangement from which men and capitalism 
profited (McIntosh 1978; Pateman 1988; Wilson 1977). In challenging this more 
subtle form of social stratification, the systematic subordination of women to men 
was often termed as patriarchy. In the efforts to theorize patriarchy and the welfare 
state, the effective shift from private patriarchy to public patriarchy was noted 
(Walby 1986; 1990). According to this view, what changed with the advent of the 
welfare state was that women became directly exposed to patriarchal relations in the 
public sphere of the labour market and the state rather than indirectly via the 
patriarchal family.
18 However, the uncritical acceptance of the state as the key player to redress gender inequality by 
liberal feminists was still criticised by some feminists such as Elshtain (1998).
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The notion of a patriarchal welfare state was further encouraged by a series of 
findings on the disadvantaged economic status of women in the welfare state (for 
example, Glendinning and Millar 1992; Goldberg and Kremen 1990). It was argued 
that most of the state welfare schemes were skewed towards the contingencies which 
were more likely to occur in men’s life courses. Some saw this as a two-channel 
welfare system, where most women are covered by social assistance as clients while 
most men are covered by social insurance as rights-holders (Fraser 1989; Nelson 
1990). Although the thesis of the dual welfare system has been criticised for its 
neglect of derived rights as wives and the diversity among welfare states (Sainsbury 
1993), the entitlements in social security systems are indeed stratified, often bringing 
fewer benefits to entitlements as wives or mothers (Sainsbury 1996). According to 
these accounts, state welfare may have changed the way and the extent of women’s 
subordination but not eradicated their subordination itself.
However, the concept of patriarchy received heavy criticisms for being, among 
others, essentialist and ahistorical (for the review of the concept, see Duncan 1995). 
Increased academic interest in cross-national comparisons since the late 1980s 
further encouraged more nuanced views on the relations between women and the 
welfare state. Jane Lewis, for example, suggested that despite the shared norm on 
the gender division of labour, namely the male breadwinner model, the degree of its 
strength differed across countries (Lewis 1992). On the other hand, Theda Skocpol 
demonstrated the differences in the form  of the male breadwinner model manifested 
in state welfare, using the development of mother’s pensions in the US as a case 
study (Skocpol 1992). The growing attention to cross-national diversity also led to 
the increasing interest in the historical context in which various welfare institutions 
developed as well as in the political struggles among diverse social groups for their
claims to welfare resources. Reflecting this trend, more recent attempts to theorize 
the welfare state from a gender perspective try to accommodate better the fluidity 
and diversity of gender relations as well as women’s agency (Connell 1987; Duncan 
1995).
In summary, contributions by feminist scholars have greatly illuminated the gender 
bias embedded in state welfare, which manifests itself in the differential treatment of 
women and men and/or women’s generally lower level of benefits as wage earners in 
the welfare system. While these situations can be commonly observed across 
countries, more diversity-sensitive approaches to the ‘gendering’ of welfare states 
have also exposed differences in the degree and the form of these shared traits among 
welfare states.
In order to see the country-specific context, the following sections focus on the state 
welfare in Japan and review the literature on women’s pensions in the country.
1.3.1 The Japanese welfare state
Analyses of the Japanese welfare state often stress its difference from western 
welfare states. During Japan’s economic success in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
difference was often emphasised in a positive note, interpreting the ‘uniqueness’ of 
the welfare mix in Japan as one of the important factors of its apparent success (for 
example, Nakagawa 1979). In the 1990s, attempts were made to compare Japan in a 
more systematic way with other western welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
1997; Goodman and Peng 1996; Gould 1993; Kwon 1997). Most of these studies 
also concluded that Japan was qualitatively different from other western welfare 
states. Inspired by the seminal work by Esping-Andersen (1990), some even argued
that Japan and other emerging welfare states in East Asia such as South Korea and 
Taiwan should be classified as a separate welfare regime qualitatively different from 
western welfare states (Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1997). These attempts at 
systematic comparison of Japan with other countries have provided some important 
insights into the characteristics of the Japanese welfare system. One of the most 
often pointed out ‘unique’ features of the Japanese welfare system was the strong 
reliance on the family and on companies for the provision of welfare.
Nonetheless, there are some limitations in these studies because comparison between 
countries of significantly different cultural backgrounds necessitates sacrificing 
detailed accounts of differences in the meaning of apparently similar institutions to a 
certain extent (Peng 2000). Although the importance in Japan of the family and 
enterprises as welfare providers is well acknowledged, cross-national qualitative 
differences and similarities of these two institutions and their relation with the state 
are not usually analysed (ibid.). Thus, for example, although Japan is not included in 
Lewis’s analysis of gendered welfare states (Lewis 1992), Japan would be 
categorised as a welfare state of strong breadwinner model in her typology along 
with Britain and Germany. However, understanding Japan simply as a strong male 
breadwinner welfare state would not reveal the importance of normative gender roles 
as daughters/ daughters-in-law or sons/ sons-in-law in Japan despite their significant 
implications for the gender division of labour and state welfare in the country.
In contrast, Japan-specific features of companies and the family form the central 
theme of many Japan-focused studies on state welfare. One of the major key 
concepts often employed in these analyses is ‘companyism’ or a corporate-centred 
society (Kigyd Chushin Shakai). The corporate-centred society is understood as a
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society where the corporate sector wields significant power in socio-economic and 
political spheres of a society and its norms and principles control the everyday life of 
individuals. According to the proponents, this society emerged in post-war years of 
economic growth as large corporations secured the loyalty and commitment of male 
labour in exchange for an inclusive management style, lifetime job security and a 
plethora of fringe benefits (Baba 1991; 1997; Watanabe 1990; Watanabe 1997). 
Moreover, for this company-centred society, the rigid gender division of labour is a 
factor indispensable to their functionality (Osawa 1992; 1993; 1998). Lifetime job 
security and seniority-merit based salary are possible because of the exclusion of 
women as fully-fledged employees. Women’s unpaid work as wives and daughters- 
in-law also makes it possible for male workers to commit themselves to paid work, 
which often involves long-hours working, long-distance and sudden transfers and 
occasionally even separate living (tanshin funin).
Scholars who share this view explain that the Japanese welfare system, including
both public and private, has developed based on these social relations. In the
corporate-centred society, economic welfare of the family is guaranteed by the
company via the breadwinner, and care services are provided by housewives who are
in turn economically provided for by the breadwinning husband. Putting the
economic growth as the top priority, the state endorsed the corporate centred nature
of the Japanese society and the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model as its
basis (ibid.). Economic security of the family was regarded by the general pubic as
being best provided by the employment of the male breadwinner, and the
advancement of his and his company’s positions were regarded as the advancement
of the welfare of the family and vice versa. The perceived congruence between the
welfare of the family and the growth of the company, and the state’s role in it, are
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well captured by the New Life Movement in the early post-war years (Gordon 1997). 
In the Movement, various programmes were created in the initiatives of large 
companies and the state in order to ‘educate’ housewives of the workers to become 
better equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills required to provide better 
‘housewifery’ services at home. On the other hand, at least until the late 1980s, the 
availability of public care services is generally limited on the assumption that most 
people have female family members to provide necessary services.
The significant importance of the family and companies to the welfare arrangements 
in Japan means that a lack of gender perspective would lead to a particularly 
unsatisfactory result as an analysis of the Japanese welfare system. Nonetheless, 
both comparative and Japan-focused bodies of literature did not always take into 
account the factor of gender in their analysis. The next section reviews the growing 
body of literature which is sensitive to gender aspects of state welfare, especially in 
the field of public old-age pensions.
1.3.2 Gender equality and old-age pensions in Japan
In Japan, the feminist critiques of the gender bias in state welfare started relatively 
late. Influenced by the theoretical development in Europe and the US, feminists in 
Japan began analysing state welfare from a gender perspective from around the 
1990s19. Nonetheless, the 1990s onwards saw a rapid increase in studies on 
embedded gender bias in the Japanese welfare system. In these studies, it was 
pointed out that the Japanese welfare system treated married women first and
19 For a concise review of this development in Japan, see Sugimoto, Kiyoe. 2004b. Josho: Feminisuto 
Shakai Fukushigaku wo mezashite (Introduction: Towards the study o f feminist social welfare). In 
Feminisuto Fukushi Seisaku Genron (Welfare Policy from a Gender Perspecitive), edited by K. 
Sugimoto. Kyoto: Minerva.
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foremost as full-time unpaid workers and withheld developing appropriate social 
services. As such, women were included in the welfare system as economic 
dependants through entitlement as wives (Ida 1998; Osawa 1992; 1993; Shiota 2000; 
Sugimoto 2004a).
The late start of welfare analysis from a gender perspective in Japan, however, does 
not necessarily mean that there were few studies on women’s disadvantaged position 
in state welfare until then. On the contrary, there were robust critiques of the 
situation especially from the 1970s (Sugimoto 2004b; Tamiya 2003). However, at 
first, feminist critiques were more focused on the lower level of women’s share in 
state welfare and unsatisfactory ‘protection’ of certain categories of women such as 
widowed mothers rather than on the gender bias in state welfare (ibid.).
This is certainly the case with old-age pensions. Demonstrating the persistent gender 
gap in pensions and economic hardship faced by older women, feminists in the 1970s 
and early 1980s in Japan often demanded the improvement of derived benefits as 
wives (Shimada 1981; Takenaka 1977). Although many of them also pointed out 
derived benefits as the manifestation of women’s marginalised position as pensioners 
in their own right, they nonetheless supported derived benefits as a practical measure 
to improve women’s economic welfare in old age. For example, Takenaka (1977) 
attributed women’s weaker pension rights to the existing pension system which was 
based on the household as a basic unit rather than individuals. She criticised that 
women were excluded from the pension system as fully-fledged members but treated 
as dependants of their husband due to their weaker economic positions in the family 
as well as in the labour market (ibid.). Still, she and others generally demanded for 
the rise in the level of survivors’ pensions and additional pensions for dependent
spouses despite the danger of consolidating the very foundation they criticised, 
namely, the household-based state welfare (Tamiya 2003).
After the 1985 reform, however, this line of argument for derived benefits began 
being criticised for ignoring single women and divorcees, who may also be 
disadvantaged in the labour market due to their sex and their responsibilities for 
unpaid work (for example, Shiota 1997, 2000). Indeed, the derived rights cannot 
benefit single parents or unmarried carers despite their contribution to society 
through their care work. With the rise in non-marriage and divorce, it has 
increasingly become difficult to legitimise derived rights for dependent spouses as 
‘women’s interest’. Pointing out the diverse economic situations among women, 
some even argue that housewives are generally in the privileged social group, which 
benefit from the contribution made by working women and men (Hatta and Kimura 
1993; Kido 1993; Shiota 1997)20.
Moreover, the focus of feminist academics began shifting from ‘women’s 
oppression’ to ‘gender bias’ in state welfare. Reflecting this theoretical development, 
most feminist studies on the pension system are now critical about derived benefits. 
Especially, the non-contributory basic pension for dependent spouses introduced in 
the 1985 reform has been criticized as a prime example of gender bias towards the 
male breadwinner/ female homemaker households (Shiota 2000). Historical analysis 
of the public pension system from a gender perspective also revealed the continuity 
of the underlying norm of the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model in the 
system (Murakami 1994; Tamiya 2003; Yokoyama 2002). These studies often argue
20 More explicitly using the concepts of class and ‘race’, similar argument was put forward by Meyer 
in the context of the public pension system in the US (Meyer 1996).
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that measures to improve derived benefits would perpetuate gender inequality by 
reinforcing the gender division of labour within the household as well as in the 
labour market. As such, most of these critics call for a gender-neutral welfare system 
based on individuals rather than the household as a basic unit (for example, Ida 1998).
In a sharp contrast with feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, those in the 
1990s onwards tend to criticise derived benefits for wives as gender unequal and 
regard housewives not as the victims of gender inequality but the beneficiaries of the 
gender unequal system. Those in this camp usually support measures to neutralise 
the underlying gender bias for the male breadwinner/ female homemaker households 
in the welfare system. According to them, one of the measures to achieve this in the 
pension system is to remove the derived benefits, especially, the non-contributory 
basic pensions for dependent spouses (for example, Hatta and Kimura 1993; Ida 
1998; Shiota 1997; 2000; Yokoyama 2002).
On the other hand, there are some voices which express concerns about the possible 
negative effects of this trend on women’s economic welfare in a real world, which is 
gender unequal. Pointing out the current political climate of welfare retrenchment, 
they warn that the concept of ‘gender neutrality’ is more likely to be used in political 
rhetoric to level down, rather than level up, state welfare, leaving women generally 
worse off (Ito 2004; Sugimoto 2004b). Indeed, as seen above, gender neutrality does 
not necessarily mean gender equality in outcome or better state welfare for all. 
These proponents argue for the importance not to ignore the gender inequality in 
outcome here and now and point out the need to pursue measures to overcome it 
(ibid.).
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The contrast in these approaches to women’s pensions -  equal treatment of both 
sexes vs. special considerations for women’s disadvantaged position -  in a way 
parallels with the theoretical dilemma between equality'and difference in women’s 
citizenship reviewed in the previous section. In the theoretical development, this 
impasse is sought to be resolved with the attempt to create a truly gender neutral 
citizen model by questioning the male-oriented nature of the apparently gender 
neutral ‘standard’ in the citizenship concept itself (see the previous section). 
However, in the debates on gender equality in pensions in Japan, few questioned 
whether the apparently gender neutral ‘standard’ practices expected from members 
of the Japanese pension system are truly gender neutral. Rather, the lower level of 
women’s pensions has often been explained as a simple result of women’s ‘atypical’ 
working patterns and disadvantaged positions in the labour market (Hori 1996). 
Indeed, women tend to earn less, work part-time and have disrupted careers due 
mainly to family responsibilities. According to those who attribute women’s lower 
pensions solely to the labour market practices, therefore, the redressing measures 
should be sought in the area of labour market policies rather than in pension policies 
(ibid.). Even those who argue for redressing measures within the pension system 
tend to accept women’s ‘atypical’ working patterns as the cause for their lower 
pensions, reaching to the conclusion that the only way forward would be tax- 
financed universal basic pensions for all citizens based on social rights (Ito 2004).
Nonetheless, gender gap in pensions is caused not only by women’s differences in
the labour market but also by the structural bias towards men of the pension system
(Allmendinger, Bruckner, and Bruckner 1993; Falkingham and Rake 1999). Many
pension systems, including the Japanese one, are structured to link earnings and
benefits, to limit entry with time and earnings thresholds, and to set the minimum
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required period of contribution, all of which are based on criteria closer to male 
working patterns. Thus, although tax-financed basic pensions may indeed be the 
only solution to all forms of pension inequality in old age, this is not necessarily the 
case if the concern is about gender gap in pensions. The gender gap in pensions can 
also be tackled through questioning the male-oriented criteria in the pension system 
(ibid.).
Preoccupied with the critiques of apparent gender bias in the form of derived benefits, 
however, few feminists in Japan pursue this line of argument. Most of them simply 
emphasise the importance for women to be included in the pension system as wage 
earners rather than as dependants without seriously questioning whether this path of 
inclusion would lead to decent pension benefits for all women in their own right. In 
a way, it can be said that these feminists pursue gender equality in pensions through 
assimilation into the norm based on the male-oriented life course model. As feminist 
critiques of citizenship theory suggests, however, the final destination of this pursuit 
may be legitimisation of women’s second class citizenship in the form of lower 
pension benefits without any practical compensatory measures for ‘women’s 
difference’ such as derived rights.
Considering the recent trend in pension policies, the marginalisation of issues with 
regard to pension outcomes can be detrimental not only to gender pension gap but 
also to women’s economic welfare in old age. In the next section, the recent trend in 
pension policies across welfare states and its gender implications are considered with 
a focus on Japan.
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1.3.3 Pension privatisation and women’s economic welfare in old age
Across welfare states, older women are more represented in lower income groups 
than older men. This is also the case in Japan. Empirical studies still show women’s
economic vulnerability in old age, especially for single women, due mainly to their
0 1low level of pensions .
However, the recent trend in pension policies across welfare states does not suggest a 
brighter picture for women’s economic welfare in old age. With the heightened 
awareness of population ageing, concerns about the increase in the cost of public 
pensions have mounted pressures for their curtailment across welfare states. This 
purported economic imperative is often backed up by arguments for intergenerational 
equity. In these arguments, generations are placed in an antagonistic position, where 
one generation’s gain is said to lead to another generation’s loss (Cardarelli, Sefton, 
and Kotlikoff 2000; Thomson 1989). Although these arguments have been 
extensively critiqued (Arber and Attias-Donfiit 2000), older people are still generally 
depicted as dependants of the society. Against a backdrop of ascending neo-liberal 
ideologies and duty discourses (Dean 1999), self-responsibility and individual 
arrangements rather than collectivist approaches for economic welfare in old age 
have been vigorously promoted. Challenges to the post-war welfare arrangements 
have come from other directions as well. Due to the changes and diversification of 
families and people’s life courses, social security systems based on a particular 
model of the family and life cycle begin to show their limitations (Borsch-Supan 
2000; Esping-Andersen 1996).
21 See Chapter 6 o f this thesis for more details.
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These changes in socio-economic situations together with demographic concerns 
have contributed to the rise in the advocates of the shift from pay-as-you-go public 
pensions to funded defined contribution pensions as a main source of incomes in old
99age . It was argued that funded pensions were more suitable than pay-as-you-go 
pensions in ageing societies because the former would be less influenced by 
demographic changes (OECD 1998; 2001a; World Bank 1994). The move towards 
defined contribution pensions would open up more possibilities for the private sector 
to operate individuals’ pensions. Indeed, international economic organizations such 
as World Bank further enhance this move by advocating mixed income in old age 
with a strong emphasis on private pensions (ibid.).
While some question the purported economic advantages of privatisation and funded 
systems (Barr 2001), many welfare states are now following the package of further 
encouragement of private pensions. Faced with a rapidly ageing population, Japan is 
no exception to this trend. Although the government did not take the path for all-out 
privatisation of old-age pensions, it nonetheless introduced new funded private 
pension schemes as additional pensions in 2000.
However, privatisation of old-age pensions has significant gender implications to the 
disadvantage of women in general (Davies and Ward 1992; Ginn and Arber 1999a; 
1999b; Waine 1995). Firstly, private pensions have few, if any, redistributive 
features between the insured. Thus, income inequality during working life is more 
likely to be reproduced in old age. For women as wage earners, this means the 
perpetuation, or even worsening, of gender pension gap already present under the 
current pension system unless women’s gains from the labour market become on a
22 Most of the state pension systems are financed on a pay-as-you-go and defined benefit basis.
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par with men’s. Secondly, private pensions are more likely to disadvantage women 
as carers because few private schemes, if any, include a period of caring as a form of 
contribution. Reflecting the strong critiques against the sole focus on paid 
employment as the basis of social rights (Bussemaker 1999; Taylor-Gooby 1991; 
Twine 1994), many public pension systems now have some features to count caring 
period as contribution period. However, the possible positive effects of these moves 
on the pension level of carers could be cancelled out if the relative importance of 
incomes from private pensions increases in old age. As the majority of those who 
take time out of the labour market for care work are women, this difference between 
public and private systems has more significant ramifications for women. Lastly, 
private pensions are more likely to disadvantage women as wives because fewer 
private pensions have derived benefits for dependants. Thus, the enhancement of 
mixed income can lead to quite a disadvantageous system for those who have fewer 
or no gains from the labour market.
Considering these points, recent promotion of private pensions offers a gloomy 
prospect for women, who generally have lower incomes and longer life expectancy 
(Wilson 2000). Nonetheless, there have not been many discussions in Japan about 
the possible negative effects of private pensions on women’s economic welfare in 
old age. One of the reasons for this silence may be that the private pensions 
introduced in 2000 are top-up occupational pensions within the existing public 
system rather than a substitute of the latter. As such, the strong link between the 
levels of paid premium and benefits is relatively well accepted without criticism. 
Moreover, unlike countries such as Britain, private pensions do not yet constitute a 
major part in the total incomes of older people in Japan (OECD 2001b). Thus, when
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women’s pension issues are discussed, it is often solely focused on public pension 
schemes in Japan.
Rather than privatisation of pensions per se, therefore, it can be argued that the 
possible disadvantageous pension trend for women in Japan is the growing 
acceptance of the main principle of private pensions -  the strong link between paid 
premium and benefits -  within the public pension system. This link is often justified 
in the name of ‘insurance principle’ in the social insurance system, while the 
possibility for redistribution represented by the word ‘social’ is marginalised.
The uncritical acceptance of the strong link between paid premium and benefits, 
however, would lead to even more unequal distribution of resources among older 
people unless certain pension benefits based on social rights are established. The 
review of the existing literature has also revealed that the rise in critiques of pensions 
from a gender perspective could ironically enhance this trend by focusing on gender 
neutrality through equal treatment.
Refocusing on the issue of gender equality in outcome, this study explores how the 
link between paid premium and benefits has been legitimised in the history of the 
Japanese pension system, and considers its implications for gender pension gap and 
women’s economic welfare in old age. In the next chapter, the design of the research 
is explained.
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Chapter 2 Research Design
This chapter explains the design of the research presented here. First, the chapter 
introduces the main research questions and the focus of the analysis. Then, methods 
utilised for the research are described and the rationale for the choice of the methods 
is explained.
2.1 Research questions and framework for analysis
The main concerns of this research are women’s economic security in old age and 
the gender gap in old-age pension benefits. The central questions of this research are 
firstly, why concerns about gender inequality in pension outcomes have failed to 
impinge on the political agenda as a primary problem to be tackled in Japan, despite 
increasing cries for gender equality in the nation, and secondly, what are the 
implications of this neglect for women’s economic welfare in old age and gender 
equality in outcome. While gender inequality in pension outcomes can be measured 
in many ways, it is defined in this research as the gap between women and men in 
the level of their own old-age pension benefits. In the study, this inequality is also 
referred to as the gender pension gap.
The answer to the first central question is sought by examining how a certain 
boundary of state welfare and the way it redistribute resources have been 
problematised or legitimised in the history of the Japanese public old-age pension 
system. In the above literature review, it has been suggested that state welfare is 
redistribution of resources based on legitimised claims, but that the basis of the 
legitimacy can be challenged and replaced. It has also revealed that the basis of 
entitlement to state welfare can be different between women and men depending
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prevailing norms and principles on gender roles. This research focuses on the 
changes and continuities of embedded assumptions on gender relations, 
intergenerational relations, and the state-individual relations embedded in the 
pension system, which helped to promote certain approaches to competing issues of 
equality and fairness at certain point of time.
In order to answer the second question, the situations of economic status of older 
people in the mid-1990s are first examined, and then, pension simulations are 
conducted using the life courses of hypothetical women. Combining these findings, 
the implications of the way women’s pension issues are problematised in recent 
years are considered from a viewpoint of gender equality and women’s economic 
welfare in old age.
2.2 Research methods
This research examines both the development of ‘women’s pension problems’ in the 
Japanese old-age pension system and its implications for future female pensioners. 
This requires a mix of methodological approaches and data. In the first part, a 
historical analysis is employed, using mainly published government documents as 
the data. In the latter part, the implications of the problematisation of women’s 
pensions are analysed, depending primarily on income data from published statistics 
and simulations. In the following, employed methods and data are explained.
2.2.1 Single-country focus and cross-national comparison
The thesis is a mixture of a single country focus and cross-national comparison. The 
historical part of the thesis (Chapters 3 to 5) is mainly focused on Japan, but the
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quantitative part (Chapters 6 and 7) compares the Japanese situations with those of 
other countries, primarily of Britain and Germany.
The single-country focused approach in the historical part is firstly because this study 
is an attempt to understand the changes and continuities of people’s perception of a 
certain institution -  a public pension system -  in the country specific context. As 
noted above, cross-national studies may lead to obscuring qualitative differences of 
rough equivalents of social institutions (Peng 2000), while a single-country focus 
allows an in-depth analysis of state welfare in a country-specific socio-economic and 
political context. Another reason is practicality. As this thesis tries to capture 
changing discourses on pension reforms spanning over 100 years, the sole focus on 
Japan is a practical choice in order to manage the study within the limitation of 
resources.
However, in order to learn a relative status of the country in terms of various 
measurable indices, the understanding of other countries’ situations is useful. 
Moreover, comparison with other countries can illustrate different solutions and 
alternatives to similar policy issues. Indeed, comparative studies have demonstrated 
that welfare states pursue a range of different pension policies in the face of similar 
socio-economic constraints (Ginn, Daly, and Street 2001). In this sense, single­
country studies and cross-national comparative research are mutually complementary 
for the understanding of welfare states, and neither would be complete without being 
informed from the other approach. Although this thesis presented here does not 
conduct cross-national comparison of policies or political processes, it compares in 
its latter part the institutional factors within the public pension system which produce, 
ameliorate or magnify the gender gap in pensions.
Looking at only three countries, the thesis does not take the welfare regime approach 
as exemplified by Esping-Andersen (1990). There are many examples which 
deliberately chose not to take the regime approach, although the choice of countries 
may be affected by the existing typologies (for example, Daly 2000; Daly and Rake 
2003; Sainsbury 1996). As noted above, however, the approach of this study is also 
different from the latter group of studies, because it does not treat all chosen 
countries with equal weight. The focus is firmly put on Japan, and cross-national 
comparison is conducted in order only to capture relative situations of income 
inequality between older women and older men in Japan as well as to better 
understand the structural factors of the Japanese public pension system which affect 
the gender gap in pensions.
By combining a single-country focus with comparative elements, I hope to strike an 
optimal balance between generalisation and specification in the discussion of 
Japanese women’s pensions.
The choice of Britain and Germany as a reference point is firstly because of their 
influence, positively or negatively, on the Japanese pension system. Prior to the 
introduction of the public pension system in Japan in the late 1930s, the German 
system was closely studied and in the end a Bismarckian type of pension insurance 
was adopted. However, after the Second World War, the Japanese pension system 
incorporated various elements not dissimilar to the post-war British system, which is 
often taken up as an archetype of Beveridgean model. In a way, both models coexist 
in the post-war Japanese pension system.
Another reason for comparing Japan with Britain and Germany is similarities and
differences of the dominant gender models in their social systems. Comparative
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research suggests that social systems in both Britain and Germany are based on the 
strong breadwinner model (Lewis 1992). While Japan is often excluded from 
comparative studies of welfare states, rigid gender division of labour in the country 
suggests that it shares similar gendered assumptions with Britain and Germany, at 
least in post-war Japan. On the other hand, there are significant differences among 
the three countries in the configurations of welfare mix for care despite their apparent 
similarity in the gender ideal model. As noted above, the roles of women under the 
gender division of labour in Japan include not only as mothers but also as carers for 
their parents-in-law. On the other hand, despite the general emphasis on motherhood 
as in Britain and Germany, institutional care is not uncommon for pre-school 
children in Japan (Michel and Mahon 2002). In 2000, around 35 per cent children 
aged between 3 and 5 attended day care centres (full-day care), while about half of
9^children in the same age group attended kindergartens (usually half-day care) .
By comparing the economic situations of older women in these three countries, the 
specificities and commonalities of women’s social citizenship rights in Japan can be 
more clearly revealed.
2.2.2 Historical analysis
The first part of the thesis takes a historical approach in order to capture the dynamic 
nature of ‘women’s pension problem’. As reviewed in previous chapter, in the 
analysis of welfare states, it is important to look at the country-specific historical 
context in which each welfare state developed. The history is traceable not only of
23 The rates are calculated from Japan Census in 2000 and Japan Statistical Yearbook (2004). Japan 
Statistics Bureau (Tokei Kyoku). 2000. Kokusei Chosa (Japan Census)., Japan Statistics Bureau 
(Tokei Kyoku). 2004. Japan Statistical Yearbook. The number o f attendees for day care centres is 
only o f those in publicly run or subsidized centres, thus, those cared in unauthorized institutions are 
not included.
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the institutional arrangements but also of discourses which constituted the 
development. This thesis identifies norms and principles among key policy makers 
of the time on the various social relations which are challenged or left unchallenged 
in the way certain issues are problematised in pension reforms. Especially, by 
examining the changes and continuities in the way women’s pension issues are 
problematised in policy proposals, the thesis analyses the underlying assumptions on 
the relations between genders, between generations and between the state and 
individuals and considers their implications for women’s economic welfare in old 
age and gender equality in outcome.
The historical part of the thesis extensively uses policy documents by the 
government and public advisory councils in order to examine the explicitly stated 
goals of policies of the time and the ways women’s pension issues were 
problematised in the period of interest. For the period from the 1990s onwards, 
many documents are directly available, and thus obtained, from relevant ministries or 
other public organisations as on-line documents through the Internet.
For the period between post-war years and the 1980s, many policy documents on 
social security can be found in a series of historical document source books compiled 
by Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo (1975a; 1975b; 1988a; 1988b). They are the compilation 
of key reports of relevant advisory councils of the government, draft bills, ministerial 
ordinances, published opinions and statements by political parties and other key 
organisations with regard to the social security system.
Another important source of policy documents for this period is official records of
the development of the Japanese social security system edited by the Ministry of
Health and Welfare (MHW, later the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) and by
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Koseidan, a quasi-govemmental organisation in charge of managing a part of the 
public pension fund. They are ‘Kosei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year History of 
the Employees' Pension Insurance)’ (Koseidan 1953), ‘Kosei Nenkin Hoken 15 nen 
shi (15-year History of the Employees' Pension Insurance)’ (MHW 1958), ‘Kosei 
Nenkin Hoken 25 nen shi (25-year History of the Employees' Pension Insurance)’ 
(MHW 1968), ‘Koseisho Gojunen shi (Fifty-year History of the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare)’ (MHW 1988) and ‘Kokumin Nenkin 30 nen no Ayumi (30-year 
History of the National Pension)’ (MHW 1990). These publications also contain 
excerpts or abridged versions of similar policy documents with the above books 
compiled by Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo. However, being focused on the public 
pension system, they provide more complete or near-complete versions of outlines 
and drafts of bills from the early stage of law-making, complete versions of finally 
legislated laws and more non-legislated regulations and ministerial ordinances as 
well as various cross-sectional statistics, which all provide valuable primary data on 
the public pensions.
In addition, the above books edited by MHW and Koseidan also contain extensive 
quotes of remarks, opinions and official statements made by key high-ranked 
officials and ministers of the time both within and outside of the Diet, all of which 
are knitted together in a chronological order by a narrative of ‘insiders’. Moreover, 
these publications, together with another publication edited by Koseidan, ‘Kosei 
Nenkin Hoken Seido Kaikoroku (Memoir of the Employees' Pension Insurance 
System)’ (1988), include memoirs and interviews of key bureaucrats in MHW in the 
history of the public pension system, providing insiders’ views on the intended goals 
and political background of certain pension policies. This allows readers to put 
pension laws in a historical context.
These documents are complemented by the record of deliberations in the Diet and 
annual reports of relevant ministries in order to have a fuller picture of the debates in 
the policy-making process.
Utilising these materials, attempts are made to uncover the underlying assumptions 
of key policy makers on gender, intergenerational and state-individuals relations 
from what were proposed, legislated, rejected or neglected.
2.2.3 Statistical data
The latter part of the thesis is of quantitative nature. In Chapter 6, the economic 
situations of older people and income inequalities between women and men are 
compared between Britain, Germany and Japan. In the thesis, incomes officially in 
one’s own name, that is, money either from the market or from the state but not from 
the family, are looked at. While neither household incomes nor individual incomes 
may directly show the real economic welfare of individuals in the household, 
individual incomes have significant meanings in the sense that it enables individuals 
to have an option of ‘exit’ (Hobson 1990, see also the next section).
Chapter 6 primarily uses the data from OECD publications on the retirement income
policies in nine selected countries, but especially those from ‘Ageing and Income’
(OECD 2001b). Between 1999 and 2001, OECD undertook a research project to
compare and examine retirement income policies of Britain24, Canada, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. The results
were published in a series of OECD reports such as Casey and Yamada (2002) and
Yamada (2002), and were compiled in the final report, ‘Ageing and Income’ (OECD
24 In order to avoid possible confusion, all data for the UK as well as those for Britain are categorised 
as data for Britain in this thesis.
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2001b). For the purpose of this chapter, only the data for Britain, Germany and 
Japan are extracted from these reports.
The main income data set used in the above OECD reports is the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS). This data set is open to the public for research purposes and 
provides internationally comparable, standardised micro-data on incomes, based on 
national income surveys of participating countries. However, Japan is not a member 
country of LIS due to its statutory restrictions on the public access to national 
statistics, and thus, standardised comparable data were separately provided by the 
Japanese government for the purpose of this OCED project (Casey and Yamada 
2002: 30-31). Table 2.1 shows the original sources of the income data for Britain, 
Germany and Japan used in this OECD-led project.
Table 2 .1  The original sources of income data for Britain, Germany and Japan
Country The original survey Years of survey
Germany The Luxembourg Income Study (derived from 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study)
1984 1994
Japan Comprehensive Survey of Living Condition of the 
People on Health and Welfare, Income 
Redistribution Survey
1985 1995
Britain The Luxembourg Income Study (derived from 
The Family Expenditure Survey)
1985 1995
Source: Yamada (2002: 27), Casey and Yamada (2002: 31)
The primary use of the data from these OECD publications in this chapter is mainly
because of the unavailability of other internationally comparable data on older
people’s own incomes broken down by sex for Japan. As mentioned above, the
access to micro-data collected by the government surveys is strictly limited by law in
Japan even for academic research purposes. This means that individual researchers
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should satisfy with officially published tables and charts derived from a survey of 
interest rather than directly manipulating the data according to their research 
purposes. Moreover, the results of income surveys are often presented as household 
incomes rather than individual incomes. Only limited data on older people’s 
individual incomes have been made available to the public in Japan (usually 
available in the form of tables and charts in research reports commissioned by the 
government or annual reports by relevant government ministries). However, because 
they are usually focused only on Japan, the cross-national comparability may be 
compromised to a certain extent.
In contrast, the income data provided in the OECD reports mentioned above are 
shown as ‘adjusted individualised household income’ (Yamada 2002: 29). This 
means that, firstly, incomes of household members are aggregated and individualised 
based on the assumption of redistribution within a household and, secondly, the 
OECD equivalence scale is utilised to enhance the comparability between 
households of different sizes25. Moreover, these OECD reports also provide 
individuals’ own incomes broken down by sex in some occasions. In this sense, the 
said OECD reports are valuable source of data to understand the relative income 
situations of the Japanese elderly in comparison with those in other major countries. 
As one of the above OECD reports observed, this OECD-led project was the first of 
its kind to include cross-sectional data set on individual incomes of the Japanese 
elderly for cross-national comparison (Yamada 2002: 8).
25 For calculation details o f the data, see pp. 32-37 in Casey, Bernard, and Atsuhiro Yamada. 2002. 
Getting older, getting poorer? A study of the earnings, pensions, assets and living arrangements of  
older people in nine countries. OECD Occasional Papers 60.and p. 30 in Yamada, Atsuhiro. 2002. 
The Evolving Retirement Income Package: Trends in adequacy and equality in nine OECD countries. 
Paris: OECD.
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Nonetheless, there are some limitations even with the data from these OECD 
publications. Firstly, although these OECD publications provide a significant 
number of tables and charts, they are not always broken down as one wishes, posing 
significant limitations on what can be analysed from the data. However, as the 
access to the original data set for Japan is restricted, the manipulation of the data is 
very limited. Secondly, being a cross-sectional data, they can only provide a 
snapshot at certain points in time -  the mid-1980s and mid-1990s -  rather than actual 
changes in individuals’ income situations over the decade.
Still, the strengths of the data in the above OECD publications are far greater than 
the weaknesses, and because of this reason, although data from other publications are 
also used where available and applicable, income data presented in Chapter 6 are 
primarily derived directly from these OECD reports. This means that the tables and 
charts in the chapter are reproductions of those shown in the OECD reports for 
countries of our interest -  Britain, Germany and Japan -  unless otherwise stated.
2.2.4 Simulations
While secondary data are helpful to learn about past situations, these data cannot 
show the future prospects of policy outcomes. However, in order to make informed 
decisions on policies, certain forms of predictions for outcomes are indispensable. 
Especially for policies whose implications are played out over a long distance into 
the future such as pension policies, some form of ‘looking into future’ is necessary 
for the assessment. For this purpose, the thesis uses simulations based on the 
pension and taxation rules in Britain, Germany and Japan.
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Among a number of simulation methods (see inter alia, Mitton, Sutherland, and 
Weeks 2000), the thesis employs one based on hypothetical individual models. This 
method has two distinctive features. One is that it takes a microeconomic approach, 
where the focus is put on the individuals’ economic prospects rather than on the 
aggregate economy-wide impacts. While recent debates on pension policies in Japan 
tend to be focused on the macroeconomic dimension of pension policies such as 
fiscal implications or intergenerational resource distribution, the importance of 
microeconomic dimension such as the implications for individuals’ economic 
security in old age cannot be ignored. Thus, simulations focused on a pension 
outcome for an individual with a certain life-course can provide another vantage 
point from which the adequacy of pension policies can be assessed.
Another feature of this method is great flexibility in constructing models. The data 
for simulations can be ‘fictional’ rather than nationally representative. Although this 
fact also means the limitation of the models in respect of actual representativeness of 
a population, there are several advantages which can compensate for this downside. 
One is increased feasibility of research even when the availability of nationally 
representative data or cross-nationally comparable data is limited (Johnson and Rake 
1998; Rake 2000). In the research presented here, this is especially valuable because 
the area of interest is the outcomes of a pension system for younger women, which 
are determined by a series of life choices and circumstances spanning about 40 years 
of time. No data, including longitudinal data, can predict the life courses of current 
younger women in the next 40 odd years. Moreover, women’s life courses are 
possibly more diverse than those of men’s, and also can be more sensitive to cohort 
effects because of changing attitudes towards women’s labour market participation.
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Thus, the ‘making-up’ of life courses is a necessary step to explore the implications 
of current pension policies for individual women.
Related to this point, the second advantage of this method is that researchers can 
focus on cases which cannot be picked up by nationally representative surveys, for 
example, because of small sample numbers, but which may still have a significant 
meaning for policy discussions (Evans 1996). In this research, certain hypothetical 
life-courses are constructed not necessarily because of their likelihood in reality, but 
in order to illustrate the outcomes for stylised cases in a similar vein as ideal types.
The third benefit of using hypothetical cases is that it can better control the variables. 
This is an especially valuable asset for cross-national comparisons. In comparative 
research, one of the major challenges is having too many variables. However, by 
holding factors constant other than the social systems of interest, this method can 
elucidate directly the link between policies and outcomes (Johnson and Rake 1998; 
Rake 2000). Since the objective of the research presented here is to examine the 
current pension systems per se in terms of gender gap in pensions and women’s 
economic security in old age rather than the prediction of likely outcomes for 
existing populations, this simulation method is more appropriate.
The relative ease with which the models can be constructed together with the high 
comparability and flexibility of hypothetical cases has appealed to many researchers. 
One of the early and most extensive attempts is by Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980), 
who looked at child support package in 9 countries. In the area of pension policies, 
there are studies which used this method for a single country such as one by 
Falkingham and Rake (1999), Hills (2004) and Shiota (1997) as well as for cross­
national comparison such as by Johnson (1998) and OECD (2001b; 2005).
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However, in these examples, the unit of examination is either the household or male 
individuals. While an individual’s economic welfare cannot solely be determined by 
her/his own incomes, the household-centred approach does have a limitation when 
one’s interest is not only in women’s economic welfare but also in gender equality. 
Research suggests the existence of inequality within a household, in which women 
are more likely to have smaller share of household resources than men if they are not 
her own (Pahl 1989; 2005). The thesis therefore looks at pension benefits paid 
directly to women rather than through their husband. WTiile the survivor’s pensions 
or their equivalents are taken into account, the dependants’ additions paid to the head 
of households (usually husbands) are excluded.
The simulation results are interpreted on their own first. Then, they are further 
examined in combination with findings from other chapters in order to answer the 
research questions and discuss policy implications from a viewpoint of gender 
equality and women’s social citizenship in old age.
Part Two
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Chapter 3 Towards Inclusive Social Citizenship? Establishment of 
the Employees’ Pension Insurance and National Pension
The history of public old-age pensions for the private sector is still relatively short in 
Japan. The first of its kind in the country was introduced in 1939 for workers in the 
shipping industry, the key sector of the time for warring Japan. The last of its kind, 
the National Pension (NP), was established in 1961 for those who were previously 
outside of the public pension system. In between, the inclusion of more citizens had 
been a recurring political issue. In post-war years, the demand for pension coverage 
for a wider population was often advanced under the slogan of ‘pensions for all (Kai 
nenkin)\ Although NP was established as a response to this demand, one category 
of the population was excluded from mandatory membership of this scheme -  
namely, housewives of the insured employees.
This chapter examines how women’s exclusion from the pension system was 
justified in the development of the Japanese old-age pension system for non-public 
workers. In examining this, what issues were considered as primary problems with 
the existing system for the provision for old age and what issues were left 
unproblematised are considered. In so doing, various underlying assumptions on the 
relations between women and men, between generations and between the state and 
citizens are elicited.
3.1 Modernisation and state welfare
Provision for old age was considered largely a private responsibility in Japan until
the mid-20th century. It was the eldest son’s duty, as an heir, to live with and provide
for his ‘retired’ old parents, while it was his wife’s duty to serve her in-laws. These
norms of filial piety and rigid gender roles were closely intertwined with ancestor
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worship and inheritance rules, rooted deeply in Japanese history in the context of 
patriarchal ie system. In the ie system, which literally means ‘house’, members in 
the household, kin and non-kin alike, were integrated into hierarchical relationships 
based on age, seniority and sex. The ie was supposed to be a self-sufficient entity, 
wherein all the needs of individual members for support were to be met26. The 
transition to a modem society did not change these long-established practices
97significantly . Instead, this private welfare system was formalised by the Meiji 
Civil Code (promulgated in 1898), regulating relationships among members of a 
household until the end of the Second World War. The Meiji Civil Code legitimised, 
among other things, women’s inferior position to men, the eldest son’s inheritance 
rights and the responsibilities of the head of the household towards his ‘retired’ 
parents and other dependants . Thus, the family continued to be the core provider 
for the elderly in the new era.
This heavy reliance on private welfare was politically possible partly because Japan 
was still predominantly an agrarian society. In the early 1880s, 76 per cent of the 
male labour force in Japan was employed in the primary sector, while in the similar 
period, the ratio was 19 per cent in Britain, 36 per cent in Germany and 51 per cent
26 For more detailed account o f the ie system from an anthropological viewpoint, see Nakane, Chie. 
1967. Kinship and Economic Organization in Rural Japan, Monographs on social anthropology, no. 
32. London: Athlone Press.
27 The year 1868, when the Tokugawa shogunate was replaced by the imperial court of Meiji (1868- 
1912) as the political ruler, is customarily regarded as the beginning o f the modem age in Japan.
28 The Meiji Civil Code was not necessarily the codification o f existing practices. Rather, it was more 
of an imposition of norms o f the ruling elite -  samurai in feudal Japan -  on the rest o f the population. 
Indeed, before the introduction of the Meiji Civil Code, practices o f family care, inheritance rules etc. 
were more flexible and varied significantly across regions. Moreover, even after the introduction of 
the Meiji Civil Code, old practices survived in some parts o f Japan. For the diversity o f the ie system 
across regions, see, for example, Nakane, Chie. 1967. Kinship and Economic Organization in Rural 
Japan, Monographs on social anthropology, no. 32. London: Athlone Press. For the ‘invention of 
tradition’ in early modem Japan, see, for example, Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan's Modern Myths: 
ideology in the late Meiji period. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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in the US (Maddison 1969: xvi Table 2)29. Moreover, the need to manage the 
sophisticated irrigation system for rice production made cooperation among 
neighbours vital for survival, thus individual farming households were firmly 
integrated into a closely-knitted community formed around an irrigation system. In 
these closed communities, compliance with norms and order, including the 
responsibilities for the elderly in the community, was easier to enforce. Indeed, there 
were records of publicly enforced ‘filial piety’ and ‘mutual help’ (Garon 1997). In a 
way, provision for old age was based on the publicly managed private 
intergenerational contract in early modem Japan.
Under this social arrangement, public provisions for the elderly were limited to those 
who could not turn to their familial ties for support. Moreover, external aid was 
expected to be first sought within communities on an informal basis and public relief 
was considered to be the very last resort. While this kind of relief system was 
already well established in the Tokugawa era (1603-1867), the Meiji central 
government standardized these practices as a statutory national public relief system 
in 187430. The ordinance, Jukkyu Kisoku, laid down that only those who were unable 
to work due to old age (70 years or over), invalidity or sickness and had no kin were 
to be the objects of public aid. As can be seen in this limited scope of the state relief 
and reinforcement of customary practices, the new law did not significantly improve 
the lot of the poor elderly. On the contrary, evidence suggests a cutback of state 
relief in the process of welfare modernisation in Japan (ibid: 35-36). Indeed, the 
main purpose of this nation-wide legislation was to consolidate the power of the
29 The year for the respective countries is as follows: 1872 for Japan; 1871 for Britain; 1882 for 
Germany; and 1870 for the US.
30 For the historical legacy of the Tokugawa regime in the Japanese social welfare, see pp. 25-59 
Garon, Sheldon M. 1997. Molding Japanese minds : the state in everyday life. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.
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central government over the local self-governing bodies and publicize the emperor’s 
reign in the precarious period of regime change rather than relieving the economic 
plight of the elderly (Garon 1997: 35-36; Murakami 2000).
The limited nature of the national poor relief system in Japan in a way hindered the 
emergence of old-age pensions as a form of poverty alleviation among the elderly 
commoners (Lewis 1981: 132). In countries such as Britain, the increasing cost as 
well as demeaning effect of poor relief was often pointed out as one of the key 
driving forces behind the development of the public pension system31. In Japan, 
however, these concerns were not pressing issues due to the state’s rigorous efforts to 
contain the relief expenditure and portrayal of the public relief as charity from the 
state. Indeed, although British Poor Law and Old Age Pensions were relatively well- 
known among intellectuals and policy makers by the end of the 19th century, they 
were perceived in the main as negative examples for Japan to avoid following suit, as 
well as the source of complacency about the Japanese family system (Ishida 1989).
This heavy reliance on private welfare, however, began revealing its limitation as
• O') #industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded . In an attempt to respond to this 
situation, several bills were submitted to the Imperial Diet between the 1890s and the 
1910s to replace Jukkyu Kisoku, among which, there was an early attempt to 
introduce old-age pensions. Nonetheless, these bills proved abortive in the face of 
arguments that heavy state intervention would not only cause a financial drain but
31 For the account o f British case, see Heclo, Hugh. 1974. Modern Social Politics in Britain and 
Sweden : from relief to income maintenance, Yale studies in political science ; 25. New Haven ; 
London: Yale University Press, Thane, Pat. 2000. Old Age in English History : past experiences, 
present issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32 However, the proportion o f the population in agriculture was still relatively high; 44.7 per cent in 
1938. See Table 9.1 in Minami, Ryoshin. 1994. The Economic Development o f  Japan: a quantitative 
study. 2nd ed, Studies in the modern Japanese economy. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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also crowd out informal support (Garon 1997; Murakami 2000). Many policy 
makers were especially wary of making poor relief a right of citizens. It was 
maintained that granting the poor a relief as a right would damage self-help 
initiatives, an important ingredient of poverty prevention (ibid.).
As a result, although some amendments to Jukkyu Kisoku were introduced, it was not 
until 1929 that a new law (Kyugo ho) was promulgated to strengthen public 
responsibilities for poor relief. With this new legislation, the age threshold at and 
over which public relief could be granted was lowered from 70 to 65. Even with this 
new legislation, however, social rights to relief were not acknowledged. The benefits 
were offered as benevolence ‘from above’ rather than social rights of the poor. 
Moreover, able-bodied persons remained ineligible for relief. Thus, most people, 
including the elderly, did not have an easy access to the public relief even when 
faced with poverty.
3.1.1 Social problem in the quest for national wealth and power
In contrast to the slow development of state welfare for those who were
‘unproductive’, the need of state welfare was discussed relatively early for
productive population. In the efforts to catch up with the West, Japan rigorously
pursued industrialisation as a way to build up national power and wealth after the
Meiji Restoration in 1868. As a result, the GDP share of mining and manufacturing
jumped from mere 8 per cent in 1888 to about one third by 1938 (Minami 1994:
Table 5.4). At the same time, increasing numbers of Japanese policy makers and
intellectuals began seeing workers as a vital national resource, and thus, the health
and welfare of population became the issues of national interest. From around the
1890s, the appalling working conditions and recruitment practices of factory workers
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raised public criticisms, and calls for state intervention became increasingly vocal33. 
Also, during this period, the labour movement gradually became active and fears of 
social unrest grew among policy makers. When the world’s first social insurance 
was introduced in Germany in the 1880s, contemporary policy makers and 
intellectuals in Japan positively regarded them as an effective tool for labour control. 
Anticipating the rise of labour movements in Japan in the near future, some elites 
argued for the need to introduce pre-emptive measures (Saguchi 1977). Against this 
backdrop, a series of protective laws began being introduced from the end of the 19th 
century. This eventually led to the introduction of old-age pension schemes in Japan 
(ibid.). Rather than as an extension of poverty relief, therefore, the Japanese old-age 
pension system developed along a line of labour control as in the case of Germany.
However, the priorities for state welfare were felt in the immediate reproduction of 
today’s labour in the form of protective legislation and health insurance, rather than a 
promise of security in the distant future such as old-age pensions. In 1911, the 
Factory Law was passed and in 1922, the Health Insurance Act was promulgated for 
miners and factory workers. While this trajectory of state welfare was common with 
many other European nations, this prioritisation was also related to the gender 
ideology and gender segregation in the labour market of the time. By this time, the 
ideology on ideal womanhood as ‘good wife and wise mother (rydsai kenboy was 
firmly established, and female workers were regarded first and foremost as mothers 
or mothers-to-be. Moreover, industrialisation in Japan was first led by the textile 
industry34, whose labour was mainly consisted of young single women from poor
33 For example, see Yokoyama, Gennosuke. 1950. Nihon no kaso~shakai (Underclass in Japan). 
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
34 By the early 1930s, more than half o f workers employed in factories with five or more employees 
were in the textile industry. See p.46 in Hunter, Janet. 2003. Women and the Labour Market in
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fanning families on a short-term contract. As a result, at first, welfare issues of 
industrial workers tended to be discussed within the framework of protection of 
health and moral virtue of future mothers (Hunter 2003) rather than acknowledging 
their rights as wage earners or long-term income security, although these latter issues 
may also have had profound impacts on female workers’ well-being.
Only when the importance of male-dominant industries became more salient, did 
public attention begin to turn to longer-term income maintenance projects such as
thold-age pensions. By the beginning of the 20 century, heavy and chemical 
industries began taking hold, and by the end of the 1930s, these surpassed light 
industries in terms of the share of manufacturing output (Minami 1994: Table 5.6). 
These industries were male-dominated, and their jobs were considered to be more
*5 c
skilled, hence more likely to be on a long-term contract . Moreover, skilled ‘elite’ 
blue-collar worker households were increasingly assimilating to the male- 
breadwinner/ female homemaker model, which was already prevalent among 
burgeoning white-collar worker households by the 1920s (Chimoto 1990). This 
difference in the profile of the labour significantly affected the prospect of organised 
labour, their demands, industrialists’ attitudes and state’s policies.
Since the early 1920s, some company-led mutual associations in the male-dominated
 ^(\public sector began to provide old-age pension benefits . Several attempts were also 
made to introduce state old-age pension schemes to the private sector first for the key
Japan's Industrialising Economy: the Textile Industry before the Pacific War. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon.
35 For a historical account of industrial relations in heavy industry of pre-war modem Japan, see for 
example, Gordon, Andrew. 1985. The Evolution o f  Labor Relations in Japan : Heavy Industry, 1853- 
1955, Harvard East Asian monographs ; 117. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies 
Distributed by Harvard University Press.
36 For the civil servants and military officers, pension schemes were already introduced in the late 19th 
century.
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industry in Japan, shipping. Nonetheless, these attempts for state pensions were 
obstructed by resistance from large businesses, which preferred paternalistic 
corporate welfare and feared larger labour costs (Yamazaki 1985). Thus, people in 
general had no social rights to old-age public provisions until 1939, when the 
warring government felt the stronger need to exert its muscle to counter the 
opposition. Even then, inclusion in the pension system was delayed for women, 
because they firstly needed to be acknowledged as wage earners rather than as future 
wives and mothers.
3.1.2 Wars and the establishment of the public pension system
The introduction of a public pension system to the private sector was deeply related 
to the ongoing war. As the war dragged on, concerns about the labour shortage and 
stagnant productivity deepened among the policy makers. The introduction of public 
pension system was discussed in this context. The explicitly stated goal of its 
introduction was to enhance productivity by boosting workers’ morale and 
discouraging their job hopping rather than to ensure their financial security in old 
age37. The new system was also expected to control money circulation and to
•3 O
finance the war (Yamazaki 1985; Yamazaki 1990: 68-71) . It was, therefore, no 
surprise that pension schemes were first introduced only for strategically important 
industries of the time; shipping in 1939 (enforced in 1940), followed in 1941 by
37 See, for example, an official argument put forward by the Head o f General Affairs, Insurance 
Bureau (Hoken'in Somu kyoku) in support of establishing the public pension system in the 
Investigation Committee of Insurance System, Insurance Bureau (Hoken ’in Hoken Seido Chdsa kai) 
(quoted in p. 52 Koseidan, ed. 1953. Kosei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history o f  the 
Employees' Pension Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan. See also the statement by Minister o f Health and 
Welfare in the 76th Imperial Diet Session in explaining the rationales for the bill (quoted in pp. 76-77: 
ibid.).
38 For the limited ability o f public pension schemes to meet this objectives, and qualifications o f these 
often stated objectives, see pp. 96-98 in Lewis, Paul Martin. 1981. Family Economy and Policy: a 
case study of Japan's public pension policy, University of California, Berkeley Ann Arbor.
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other key industries such as mining, manufacturing and transportation (enforced in 
1942).
However, the Japanese public pension system was not solely a product of the war. It 
can also be understood as a product of the state-led modernisation project of Japan
* fUsince the end of the 19 century (Murakami 2000). Many policy makers of the time, 
especially ‘social bureaucrats’ (Garon 1987) who staffed welfare agencies in the 
government, regarded state welfare as necessary apparatus of modem states for 
social management. Based on an evolutionary view of state development, they 
believed a set of welfare schemes, including public pensions, needed to be 
introduced gradually according to the developmental stage of the nation.
Another factor which drove the introduction of public pension schemes was also 
related to the state-led modernisation project -  namely, workers’ demand for equal 
treatment between the different sectors. As noted above, shipping was the first 
industry in the private sector which gained an access to public pensions. This was 
partly because seamen in private vessels had been regarded as unfairly disadvantaged 
in state welfare compared with workers in the public sector and those on land, 
despite the vital importance of their role in the Japanese economy and in wars. They 
were excluded from public welfare schemes for workers on land, such as Health 
Insurance, as well as from those for the marine, such as pensions. A sense of
'XQunfairness led to lobbying by shipping unions for redress , to which the bureaucrats 
of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) responded with sympathy (Koseidan 
1953: 41-42; 1988: 10-15; Murakami 2000: 47-51). Once the public pension scheme
39 While the introduction was delayed to 1939, the need for Seamen’s insurance itself had been long 
discussed since the 1910s, and the first draft bill was prepared in the early 1920s. See MHW 
Insurance Bureau (Koseisho Hoken kyoku), ed. 1958. Sen’in Hoken Jugonen shi (15-year History o f  
Seamen's Insurance). Tokyo: Sen'in Hoken kai.
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for sailors (the Seamen’s Insurance or Sen’in Hoken) was introduced, this in turn 
encouraged the introduction of a similar scheme for blue-collar workers on land (the 
Workers Pension Insurance (WPI) or Rodosha Nenkin) on the grounds of equal 
treatment of workers. Hanasawa Takeo, one of the key officials who were in charge 
of establishing the public pension system, later recounted the strong demand of the 
time from the shipping unions for establishing the public pension system for sailors, 
and confirmed its implications for the introduction of public pension schemes not 
only for sailors but also for workers on land (Koseidan 1988: 10-15). However, 
under the feudal system of the Tokugawa regime, a clear demarcation of classes 
would have justified the discriminatory treatment of workers from the different 
sectors. In this sense, although the democracy in Imperial Japan was limited in 
nature and citizenship rights were severely compromised under the military regime, 
the state-led modernisation project since the end of the 19 century helped to 
establish the belief in an ideal of fundamental equality among commoners.
On the other hand, the limitation of Imperial democracy (Gordon 1991) was also 
clear in the new pension system. It allowed workers to be evaluated according to 
their usefulness for the Empire. Indeed, the sense of inequality among workers 
might not have been problematised to such an extent if policy makers had not felt the 
need to co-opt workers for war efforts through increased productivity. Thus, certain 
groups of labourers such as miners and seamen received preferential treatments in 
the newly introduced pension system because their work was perceived as vital to the 
war. This demonstrated that the state was still able to legitimise differential 
treatment among workers as it saw fit under the name of national interest.
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Another differential treatment which was legitimised was between women and men. 
The newly established WPI limited its mandatory coverage to male workers and left 
female workers to voluntary membership despite the substantial number of female 
workers in the covered industries. Although the ‘woman question’ did surface in the 
process of drawing up the bill, women’s exclusion from the pension scheme was 
justified by defining them as future wives and mothers. In the deliberation at the 
Diet, the Minister of Health and Welfare explained women’s exclusion as follows:
‘Women work only until marriage to complement the household incomes 
or save up money for wedding preparation, thus, their employment 
period is short. Therefore, to make it compulsory to join in a long-term 
insurance such as pension would be firstly disadvantageous to female 
workers themselves, and secondly, the insurance technique to avoid their 
disadvantage would be too complicated and difficult to implement 
(Koseidan 1953: 54-55)’.
To the government, female workers were first and foremost future wives and mothers. 
Indeed, the bearing and rearing of future soldiers was considered to be an important 
service of women in Imperial Japan, to such an extent that the newly introduced WPI 
included special clauses for female, workers who joined the scheme voluntarily40. 
One of such examples was the handling of the payment record of less than 6 months. 
True to the stated goal of increased productivity, WPI included a clause which 
disregarded premiums paid for less than 6 months in a workplace in order to 
discourage workers’ job hopping. However, if a female member left the scheme due 
to marriage, her payment record was valid even if it was less than 6 months 
(Insurance Law Implementation Regulations (Hoken ho shiko kisoku) 1941.12.29). 
Despite the stated objective to enhance the productivity through WPI, therefore, the
40 While not so many female workers took out the voluntary coverage, there were 72 female voluntary 
members in 1942. See p.453 in Koseidan, ed. 1953. Kosei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history 
o f the Employees' Pension Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan. The total number o f WPI members (both 
mandatory and voluntary) in the same year was 60,070.
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policy makers of the time refused to admit the vital importance of female labour, let 
alone the latter’s contribution to the national economy.
3.1.3 The Employees’ Pension Insurance and women
Within a year of the introduction of WPI, the need for a reform was widely 
recognised. Although policy makers propagated the newly introduced WPI as 
benevolence of the state to reward workers’ vital contribution (Koseidan 1953: 152), 
WPI was more likely to kindle workers’ dissatisfaction with the scheme due to its 
limited coverage and strict criteria for ungenerous benefits. Especially problematised 
was dissatisfaction among conscripted workers, whose service became increasingly 
indispensable to the war economy (ibid: 150). Most of these workers were on a two- 
year contract, and thus their payment to the pension fund was simply wasted for them 
because in order to receive any benefits at all, including a lump-sum Withdrawal 
Payment (Dattai ichiji kin)4\  at least three years of premium payment was required. 
There was also a need to deal with the issue of differential treatment of white- and 
blue-collar workers as well as of female and male workers, who were all supposed to 
be on a patriotic service. Especially, the exclusion of growing numbers of female 
workers from the scheme was increasingly considered to be inappropriate. Unlike 
pre-war years, female workers were not concentrated in the light industries but were 
mobilised to fill in the vacancies left by men in ‘male’ sectors and positions.
41 Due to its long minimum payment years (20 years) combined with limited coverage o f the scheme 
(workplaces with 10 or more operatives), it was predicted that many workers would fail to accrue the 
entitlement to the old-age pensions. Especially, the exclusion o f workplaces with less than 10 
operatives meant that only minority of workers would be able to satisfy minimum payment years 
because of the prevalence of small-scale businesses in Japan. This was justified by quoting the similar 
restrictions in the Health Insurance for workers introduced in 1922 (see, for example, the official 
explanation of the bill by the Pension Bureau Chief presented in the Imperial Diet quoted in Koseidan 
(1953: 53-54)). However, in order to avoid dissatisfaction o f workers, who could not satisfy the 
required minimum payment period, a clause for de facto refund was included for premature 
withdrawal from the scheme for those with payment record of at least three years.
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Reversing the trends towards ‘women’s protection’ in the 1920s and the early 1930s, 
some protective labour laws were suspended to lift the ban on women’s engagement 
in certain occupations and on night shifts42. The share of female labour force in the 
civilian industries grew from 35 per cent in 1930 to 39 per cent in 1940 and 42 per 
cent in 1944. The increase was especially steep in heavy industries for younger 
women, while middle-aged women were mobilized to labour in agriculture (Cohen 
1949: 288-290).
In order to resolve these issues and to enhance the policy ‘effects’ of WPI, an 
amendment bill was submitted in January 1944. The Minister of Health and Welfare 
this time justified women’s inclusion by citing their advancement into the key 
industries. The bill was passed swiftly through the Diet, extending the coverage and 
improving the benefit level significantly43. The revised pension system, now 
renamed as Kosei Nenkin or Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI), covered as the 
mandatory insured both sexes of blue- and while-collar workers in enterprises with a 
workforce of five or more people. As a result, the number of the insured jumped 
from 3.5 million in 1941 to 8.3 million in 1944 (Koseidan 1953: 453).
Inclusion of female workers, however, did not mean that women began being treated 
as fully-fledged wage earners. Women’s entry into non-conventional areas of paid 
work was considered to be an anomalous situation resulting from the national 
emergency and therefore they were not expected to remain in the position once the
42 This change in policies towards women can be well illustrated in coal mining industry. Although 
women in the pit were not uncommon in the 1920s, the ban on the practice was stipulated in 1928 
with the grace period o f five years. By 1933, the number o f female pit workers dropped, although 
they were never eliminated due to many exemption rules and lax enforcement. In 1933, however, the 
ban was partially lifted and revoked completely in 1939. For the impact o f the protective labour 
legislation on female coal-miners, see Mathias, Regine. 1993. Female labour in the Japanese coal­
mining industry. In Japanese Women Working, edited by J. Hunter. London: Routledge.
43 To finance these improvements, however, the premium rate was raised to 11 per cent for both sexes.
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war ended. Moreover, women were more encouraged to serve the state through their 
role as mothers44. Unlike Britain or the United States, the mobilisation of women for 
industries was never thorough in Japan (Cohen 1949: 272)45. The government did 
not introduce conscription of women until the last stage of the war, and never did for 
married women. Although those of working age (women between 12 and 39, and 
men between 12 and 59) had to register their employment status, married women and 
women with children were exempted from the requirement. Moreover, apart from 
abundant propaganda and neighbourhood pressure, the government did not resort to 
forceful measures to mobilize ‘unoccupied’ women into the labour market. As a 
result, even at the height of conscription for war work in 1944, about 6.3 million 
women aged between 15 and 39 were classified as unoccupied (ibid: 319-322). 
Through the enshrinement of motherhood and indoctrination of the ideology of the 
family-state, women were still expected to exit from the labour market on marriage 
or childbearing and thus to leave the pension system without fulfilling the minimum 
eligible period.
Reflecting this assumption, some clauses of WPI were added or amended to 
explicitly encourage marriage for female workers when it was transformed into EPI. 
For example, the required minimum period for the Withdrawal Payment was shorter 
for women (6 months rather than 3 years) if their reason of withdrawal was marriage. 
A new lump-sum marriage benefit -  equivalent to six-month salary -  was also
44 For an analysis o f the revitalisation o f ‘good wife, wise mother’ ideology and the dilemma the 
government faced against the backdrop of labour shortage during the war, see Miyake, Yoshiko. 1991. 
Doubling Expectations: Motherhood and Women's Factory Work Under State Management in Japan 
in the 1930s and 1940s. In Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945, edited by G. L. Bernstein. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
45 However, the extent o f female mobilisation in Japan was greater than in Germany. While in Japan, 
the number of women in civilian labour force increased by 1.25 million between 1940 and 1944, in 
Germany the number was 0.3 million between 1939 and 1944. See p. 290 in Cohen, Jerome Bernard. 
1949. Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction. Minneapolis,: Univ. o f Minnesota press.
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created for female workers with membership record of three years or more. On the 
other hand, unlike miners, for whom the minimum required contribution period was 
shortened, women did not receive any special arrangements to facilitate the access to 
their own old-age pensions. While the state was willing to grant women one-off 
benefits for their national service as mothers, it ignored the long-term consequences 
of the service -  namely, the lack of their own pensions.
Women’s loss of the entitlement to their own pensions was not problematised, 
because women were expected to marry to be provided for by their husband. Unlike 
the eligibility as wage earners, eligibility as wives was included from the outset in 
the form of survivor’s benefits both in the Seamen’s Insurance (lump-sum benefits) 
and Workers’ Pension Insurance (pensions for 10 years). In WPI, if the deceased 
had satisfied the minimum period of membership (20 years), the survivors were 
entitled to benefits equivalent to half of the old-age pensions for ten years. Moreover, 
widows were treated more favourably than other possible beneficiaries46. Unlike 
others, widows were able to receive the Survivor’s Pension (SP) regardless of their 
health status or age47. The 1944 reform further improved SP. The benefit became a 
life-time provision, and the requirement of a minimum period of membership was 
abolished if the death was caused by occupational accident or disease. Also, an
46 Family members who were entitled to survivor’s benefits were, and still are, numerous in the 
Japanese pension system. They include spouses (including common-law spouses), minor/disabled 
children, aged/disabled parents, minor/disabled grandchildren and aged/disabled grandparents who 
were financially supported by the deceased. The priority of the benefits was given in the above order. 
In WPI, however, more detailed hierarchy was legislated among the survivors in reflection of the ie 
system. In principle, men had a priority over women, and adoptive relations had a priority over blood 
relations. In the descending line, the priority was given following the inheritance order. The 
entitlement belonged to those in the ie, thus, if a widow remarried and left the ie, she would be 
disqualified and the next survivor in order in the ie would inherit the entitlement until the 10 year 
period was expired. (Ordinance for Insurance Law Implementation (Hoken Ho Shikd Rei) 
1941.12.29)
47 Survivors except widows and orphans were entitled to survivor’s benefits only if they were aged 60 
or over or invalid at the time o f the death o f the insured and remained so without other means for 
living.
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additional allowance (Shijo warimashi kin) was introduced for the recipients of SP 
with minor children. This new additional benefit was justified as a means to 
‘encourage childbearing’48.
These favourable arrangements for wives (or more precisely, widows) 
notwithstanding, the central focus was neither on women’s economic welfare nor on 
men’s breadwinning role in old age. Hanasawa Takeo, a key MHW bureaucrat in 
establishing WPI and EPI, later recalled that opposing conservative politicians and 
peers in the Diet granted their assent only when they were assured that the new 
pension schemes were no more than giving workers some pocket money, and thus 
some limited autonomy in old age rather than full economic independence (Koseidan 
1988: 20-21). Explicitly and implicitly assumed in this compromise was that the 
main provider for old age would be and should be the family under the ie system. 
Ignored in it was the need for any financial autonomy in old age of female workers 
and of the elderly of the time.
3.2 Women’s place in the post-war pension system
Japan’s surrender in August 1945 entailed radical transformation of socio-economic 
and political systems. Under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP)49, the ie system, which had been the basis of social systems in Japan, 
was overturned by the introduction of the new Constitution (promulgated in 1946) 
and the revision of the Civil Code. The new Constitution clearly stated the equality 
between women and men, and the revised Civil Code denied the privilege and
48 See, for example, the official explanation o f the rationale for the reform by Ministry o f Health and 
Welfare in the Special Committee, the 84th Imperial Diet Session, quoted in p. 161 Koseidan, ed. 
1953. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history o f the Employees' Pension Insurance). Tokyo: 
Koseidan.
49 Japan was under occupation until 28th April, 1952.
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authority of the head of the household, laying down equal partnership between 
husband and wife, and equal inheritance rights of all children50. In this new 
legislation, the assumed model family was no longer an extended family as in the ie 
system, but a nuclear family, consisting of a married couple and minor children.
This change had profound implications for the relationship between the state and 
individuals. Undemocratic though it might have been, the patriarchal extended 
family had operated as a form of a safety net. Thus, the denial of the ie system 
necessitated more finely-meshed public safety net. Indeed, in post-war Japan, the 
state began to take direct responsibility for citizens’ welfare. The new Constitution 
stipulated citizens’ rights to a social minimum as follows:
Article 25: All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum 
standards of wholesome and cultural living. In all spheres of life, the 
State shall use its endeavours for the promotion and extension of social 
welfare and security, and of public health.
Along with these new social relations, however, there remained elements of old ones 
in legislation regulating the responsibilities of family support. In the revised Civil 
Code, the obligation of family support extended well beyond the new family model 
to include not only lineal families and siblings but, under certain circumstances, also 
collateral relatives up to the third degree. The difference from the old laws was that 
the eldest son was no longer solely responsible for providing for retired parents and 
poor relatives. All the siblings were equally responsible under the new law. 
Nonetheless, social customs did not change overnight, and the extended family 
remained a key provider of welfare in need. This was especially true of provision for 
old age. Partly because of the immaturity and limited coverage of the state pension
50 The equal inheritance right o f children outside marriage was not, and still is not, guaranteed.
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system, it was often the case that the eldest sons took in or stayed with their aged 
parents, which usually meant that care responsibilities remained with their wives as 
dutiful daughters-in-law. Changes in the family norms had to wait for corresponding 
economic feasibility of the new family model, for which a substantial increase in the 
state’s role (such as better public pensions) was necessary. However, in the 
immediate post-war years, the Japanese pension system was on the brink of collapse.
3.2.1 Post-war emergency
With the end of the Pacific War, the objective of the pension system was transformed 
from a tool for the war efforts to a means of providing economic security51. Within a 
couple of years of the surrender, clauses which were explicitly linked to war efforts -  
such as marriage payment and additions for long-term job retention -  were deleted. 
Amendments were also introduced to clauses which reflected the ie ideology such as 
men’s priority for the receipt of SP.
However, the most pressing issue of the time was the sustainability of the pension 
system itself. As a result of the rapid inflation and destroyed national economy, the 
real value of the benefits was reducing quickly while the membership was 
plummeting53. Moreover, day-to-day survival was a more relevant issue for most of 
the Japanese of the time rather than benefits in the distant future.
51 See, for example, a commentary by the head of pension division, MHW, quoted in pp. 216-218, 
Koseidan, ed. 1953. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history o f  the Employees' Pension 
Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
52 Although the payment o f old-age pensions had not started yet, invalidity and survivor’s benefits 
were already in payment.
53 The number of the insured decreased from 7.9 million in July 1945 to 4.2 million a year later. See p. 
221 in Koseidan, ed. 1953. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history o f  the Employees' Pension 
Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
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In response to these situations, the government facilitated the receipt of the 
Withdrawal Payment54 in 1946 (amended in 1947) so as to minimize the effects of 
inflation as well as to use the benefit as a de facto unemployment benefit55. This had 
a profound gender implication. Although this arrangement itself was gender-neutral, 
the employment policy taken at the time was not. With the end of the war, the 
government took active policies to send women back home to free up jobs for men 
who were returning from the front and former colonies56. Bans on women’s 
underground mining work and night shift were also reintroduced. As a result, the 
number of the female insured (both mandatory and voluntary) dramatically dropped 
from 2.2 million in 1944 to 1 million in 1945 (Koseidan 1953: 453).
This situation changed only marginally, if at all, as a result of the 1948 reform. Well 
aware of the long-term disadvantage of the Withdrawal Payment for workers, the 
government tried to discourage its receipt through an increase in the minimum 
eligible period of membership (from 6 months to 5 years) and the introduction of 
waiting period for the receipt (not payable not until the age 50 or over). However, 
the government was not particularly concerned about female workers’ loss of 
pension entitlement. If the reason for withdrawal was either marriage or childbirth, 
women were still able to receive the lump-sum payment immediately with the 
membership record of 6 months. On the other hand, the government refused to 
adjust the real value of the payment unlike the cases for the Invalidity Pension or the 
Survivor’s Pension. Through these policies, many female wage earners lost their
54 See footnote 40 for the explanation of the benefit.
55 There was no unemployment benefit at the time.
56 Indeed, MHW urged the government to implement policies to replace women as well as the elderly 
and children in the workplace with working-age men. See proposed directions o f labour policies by 
the Minister of MHW in the Cabinet meeting on 16th December 1945, pp. 16-17 Shakai Hosho 
Kenkyujo, ed. 1975a. Nihon Shakai Hosho Shiryo /. Vol. I. Tokyo: Shiseido.
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pension entitlement for a nominal level of benefits. As in the pre-war years, 
women’s pension rights were not considered seriously because women were 
expected to be provided for by their male breadwinners.
Despite this differential treatment between female and male workers, the principle of 
gender equality in the new Constitution and the Civil Code was not totally ignored 
by the policy makers. In the 1948 Reform, the eligibility criteria for SP were 
equalised between widows and widowers on the grounds of gender equality 
(Koseidan 1988: 51-52). Similarly, widowers were included in a newly introduced 
benefit -  the Widow(er)’s Pension (WP) -  again on the grounds of gender equality. 
WP was created for economically dependent wives/ husbands whose spouse died due 
to occupational accidents or diseases with membership record of less than 20 years
C *7
but 6 months or more . While widowers were completely excluded in the first draft 
bill for WP, the exclusion was problematised in the preparation process and in the 
end the government decided to include them (ibid.).
Nonetheless, the policy makers of tlie time could not overcome the long-held 
assumptions of the gender division of labour. While they were aware of the principle 
of gender equality and adjusted some EPI clauses to better accommodate the new 
norm, they failed to problematise the assumptions on social roles based on gender. 
Thus, differential treatment of women and men due to their assumed gender roles 
was not considered to be against the principle of gender equality. On the contrary, 
the gender equality which was based on the Western family ideology of the time -  a 
nuclear family based on male breadwinner/ female homemaker model -  further
57 In contrast, the Survivor’s Pension was payable only if the deceased had a membership record of at 
least 20 years or died from occupational injuries or diseases.
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endorsed women’s primary role as homemakers, and thus, their economic
• • c odependency in marriage . In the pension system, this assumption was apparent in 
the differential treatment of widows and widowers in WP. One of the differences 
was top-up benefit for minor children. Although widows could receive dependant 
additions for their minor children from the marriage, this extra help was not available 
for widowers. There was also age difference in the eligibility. Widowers could 
receive the benefit only if he was aged 55 or over or disabled when the insured died, 
while the age threshold for widows was 50 or none if they had minor children.
The implications of the differential treatment of women and men were mixed for 
women. From a perspective of equal pension rights, it was problematic without 
doubt. Differential treatment of widows and widowers could be interpreted as a 
discriminatory practice against women as wage earners by granting less benefit 
provision for their dependent spouse (Shiota 1997). While it was repeatedly argued 
that the system was based on the social reality in the course of reform debates 
throughout the Japanese public pension history59, these arrangements were not a 
simple reaction to the reality but could be said to have encouraged women to comply 
with the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model (Murakami 1994; Tamiya 
2003; Yokoyama 2002).
However, from a viewpoint of women’s economic welfare, it would be more difficult 
to judge whether these differential treatments were disadvantageous or otherwise to
58 For the dominant gender ideologies o f SCAP and their implications for labour policies in Japan 
during the Occupation, see, for example, Toyoda, Maho. 2007. Senrydka no Josei Rodo Kaikaku: 
Hogo to Byodo wo megutte (Female Labour Reform under the Occupation: Over Protection and 
Equality). Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
59 See, for example, narratives and interviews o f welfare bureaucrats in Koseidan, ed. 1953. Kdsei 
Nenkin Hoken 10 nen shi (10-year history o f the Employees' Pension Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan, 
Koseidan, ed. 1988. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken Seido Kaikoroku (Memoir o f  the Employees' Pension 
Insurance System). Tokyo: Shakai Hoken Hoki Kenkyukai.
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women. The advantageous treatments of widows could also be understood as a 
favourable treatment of women as mothers. Indeed, widows, especially widowed 
mothers, were one of the major groups which were considered to be in urgent need of 
public financial help in the immediate post-war years because of the very assumption 
of their economic dependency in marriage and motherhood. Admittedly, neither SP 
nor WP was directly aimed at improving women’s economic welfare in old age. Still, 
many women must have benefited from these provisions in old age.
Beneficiaries of differential treatments were not limited to widows. For women who 
did continue to stay in the labour market, the assumptions of most women’s 
premature withdrawal were not totally unfavourable, at least in terms of premium 
rate. In the post-war pension system, the rate of female workers was set lower than 
men’s on the grounds of fairness, considering their limited possibility for gaining the 
entitlement to old-age pensions and the abolition of female specific benefits such as 
marriage payment. The lower premium rate undoubtedly helped female workers 
who were generally lower paid than male counterparts. The difference in the 
premium rates continued until the 1980 Reform, which decided to gradually equalize 
the rates between the sexes.
A choice between equal treatment and better economic welfare would have been 
difficult to make, if one had to choose either (Pateman 1988; 1992). However, the 
issue was not even raised as a problem during this period in the national political 
arena. The principle of equality between women and men was accepted under the 
new Constitution, but the ideology on gender roles was not significantly challenged
111
yet60. Accordingly, women’s economic welfare was protected through special 
clauses and derived benefits much in the same way as with the pre-war pension 
system.
3.2.2 The Women Question again: inclusion or exclusion
The reforms in the immediate post-war years were in any case unsustainable 
temporary measures to weather the national emergency. It was therefore a general 
consensus that fundamental reform should be made to normalise the situation before 
1954 when the first wave of payment for matured old-age pensions would start. By 
the early 1950s, a number of recommendations and proposals had been put forward 
for the fundamental reform of the whole social security system. One of the first 
official recommendations came in October 1947 from the Inquiry into Social 
Security System {Shakai Hosho Seido Chosakai), an advisory body of MHW. 
However, its report ‘Outline of the Social Security System {Shakai Hosho Seido 
Ydkdy was regarded as too idealistic to be implemented given the socio-economic 
situation in Japan then. On the other hand, a report in July 1948 by the Social 
Security Mission from the US had a profound influence on post-war Japan 
(Murakami 2000). It recommended, among others, that an advisory body 
accountable to the cabinet should be set up to discuss issues on the social security 
system in Japan. Accordingly, in 1949, Shakai Hosho Seido Shingikai or the 
Advisory Council on Social Security System (ACSS) was founded as an advisory 
committee for the prime minister, which was to become one of the key bodies to 
affect the course of social security reforms in Japan.
60 A symbolic example of acceptance of women’s role as homemakers by women themselves was the 
logos of an eminent consumers group established in 1948 -  Shufu Rengd kai (the League of 
Housewives). Their chosen logo was a rice scoop {shamoji) and apron -  symbols of women’s primary 
role in the domestic sphere.
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In 1950, ACSS submitted a report entitled ‘Recommendations on the Social Security 
System’, which urged the government to establish a coherent social security system 
to embody the spirit of the Article 25 of the Constitution (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 
1975a: 187-205). The report suggested that social insurance be the basis of such a 
social security system, which should be complemented by public relief and various 
social services for public health and special needs (ibid.: 189-190). With regard to 
old-age pensions, although the report stated one national uniform pension system as 
an ideal, it recommended a dual system as a transitory compromise, which was to 
consist of a pension scheme financed by general revenue for limited groups of people 
and one financed by premiums for the employed (ibid.: 192-194). For the latter, the 
report recommended the continuity of the existing basic framework for the time 
being due mainly to the limitation of national wealth for the expansion of the 
coverage (ibid.: 192).
While this report by ACSS was widely publicized, it took another four years for the
government to introduce a fundamental reform in the pension system. This was
mainly due to the difficulties of reaching consensus and compromise among the
conflicting interests. The first brief outline for the reform was put forward by MHW
in October 1952 (MHW 1952), to which major organisations from the labour and
business expressed their opposition (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1975a: 445-451).
Although the government tried to satisfy these opposing voices to a certain extent in
the final draft bill, even this proposal met a heavy criticism from various
organisations, including ACSS, for ignoring its recommendations (ACSS 1954;
Koseidan 1988: 77-110). After making some further revision, the government
submitted the reform bill to the Diet, and in May 1954, the bill was passed with some
amendments. As a result, a series of drastic changes were introduced in EPI. The
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finance was modified from a fully funded system to a partial pay-as-you-go system 
in order to contain the rise in contribution rate. Also, a redistributive function was 
introduced by dividing the benefits into a flat-rate part and an eamings-related part.
For women, however, the significance of the 1954 Reform was arguably rather more 
in the continuation and the consolidation of the male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker model in the public pension system. Based on this model, women’s 
status as wage earners remained being treated with special clauses. As noted above, 
the premium rate for female workers continued to be lower than that of men. 
Another differential treatment from men was the pensionable age. Although the 
pensionable age for men was decided to be gradually raised from 55 to 60, that for 
women remained to be 55. Despite the lower pensionable age, women still had to 
fulfil the same minimum contribution period with men -  20 years -  for the 
entitlement to EPI old-age pensions61. Considering the difficulties to keep a job after 
an official retirement age for most employees, the earlier pensionable age could put 
women in more difficult situations to accrue an entitlement to a decent level of 
pensions in their own right. Women were thus left to face longer years in retirement 
due to earlier pensionable age and longer life expectancy with lower benefits to live 
on.
Even this earlier retirement age was considered to be hard to achieve for women. 
Indeed, in the discussions run up to the 1954 reform, women’s inclusion in the 
pension system as wage earners itself was again perceived as problematic. This 
‘woman question’ resurfaced during the discussions on the termination of the
61 The minimum required period could be reduced to 15 year after age 35 for women (age 40 in the 
case of men). If satisfied this condition, the flat-rate part was to be calculated as if the insured had 
contributed for 20 years.
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Withdrawal Payment. While this payment was originally introduced as a refund and 
had functioned as a de facto unemployment benefit, it had been long criticised for 
being against a social insurance principle. Since the unemployment insurance was 
newly created in 1947, the government proposed to abolish the Withdrawal Payment 
completely in the first draft outline of the 1954 reform . However, the government 
was also concerned about the implications of this move for female workers. On the 
one hand, it was regarded as disadvantageous for female workers, who were 
expected to, and indeed many of them did63, leave the labour market after several 
years, to treat them in the same manner with male workers to be included in a long­
term insurance scheme without a refund. On the other hand, since the contingencies 
of invalidity and death were also included in EPI, total exclusion was also considered 
to be against the interests of female workers. In order to solve this dilemma, the 
government proposed to enable female workers to opt out of EPI on the grounds of 
fairness for female workers (MHW Insurance Bureau 1958: 142-144).
In reaction to this government’s proposal, the three interest groups represented in 
governmental advisory bodies -  namely, the business, the labour and the public 
interest -  showed contrasting reactions (ibid.: 167-187). While business 
representatives agreed with the government in the need to abolish the Withdrawal 
Payment, they proposed to enable female workers to opt in EPI, rather than opt out, 
in order to avoid the perceived possible disadvantages to them from this ban. In 
contrast, the labour side opposed the abolition of the Withdrawal Payment in general 
but especially for women. They argued that, given female workers’ weaker position
62 The first draft outline can be found in pp. 149-155 MHW Insurance Bureau (Kosei sho Hoken 
kyoku), ed. 1958. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken 15 nen shi (15-year History o f  the Employees' Pension 
Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
63 In 1949, 85 per cent of female employees had work record o f 3 years or less. See p. 143 Ibid.
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vis-a-vis employers, women’s voluntary membership would in effect hinder their 
participation in EPI because the employers would be happy to avoid their share of 
premium payment. Thus, they asserted, women’s membership in EPI should be 
compulsory and their interests should continue to be protected by the Withdrawal 
Payment. The position of those representing the public interest was closer to the 
labour, arguing for the compulsory membership of both women and men. With 
regard to the Withdrawal Payment, those in this camp proposed a total ban for men 
but to create a certain compensatory benefit for women.
Taking these arguments into account, the government outlined a revised draft which 
proposed mandatory membership for both sexes as well as the creation of a new 
lump-sum benefit to replace the Withdrawal Payment for female workers with an 
EPI membership record of at least 3 years. This proposal, however, again failed to 
secure the assent of various interests. After a series of negotiations, the final reform 
bill laid down the compulsory membership for both sexes and the continuity of the 
Withdrawal Payment. As a way to discourage the Withdrawal Payment, however, 
the minimum membership period for the entitlement for women was extended from 6 
months to 2 years (for men, it was 5 years since 1948).
Although the revised law narrowed the gap between women and men in the 
minimum required period for the entitlement to the Withdrawal Payment, the 
introduced clause still accepted the differential treatment between the sexes in EPI. 
Moreover, the new clause on the Withdrawal Payment in a way further endorsed 
women’s marginal position as wage earners. While the previous clause limited the 
acceptable reasons for women’s shorter minimum period (6 months) to marriage or 
pregnancy, the new clause allowed women to receive the Withdrawal Payment after
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2 years of membership just because they were women. Moreover, the timing of 
receiving the lump-sum payment was also differentiated between women and men. 
While men had to wait until their pensionable age, women were able to receive the 
payment upon their withdrawal from the scheme regardless of their age.
As can be seen in this example, differential treatment of women and men in the 
public pension system was often put forward on the grounds of women’s interests 
and largely regarded as a fair measure for women, who were considered to have a 
different social role from men64. With regard to the Withdrawal Payment, although 
the above special treatment of female workers was originally introduced as a 
temporary measure, the termination was postponed repeatedly until the mid-1980s. 
Rather than rectifying this situation, efforts to improve women’s lot in old age were 
mainly focused on improving the share of wives.
3.2.3 Consolidated status as wives
The 1954 Reform consolidated the principle in EPI that the household was the basic 
unit for the provision. For the first time, all wives of the insured employees were 
treated unanimously as dependants. Until this reform, the Additional Pension for 
Dependants (APD) for dependent spouse was paid only to pensioners with a disabled 
spouse. However, the reform extended this provision to all spouses of the insured, 
treating wives’ economic dependency on their husband as given.
While it was often regarded in later years that this move in the 1954 created the
foundation of women’s status as dependants in the public pension system, most
criticisms from advocates of the time for women’s pensions were not about the
64 See, for example, the explanation o f the reformed Withdrawal Payment by MHW in pp. 363-364 
Ibid.
underlying gender assumptions but about the low level of APD (Murakami 1994). 
This was in a way understandable considering the growing number of housewives in 
Japan. Much in a similar way with pre-war and war-time years, but in more 
democratic rhetoric, many business, civil and government organisations endorsed the 
gender division of labour through various movements for domestic life improvement, 
encouraging women to identify themselves as housewives first and foremost (Gordon 
1997)65. Moreover, unlike pre-war years, the promoted gender ideal was gradually 
becoming achievable for much wider population in post-war Japan. As the economy 
grew and its structure changed from the one based on primary industry to the one 
based on secondary and tertiary industries, more women were enabled to, and did, 
withdraw from the labour market to form the ‘Post-War Family’ (Sengo Kazoku) or 
the nuclear family based on the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model (Ochiai 
2004)66.
However, for housewives to solely rely on APD as a provision for old age, its level 
was indeed quite limited; 400 yen per month or 20 per cent of the flat-rate part of the 
old-age pension. In the run-up to the 1954 Reform, the level of this APD was one of 
the contentious issues (MHW Insurance Bureau 1958). On the one hand, there were 
arguments to set the level at the same with the flat-rate part of old-age pension. 
Proponents of this position argued that since the level of this part was based on the 
income support level for one person, the dependants should also need the same 
amount. Opponents on the other hand argued that it was unfair and unacceptable to
65 This period was also marked as the beginning of the corporate-centred society in Japan. See pp. 62- 
63 in Chapter 1.
66 Although heated debates erupted in the mid-1950s on housewives (often referred to as the first 
housewife debate or Dai Ichi j i  Shufu Ronso), those who argued for married women’s labour market 
participation did not necessarily questioned women’s role as primary homemakers and carers. See 
Ueno, Chizuko, ed. 1982. Shufu Ronso wo Yomu (Reading Housewife Debates). 2 vols. Vol. 1. Tokyo: 
Keiso Shobo.
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provide the same level of benefits to those who had not paid premiums. In the end, 
financial constraint dictated and the amount of APD was decided as a considerably 
lower level than the flat-rate part.
More than its low level of provision, however, APD was fundamentally flawed from 
the viewpoint of married women’s pension rights. Although APD for dependent 
spouse was largely discussed as a benefit for wives, it was paid to the insured 
(usually husbands) rather than to the dependants themselves. What was assisted by 
APD, therefore, was the norm of husbands’ role as the main breadwinner rather than 
improving women’s lot.
The only chance wives could directly receive pensions as derived rights was thus 
limited to their widowhood. The 1954 Reform merged WP and SP, and the 
eligibility criteria were streamlined. As a result of the reform, the minimum 
membership period for new SP became 6 months for all eligible survivors. The 
minimum eligible age for widows was set at 40 (payable at 55) unless they had minor 
children. When these criteria were satisfied, widows could receive half of the old- 
age pensions of the deceased with APD for children. Here, the gendered norm was 
again reinforced through the differential treatment of widows and widowers. 
Husbands who did not comply with the socially expected role as the main 
breadwinner were able to expect less from EPI. The minimum eligible age for 
widowers was set at 60, and APD for children was not provided even if they had 
minor children from the marriage. While the possibility of widowers’ economic 
dependency on their wife was acknowledged, it was apparently not assumed that they 
would be responsible for the care of children.
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Neither assumed were the cases where wives had entitlement to EPI in their own 
right. Thus, even if wives were receiving their own EPI pensions, their husband with 
EPI pensions were still able to receive APD for dependent spouse. Although this 
point became a source of heated debates in later years, it was not taken up as a major 
problem in the 1950s. This was partly due to the strong gender ideology and partly 
due to the fact that only the minority of married women were employed. According 
to the Census in 1955, only 16.5 per cent of employees aged 15 and over were 
women, and only 15 per cent of the female employees were married (Japan Statistics 
Bureau 1955). Moreover, the number of pensioners was still limited and the level of 
provision was not substantial yet. The level of benefits was 26.5 per cent of the 
monthly average standard remuneration (Conrad 2001: 25), which was too low to 
support an individual, let alone a whole family. The benefits were more of a 
supplement to incomes from other sources such as one’s own earnings or other 
family members. Although gradually decreasing in number, the dominant living 
arrangement was still to live with their adult children.
3.3 The foundation of National Pension
After the overhaul of EPI, next issue looming large as a problem was the limited 
coverage of the population (Campbell 1992; Lewis 1981). Despite the consolidation 
of the public pension system, those who could benefit from it were quite limited. 
Although farmers and the self-employed constituted a large part of the total labour 
force, they were excluded from any public pension schemes. Similarly, those 
employed in businesses with less than 5 workers were exempted from compulsory 
coverage. Thus, as of March 1958, about 30 per cent of all the employed was not
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insured, and 68 per cent of the total labour force was outside of the system (MHW 
1958: 56).
Even those who were included in the public pension schemes were also at risk of 
non-entitlement to old-age pensions. Due to the limitation of bridging measures 
between different public pension schemes67, those who were covered by more than 
one pension schemes over their lifetime could have reduced, or even lost, pension 
entitlement. Among EPI members, 43 per cent of male members and 93 per cent of 
female members left the scheme without pension entitlement (MHW 1958: 71).
These limitations of the public pension system were well acknowledged even at the 
time when the government submitted a bill for Worker’s Pension Insurance (MHW 
Insurance Bureau 1958: 29). In post-war Japan, advisory bodies such as ACSS 
repeatedly called for a universal public pension system. Thus, when the government 
submitted a bill for the major pension reform in 1954, most MPs agreed on the need 
to extend the coverage beyond the existing level. As a result, the 1954 reform bill 
was passed with a resolution which required the government endeavour to establish a 
pension system for all the population as soon as possible (House of Representatives 
1954).
In addition to the improvement for the future elderly, there were also growing 
demands for public provisions for the elderly of the day (MHW Pension Bureau 
1968: 174-175). Due to the short history of the public pension system for private 
sector workers, those who were already old were totally excluded from the system. 
However, as the economic basis shifted from primary industries to secondary and
67 In addition to the separation between public and private sectors, several occupational groups left 
EPI and set up their own public pension schemes in the 1950s.
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tertiary industries, the dominant family forms changed from the traditional extended 
family to the nuclear family, gradually revealing the limitation of the informal 
support network for individuals in need. From the early 1950s, the limitation of the 
traditional intergenerational support system and the economic plight of the elderly 
began attracting national attention from the early 1950s (Koyama 1959).
Related to this point, another factor which encouraged the demand for public 
intervention for the elderly of the day was the growing awareness about their 
economic plight (Lewis 1981). The economic vulnerability of elderly households 
was in a stark contrast with the rapid increase in the average incomes and the living 
standard of working-age population. In its annual report in 1956, MHW emphasised 
the need for alleviating poverty among those who were left behind from the 
economic growth, of which the elderly was one of the key groups (MHW 1956). In 
response to these situations, from the mid-1950s, some local governments started 
granting the ‘Pension to Respect the Elderly (Keird Nenkiny to older people in their 
districts68. Although these payments were nothing more than a pocket money level, 
they contributed to stimulating discussions for the national-level pensions for all the 
elderly (ibid.).
Also encouraged these discussions was the increasing realization of the population 
ageing among key policy makers. Indeed, annual reports of MHW in the late 1950s 
repeatedly pointed out the fast growth in the number and proportion of the elderly 
due to the rapid lengthening longevity and decreasing fertility (MHW 1956; 1957;
1958). Together with the revealed limitation of the familial support and poverty
68 By 1958, 232 local authorities had introduced this kind o f provision. See Koyama, Shinjiro. 1959. 
Kokumin Nenkin ho no Kaisetsu (Explanation o f  the National Pension Law). Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin sha.
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among the elderly, the prospect of rapid population ageing further enhanced the 
discussions on the need for some sort of public provision for old age for all the 
population.
3.3.1 National Pension
By the mid-1950s, all the political parties issued their manifestoes promising the 
establishment of the pension for all (MHW 1958: 61). Anticipating the introduction, 
MHW set up a committee in May 1957 to discuss the design of a pension scheme for 
all69. By the general election in May 1958, therefore, the introduction of Kokumin 
Nenkin or National Pension (NP) was a forgone conclusion. After the victory in the 
election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party renewed its vow to introduce NP by 
1959, and established a special committee (Kokumin Nenkin Jisshi Taisaku 
Tokubetsu linkai) within the party to prepare for the introduction. In the summer of 
1958, both ACSS and MHW’s NP committee issued their reports on the possible
70form of a pension system for the whole population . After some inter-ministerial 
compromises, in January 1959, the government submitted a proposal to ACSS for 
consultation as a part of the statutory procedures. ACSS criticized the government’s 
proposal for ignoring its recommendations of their 1958 report, but prioritized the 
establishment of NP and did not resort to the total refusal of the proposal (ACSS
1959). Thus, the government’s proposal was submitted almost intact to the Diet in 
February 1959. The bill was passed by the Diet almost without revision, and the 
National Pension Law was promulgated in April 1959.
69 For some major discussion points in the committee, see pp. 457-461 Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo, ed. 
1975a. Nihon Shakai Hosho Shiryo I. Vol. I. Tokyo: Shiseido.
70 For the differences in opinions about some key issues between MHW, the ruling party (LDP), 
ACSS, NP special committee and Ministry of Finance, see pp. 204-218 MHW Pension Bureau (Kosei 
sho Nenkin kyoku), ed. 1968. Kdsei Nenkin Hoken 25 nen shi (25-year History o f  the Employees' 
Pension Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
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The new National Pension (NP) was a two-track system comprised of contributory 
pensions and non-contributory pensions71. The non-contributory pension -  Rorei 
Fukushi Nenkin or the Welfare Pensions for the Elderly (WPE) -  was established in 
1959 for those who were already too old to satisfy the requirement of minimum
• 77payment period for NP . These benefits were means-tested fixed-amount benefits, 
payable at the age of 70. In 1960, 2.2 million people were receiving the benefits, 
reaching its peak of 4.6 million in 1975 (MHW Social Insurance Agency 
Management Bureau Pension Division 1990: 388). Although the amount was far 
from generous, and the criteria for the provision (means-tests) were quite strict, the 
establishment was nonetheless the first explicit attempt to alleviate the plight of those 
who were already old. The contributory NP started two years later together with a 
bridging system between different public pension schemes. The premium was fixed 
amount and the benefit was flat rate, one third of which was subsidized from general
7 "}revenues. The minimum premium payment period was 25 years with the benefits 
payable at the age of 65. The membership of NP was mandatory for all Japanese 
citizens aged between 20 and 59 who were not covered by other public schemes. 
With the establishment of NP, all adult citizens were supposed to be included in the 
public pension system. However, there were exceptions: spouses of insured 
employees were exempted from mandatory membership together with students.
71 Unless otherwise stated, the description of NP in this section is derived from pp. 26-28 Kosei Tokei 
Kyokai, ed. 2002. Hoken to Nenkin no Doko (Trend o f  Social Insurance and Pensions). Tokyo: Kosei 
Tokei Kyokai
72 Only those who were bom before 1st April 1911 were eligible for this pension.
73 Shorter contribution periods were arranged for those who were 31 years old or over as of April 1961, 
ranging from 10 to 24 years according to their age. For those who were over 50 on 1st April 1961 
were excluded in principle due to the contribution period requirement. However, those aged between 
51 and 54 were allowed to join the scheme, contributing for 10 years. Differential contribution rates 
were used for those aged from 20 to 34 and those aged from 35 to 59.
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3.3.2 Pensions for all: should women be included?
The political consensus on the introduction of ‘pensions for all* was formed in 
relatively early post-war years. However, there was no consensus on its actual form, 
and the recommendations by various key policy makers differed considerably. This 
was true even with regard to the question of who should be covered in NP. One of 
the problematic groups for inclusion was non-employed housewives74. Unlike EPI, 
NP was decided to be an individually based benefit without special allowances for 
dependants due mainly to the financial constraint. Thus, provision for housewives of 
the NP insured should be either given up or sought through their own insurance. The 
former was problematic from a viewpoint of the ideal of ‘pensions for all’, while the 
latter was also difficult given that housewives were by definition with no incomes of 
their own to pay premiums from.
While there were opinions to exclude housewives because of the lack of their own 
incomes (for example, Ministry of Finance), the final NP bill mandated the 
membership, therefore premium payment, of non-employed spouses of the NP 
insured even if they did not have their own incomes. It was argued that although 
wives of the self-employed might not have their own incomes, they often contributed 
to the household economy through their work as unpaid family workers, thus their 
premiums should be paid by the joint household incomes (MHW Pension Bureau 
1968: 208). The final bill mandated that the head of the household pay premiums 
both for themselves and the members of the household if the latter were not covered 
by other public pension schemes.
74 See footnote No. 69 in the previous section.
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This arrangement, however, raised questions about housewives of the EPI insured 
employees . There were three strong opinions at the time (MHW Pension Bureau 
1968: 204-218). One was to exclude housewives of the EPI insured completely from 
NP on the grounds that they should be provided by their husband’s pensions. The 
most prominent proponent of this position was ACSS. Another position was to make 
housewives’ membership compulsory in line with wives of the self-employed and 
farmers from a viewpoint of equal treatment of citizens. The inclusion of 
employees’ housewives was also supported from concerns about the possible loss of 
housewives’ derived rights through divorce. This position was taken by MHW in its 
first draft proposal. Yet another opinion was expressed by MHW’s special 
committee for NP and the Ministry of Finance, which proposed to include 
housewives of the EPI insured on a voluntary basis. The latter was also in the 
opinion of making the membership voluntary for those with low or no incomes in 
general. However, excluding the poor from the compulsory membership meant that 
those who would need the public provision in old age most would be excluded from 
the public system. Thus, MHW was especially opposed to allowing voluntary 
membership in the scheme.
In the end, an inter-ministerial compromise was reached to include housewives of the 
EPI insured on a voluntary basis. In a way, ‘the women’s question was settled by 
default’ (Campbell 1992: 83) rather than as a well-thought arrangement (Campbell 
1992; Lewis 1981). During the deliberation of the NP bill in the Diet, MPs from an 
opposition party in House of Councillors criticized the proposed arrangement as
75 Although an economically dependent husband was technically in a same position, this gender- 
biased terminology has often been used in discussions about pensions for dependent spouses.
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ignoring the independent pension rights of wives, but to no avail76. Indeed, swamped 
with fierce debates between competing and conflicting demands within a tight 
deadline for the making of the new pension scheme, women’s inclusion was yet 
again not a primary concern of the policy makers of the time. The issue was brought 
up as a problem only in passing during the deliberation in the Diet. In contrast, the 
treatment of those with low or no incomes of their own and no families to turn to was 
settled with conditioned inclusion in NP. Although their final pension amount was to 
be significantly reduced, these people were still to be included in the public pension 
system through the exemption of premium payment. Considering this differential 
treatment between people with low income in general and married women, it can be 
said that ‘pensions for all’ failed to fully include married women not because of their 
low/ no incomes but because of the strong assumption as well as the norm on their 
economic dependency.
3.3.3 Mixed principles and divided women
Unlike EPI, NP was established as an individually based provision. Nonetheless, NP 
was not free from certain assumptions on economic dependency regulated by gender 
and intergenerational relations. These mixed principles can be clearly seen in the 
conditions for provision for widows. As in EPI, NP included pensions for widowed 
mothers as well as for widows. However, these two provisions in NP were based on 
different pension rights. The Widowed Mother’s Pension took the principle of 
individuals as a unit more seriously. Unlike EPI, this benefit was paid based on 
widows’ own NP membership record rather than as derived rights based on the
76 See a report by the chair o f the Social Affairs and Labour Committee o f House of Councillors in 
House of Councillors. 1959. the 31st Diet Session, No. 25.
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deceased husband’s membership record77. On the other hand, as in EPI, the 
Widow’s Pension was paid based on the membership record of their deceased 
husband.
This difference between the two benefits stemmed from the difference in their 
respective purpose. The Widowed Mother’s Pension was created based on the 
understanding of the death of the husband as an economic risk for the insured. On 
the other hand, the Widow’s Pension was created in order to avert the dissatisfaction 
among the NP insured, who generally disliked the possibility of ‘wasting’ paid 
premiums through their premature death (Koyama 1959: 158). Reflecting this 
difference in concerns, the criteria for the entitlement to the benefit were much 
stricter for the Widow’s Pension than for Widowed Mother’s Pension. Eligible 
widows for the former were limited to those aged between 60 and 64 and married for 
at least 10 years to the deceased, who had at least 25 years of membership record.
Despite these differences, however, both pensions for widows shared the same 
principle -  namely, the assumption of women’s economic dependency in marriage 
and of men’s breadwinning role. NP had no provision for widowers irrespective of 
their actual economic situations. It can be said that, despite the principle of 
individuals as a unit, NP was similar to EPI in the sense that they were based on the 
assumptions on the gender division of labour within a household. This assumption 
legitimised the differential treatment of women and men in NP. It also allowed the
77 This arrangement was not free from controversies. In the first draft proposal o f MHW, the 
condition for the benefit was based on the payment records o f both the deceased husband and the 
widow. While the government revised the condition in accord with the principle o f individuals as a 
unit in the final draft bill, ACSS still opposed to the revision, arguing that the condition should be 
based on the deceased husband’s payment record. See p. 208 in MHW Pension Bureau (Kosei sho 
Nenkin kyoku), ed. 1968. Kosei Nenkin Hoken 25 nen shi (25-year History o f  the Employees' Pension 
Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
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presence of benefits based on derived rights such as the Widow’s Pension in a 
supposedly individual-based scheme. Another example of mixed principles of the 
base unit in NP was that the head of the household was held responsible for premium 
payment for all the household members. These examples demonstrated that the old 
principle of the household-based unit and rigid gender assumptions survived in the 
new pension for all.
This incoherency of principles within NP as well as between NP and EPI were to 
lead to the situations where women were more deeply divided than before in terms of 
their prospects for economic security in old age. This was true even among 
housewives who were in principle without their own incomes. If one’s husband was 
the EPI insured and could afford to and was willing to pay for her NP premium, she 
would be provided both from derived rights and from own pension rights. If her 
husband was the NP insured, on the other hand, she would be provided only by her 
own pensions. Yet if her husband was the EPI insured and he could not afford to or 
refused to pay for her NP premium, her economic welfare in old age was largely 
dependent on the marriage and the level of her husband’s pension. Even after the 
introduction of ‘pensions for all’, therefore, women’s access to pensions was still 
largely affected by marriage.
3.4 Conclusion
In less than 80 years from the late 19th century, most people in Japan changed their
status vis-a-vis the state from peasants in the feudal Tokugawa regime to subjects of
the Imperial Japan, and to holders of sovereign power of post-war Japan. Reflecting
this transition in the status, their rights to state welfare also changed. However, the
extent and the form of changes in their social rights differed along the line of sex,
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class and age to name but a few. Moreover, the extent and the form of state welfare 
were thus defined by the dominant assumptions and norms on the role of the family, 
the community and the gender. For certain social groups, therefore, the period of 
rapid regime change since the late 19th century could be characterised by continuities 
rather than transformations in their rights to and duties for the access to state welfare.
The early history of the public old-age pension system in Japan reflected this 
differential development of rights. On the surface, the introduction of the public 
pension system could be understood as an attainment by the Japanese of social rights 
to economic security in old age after gaining civil and political citizenship rights in 
modem Japan. However, this linear developmental view could not fully explain the 
marginalisation of the contemporary elderly and women as rights holders. The 
economic plight of the elderly of the day in Japan was not taken up as a major policy 
problem until the 1950s. Moreover, women’s individual rights to public old-age 
pensions were not acknowledged even then. Policy makers of the time justified the 
exclusion of the former by emphasising the role of the family and the community as 
welfare providers, while they legitimised the exclusion of the latter by citing their 
economic dependency in marriage.
When the public pension system was established for workers in the private sector, 
the dominant assumptions and norms remained that the family should provide for the 
elderly members. This suggested that public provision for economic security in old 
age was not the primary objective of the introduction of the public pension system. 
Indeed, historical records demonstrated that the explicitly stated policy goals were to 
increase the productivity of workers and to control the money circulation under the 
military regime. Moreover, citizens’ rights to state welfare had been constantly
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denied by the government in Imperial Japan. Perceived firstly as a means for social 
management in the modem state by social bureaucrats and introduced as a tool for 
enhancing productivity and monetary control during the war, the Japanese public 
old-age pension system originated first and foremost as a measure of the state for 
labour control rather than for citizens’ attainment of social rights. Since women 
were regarded as mothers or mothers-to-be and therefore as temporary workers, their 
marginalisation in the public pension system was legitimised in Imperial Japan.
Women’s marginalised position in the public pension system did not alter much in 
post-war Japan. Although social rights of citizens and gender equality became 
formally acknowledged under the new Constitution, the gendered norm of the male 
breadwinner/ female homemaker model was not challenged in the main. Thus, even 
when the contemporary elderly began being included in the public pension system 
with the introduction of National Pension, women who conformed to the gender 
model remained excluded from the system. Their exclusion was justified by the 
norm of women’s economic dependency in marriage. Moreover, female workers in 
the public pension system remained treated as temporary workers who would 
withdraw upon marriage or childbearing to conform to the gender model. Based on 
this assumption, the differential treatment of female and male workers remained 
legitimised in the post-war public pension system.
However, the dominant assumptions on the family were forced to change as the 
family went through rapid transformation in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the 
role of the state for the provision of welfare in old age also changed. In the next 
chapter, pension reforms between the 1960s and the mid-1980s are analysed, paying
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attention to changes and continuities of the underlying assumptions on the relations 
between women and men, between generations and between the state and citizens.
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Chapter 4 Consolidation of Gendered Pension Rights: the Mid-1960s 
to the 1980s
Japan went through an economic transformation from the late 1950s to the early 
1990s. Its economy recovered from the ashes and achieved a ‘miracle’ by the early 
1970s, which slowed down with the Oil Crises in the 1970s, and formed a ‘bubble 
economy’ in the 1980s until its dramatic burst in the early 1990s. These rapid 
economic changes were accompanied by structural changes in its society. As the 
primary industry was replaced by the secondary and tertiary industries as the base of 
the national economy, the number of employee household increased rapidly from
39.4 per cent of the total households in 1955 to 65.6 per cent in 1990 (Economic 
Planning Agency 1995: 16). Moreover, this change also enhanced the increase in 
nuclear family households, reducing the average number of household members from 
4.97 in 1950 to 3.69 in 1970 and to 2.99 in 1990 (ibid: 367). One of the most 
affected areas of these changes was arguably the allocation of responsibilities for 
welfare provision.
This chapter continues examining what issues were taken up as problems in pension 
reforms, considering the embedded assumptions in the problematisation. The focus 
in this chapter is on discourses of equality and fairness in the Japanese public 
pension system. The chapter explores which inequality in the system was perceived 
as a priority to be redressed and how women’s pension rights and their economic 
welfare in old age were situated in these equality debates. At the same time, 
inequalities which were legitimised as fair or left unproblematised are also examined. 
Especially, the attention is paid to the debates on ‘women’s questions’, which began 
attracting more public attention with the growing feminist movements during the
period covered by this chapter.
4.1 Expansion in public pensions: from the 1960s to the early 1970s
In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda announced the Income-doubling Plan as a 10-year 
economic policy. This goal was fulfilled in less than 10 years. The growth-first 
policies and concomitant rapid economic growth, however, also brought plethora of 
disturbing social phenomena such as pollution, widening inequality, overpopulation 
in urban cities and depopulation in rural villages. The heightening concerns about 
these issues led to the rise of citizens’ movements and the success of left-wing 
politicians in local elections from the late 1960s, and eventually, to change in the 
central government’s attitude towards state welfare.
Against this backdrop, the 1960s and the early 1970s saw a significant expansion in 
the state’s responsibilities for welfare in Japan. The proportion of National Income 
allocated to social security increased from 5.6 per cent in 1969 to 10.4 per cent 
(Campbell 1992: 140). The main driving force was citizens’ movements for the 
social rights of the vulnerable in the increasingly affluent society. Especially, the 
economic plight of the contemporary elderly attracted national attention and calls for 
state intervention were heightened (ibid: 140-142). Under these political pressures, a
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series of welfare laws were passed, including free medical services for the elderly 
and a substantial increase in the level of pension benefits. The momentum for better 
state welfare culminated in 1973. Dubbed ‘the first year of welfare era’, this year 
saw major reforms in many welfare areas. Despite their significant financial 
implications, these improvements were legislated without much opposition
78 For the background o f the introduction of this policy, see pp. 139-153 in Campbell, John Creighton. 
1992. How policies change : the Japanese government and the aging society. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press.
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(Campbell 1992: 153-172; Koseidan 1988: 231-233). There was an optimistic mood 
that these increases in costs could be sufficiently financed with further economic 
growth.
4.1.1 Balancing equality and fairness among future pensioners
As the public pensions became widely accepted as an important source of income in 
old age, the low level of EPI and NP began attracting much criticism. With the rapid 
rise in general living standard and inflation, the real value of pension benefits was 
decreasing rapidly. Having no price indexation, the average EPI pension level 
became lower than the level of means-tested income support by the early 1960s. In 
1963, the standard level of income support benefit for a man aged 60 and over was 
4,871 yen per month, while the average EPI pension benefit already in payment was 
3,500 yen (MHW Pension Bureau 1968: 265). The demand for higher public 
pensions was further strengthened in the face of the significantly better pensions for 
workers in the public sector. In 1962, the pension level for the newly retired EPI 
insured was about one third of that of the retirees in the public sector (Kosei Tokei 
Kyokai 2002: 28). The inequality between the different sectors was widely criticised 
as an example of unfair privileging of public workers over private workers (ibid: 
264-265). The heightened interest in the public pension among people in Japan was 
illustrated by the ‘united strike for pensions {Nenkin Toitsu Suto)’. In 1972, four 
major associations of labour unions went on a joint strike demanding solely for better 
public pensions -  the first of its kind in the history of labour movement in Japan.
Against this backdrop, the government introduced a substantial increase in the
benefit level for the future pensioners. The first of such moves came in the mid-
1960s when the level of the model monthly EPI pension was raised to 10,000 yen
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(after 20 years of premium payment) when the average level of the pension benefit 
already in payment was 3,500 yen. However, although the rise was considerable and 
MHW claimed the levels to be above the international standard79, the actual pension 
level of those who were retiring at the time was far from the amount, because the 
model pensions were calculated based on the average wages of the contemporary 
working population rather than the actual lifetime averages of those who were close 
to retirement. Consequently, demand for better pensions did not subside even after 
these reforms.
Responding to the persisting demand, the 1969 Reform doubled the levels of model 
pensions. Unlike the previous pension increase, the new model pensions were 
calculated based on the actual data of those who were retiring at the time of the 
reform. The formula was adjusted so that their pension benefits would be equivalent 
to 40 per cent of the average wages of manufacturing workers of the time. Moreover, 
in order to mitigate the disadvantages of the post-war inflation, wages before October 
1957 were disregarded and those below a certain threshold were boosted to the level 
of the threshold for the calculation of eamings-related part of EPI.
The 1973 pension reform was the watershed of the Japanese pension history. The 
reform established that the level of EPI benefits should be about 60 per cent of 
average earnings of working population80. This level was to be maintained through 
newly-introduced revaluation of past wages and the indexation of benefits. The
79 According to MHW, the new model pension amounted to 40 per cent of average earnings o f  
employees after 20 years (25 years for NP) of premium payment. On the other hand, the minimum 
guaranteed level in ILO Convention No. 102 (Convention concerning Minimum Standards o f Social 
Security) required public old-age pension systems to have a replacement rate of at least 40 per cent for 
a couple after 30 years of premium payment.
80 When annual bonuses were included, the replacement rate was about 45 per cent o f the average 
earnings. See p. 235 in Koseidan, ed. 1988. Kosei Nenkin Hoken Seido Kaikoroku (Memoir o f the 
Employees' Pension Insurance System). Tokyo: Shakai Hoken Hoki Kenkyukai.
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benefit was to be increased if consumer prices rose by 5 per cent or more. Moreover, 
the benefit level was to be adjusted every 5 years in consideration of wage rises 
during the period. This reform led to an immediate improvement of pension benefits 
for those retiring at the time of the reform. The EPI pension formula was based on 
the average contribution years (27 years) and the monthly average standard 
remuneration (84,600 yen) of those who had contribution records of 20 years or more 
and who would reach pensionable age in October 1973.
During this welfare expansion era, much care was taken to balance the levels of the 
model benefits of NP and EPI on the grounds of equality between different schemes 
(MHW Committee for 50-year history 1988: 1414, 1423, 1434). Nonetheless, 
equality between EPI and NP was not straightforward due mainly to the difference in 
the basic unit for benefits (see Chapter 3). While EPI was supposed to provide for a 
family, NP was meant for individuals. This dilemma was apparently solved by using 
a couple household as a basic unit for a model pension. Thus, when the EPI model 
pension was increased to 10,000 yen in 1965, the NP model pension was raised in the 
next year only to the half of the EPI level, 5,000 yen. The difference in the pension 
levels between the two schemes was justified using the aggregate level of pensions 
for a couple as a model. The monthly benefit for a self-employed couple was 
supposed to be equivalent to that of an employee couple, in which the wife was 
assumed to be a non-covered housewife. The same reasoning was applied in the next 
two major reforms. When the model benefit level of EPI was raised to 20,000 yen in 
1969 and to about 50,000 yen in 1973, NP benefit was raised to 10,000 yen and 
25,000 yen respectively.
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Using a couple as a basic unit for equality, however, meant that inequality between 
individuals was not necessarily considered to be a problem. Indeed, despite the 
government’s claim of equality between EPI and NP, the benefit gap between EPI 
and NP in model and in reality was glaring when the pension levels of single people 
were compared. The NP model benefit for a single person was about half of the EPI 
model benefit. This was because although EPI was said to be for a couple, the EPI 
benefit for a single person was not much lower than a married person with the same 
employment record. APD for spouse in EPI amounted to only 4.6 per cent of the EPI 
total model benefit even in 1973. On the other hand, the NP benefit for a single 
person was exactly half that of a self-employed couple with the same premium 
payment record. Considering the economies of scale in household expenditure, 
therefore, single persons in NP were more likely to face economic hardship in old 
age than couples in NP or singles in EPI unless they had other economic means. 
Thus, the government’s claim on equality between EPI and NP was heavily reliant 
on the assumptions of marriage and its intactness.
The equality between the EPI and NP model pensions was also based on the 
assumption that married women were not a member of EPI in their own right. 
Moreover, employee households which took out NPI voluntary membership were 
totally out of the picture despite its rapid increase, as we will see below. In short, the 
EPI and NP model pensions were in balance only if women were excluded from the 
public pension system in their own right.
Another precarious assumption at the base of the government’s claim of equality was 
that both husband and wife in NP would take out a newly created voluntary pension 
-  the Additional Pension (Fuka Nenkin) -  for 25 years. In other words, the NP
138
model pension was attainable only if non-mandatory pensions were included. In this 
sense, the ‘models’ used for EPI and NP were not exactly equivalent. Moreover, 
because the Additional Pension was created only in 1969, equality between the two 
schemes could not be achieved until the mid-1990s even in this model.
In reality, the benefit levels of the two schemes were far from equal. This was 
largely due to the principle the government chose to stick to -  namely, funded 
insurance. Due to the short history of NP, the requirement of 25-years premium 
payment to achieve the model benefit level meant that none could receive this level 
until 1986. On the other hand, the EPI model benefit was based on the actual 
‘averages’ of earnings and years of membership. Thus, even if the equilibrium 
between the model benefit levels of NP and EPI were to be real in theory, there was a 
significant pension gap between the two schemes, which would persist at least until 
the mid-1980s.
Although these inconsistencies in the government’s claim on equality were self- 
evident, they were justified by the norms on the male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker model and the insurance principle, whereby the benefit levels should 
reflect individuals’ premium payment records. Regarding a single earner couple as 
natural, there were few voices which questioned the basic unit of model pensions. 
On the other hand, there were some voices which challenged the insurance principle 
presented by the government. Proponents of this position argued that a substantial 
and immediate increase in the benefit level would be possible by changing the 
finance from a funded system to a pay-as-you-go system (for example, see Shakai 
Hosho Kenkyujo 1975b: 103). However, these views failed to become the majority 
in the face of claims by the government on the need for fair distribution of the cost of
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the system between generations (Koseidan 1988: 232). Moreover, the insurance 
principle which closely linked the levels of paid premium and benefit was not 
challenged, legitimising the reproduction of labour-market inequality in old age.
These unchallenged principles on gender and redistribution mechanism not only 
dictated the economic share of female pensioners of tomorrow but also that of the 
elderly of the day, among which women were the majority81.
4.1.2 Intergenerational redistribution and fairness
The move for better pensions was not only for the elderly of tomorrow. There was a 
growing demand for more redistribution of national wealth for those who were 
already old (Koseidan 1988: 244-245). Since most of the elderly at the time were not 
entitled to the contribution-based old-age pensions, this demand took the form of 
strong demands for the benefit increase in non-contributory Welfare Pensions for the 
Elderly (WPE). Responding to these calls, the monthly benefit for WPE was raised 
throughout the 1960s, and reached to 5,000 yen in 1973. Moreover, Special 
Allowance for the Elderly (SAE, Rorei Tokubetsu Kyufu Kiri) was created in 1973 to 
provide limited benefits (4,000 yen) to those who were bom before 1st April 1906 
until they reach the age of 70 when they were to become eligible for WPE. Together 
with WPE, this new non-contributory benefit helped to expand the number of 
beneficiaries of the public pension system among those who were already old.
Although these moves were a significant step forward for the elderly of the day, the 
actual resources allocated for them were still very limited compared with the
81 In 1970s, 4.1 million women were aged 65 and over in Japan, while the number of Japanese men in 
the same age group was 3.2 million. See MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 
1970. Japan Census.
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improvements for the future pensioners. This was a conscious choice of the 
government, which justified the decision on the grounds of the insurance principle. 
Moreover, in order not to undercut the insurance principle, WPE and SAE were 
introduced as transitory measures rather than as permanent features to complement 
the contribution-based pensions. Thus, both benefits were limited to those who were
R9bom before certain cut-off dates and thus too old to join the insurance-based system .
The strong preference for insurance over non-contributory benefit even led the 
government to introduce a clause in NP in 1969, which reopened the opportunity to 
become voluntary members of the scheme for those who did not choose to do so at 
the introduction of NP. The new clause shortened the minimum eligible period of 
membership from 10 years to 5 years for those who were bom between 2nd April 
1906 and 1st April 1911 (those aged between 51 and 54 at the time of the 
introduction of NP in April 1961). However, as in the case of other special NP 
pensions with shorter minimum eligible period, the benefit level for this new 5-year 
NP pension was set much lower than ‘normal’ NP pension. Indeed, under the name 
of fairness and the insurance principle, all the benefit levels of special pensions -  
namely, the 10-year Pension, the 5-year Pension, WPE and SAE -  were kept lower 
than the model NP pension and differentiated from each other despite the fact that 
the recipients of these benefits had no responsibility for their short or no payment 
record.
In the subsequent years, as the levels of these benefits were raised in response to the 
strong demand for mitigating the economic plight of the elderly of the day, the 
difference in these special pensions was increasingly narrowed, and in some cases,
82 For the eligibility conditions for WPE, see Chapter 3.
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became almost nominal. By the end of the 1970s, the proportions of WPE, 5-year 
pensions and 10-year pensions to NP benefits were 53.6 per cent, 53.8 per cent and
63.2 per cent respectively (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 2002). Nonetheless, the government 
refused to introduce a universal fixed amount benefit for those aged over certain 
years but tried to retain the difference among them in the name of insurance principle 
and fairness in the system.
4.1.3 Women’s pension rights
The rapid rise in the pension level notwithstanding, the perceived direct beneficiaries 
of this achievement were mainly male workers. The model pension was calculated 
based on men’s average earnings and period of membership. For women, the reality 
was far from the ‘average’. In 1973, the average earnings of female EPI members 
were only about half of men’s . Moreover, unlike male workers, the average years 
of membership in EPI did not increase significantly for women. In the mid-1960s, 
women’s average years of membership were about five years (Koseidan 1988: 127). 
Thus, the newly claimed level of pensions -  60 per cent of working population’s 
earnings -  was not obtainable for most women. The policy makers of the time 
simply did not perceive female workers as future pensioners in their own right 
because of the assumption that women would leave the workplace upon marriage or 
childbearing.
The assumption of women’s temporary status as EPI members was not even implicit 
in the system. As mentioned in the previous section, the differential treatment of 
women and men in the premium rate and the Withdrawal Payment persisted well into
83 In 1973, the monthly average standard remuneration for female members was 51,419 yen, while 
that for men was 95,982 yen. See p. 216 in Shakai Hoken cho. 1979. Jigyo Nenpo (Annual Report): 
Shakai Hoken cho,.
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the 1980s. Until the 1980 Reform, the rate for women was kept lower than for men 
on the grounds that women were less likely to receive their own old-age pensions. 
On the other hand, attempts to equalise the eligibility for the Withdrawal Payment 
were made much earlier. On the introduction of contributory NP and coordinating 
legislation in 1961, it was decided to abolish the Withdrawal Payment with a grace 
period of five years for women and one year for men84. However, the grace period 
for women was continuously extended85 until the mid-1980s when the practice was 
abolished completely. The record of deliberations in the Diet showed that these 
special treatments were generally presented as fair measures not to disadvantage 
female workers, whose assumed purpose of employment was ‘to supplement 
wedding preparations or household incomes and thus had no expectations for long­
term benefits such as old-age pensions.’86 This comment was remarkably similar to 
that of the Minister of Health and Welfare in 1944 (see Chapter 3), revealing the 
continuity of the gender assumption.
However, this persisting assumption of the gender division of labour among policy
makers in this period was in a way understandable. More than any other time in
Japan’s history, Japanese women became housewives (shufu-ka) in the high growth
period (Ochiai 1994). Behind this trend was rising incomes, which made it possible
for many households to rely on only one income (Igami 2004). Indeed, comparing
various cohorts of women, those bom between 1945 and 1949 withdrew from the
84 The introduction o f NP and coordinating legislations in 1961 enabled workers to combine the 
premium payment record o f EPI and EPI to satisfy the minimum required period of 20 years (EPI) or 
25 years (NP). In theory, therefore, women could accumulate minimum eligible period to receive 
pensions if they joined NIP after the withdrawal from EPI or vice versa.
5 The textile industry, which employed predominantly female labour, mounted powerful lobbying for 
this move. See p. 334 in Shakai Hoken cho Nenkin Hoken bu, ed. 1968. Kosei Nenkin Hoken 25 nen 
shi (25-year History o f  the Employees' Pension Insurance). Tokyo: Koseidan.
86 Answers by the Minister o f Health and Welfare, House of Representatives, the Socal Affairs and 
Labour Committee. 1965. the 48th Diet Session, No. 10.
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labour market upon marriage or childbearing more than any other cohorts (Economic 
Planning Agency 1995: 92-93). The number of housewives in employee households 
increased from 5.17 million in 1955 to 9.03 million in 1970 (ibid: 107). Among 
married couples, 30.1 per cent of them took this form of household type in 1955, 
while the percentage increased to 36.6 per cent in 1970 (ibid). Considering the rapid 
increase in the actual number of women who followed the male breadwinner/ female 
household model, the gender assumptions embedded in pension reform could be 
indeed regarded as a ‘benevolence’ of policy makers towards female workers.
Even if the base of these special treatments was the ‘goodwill’ of the policy makers, 
they directly contributed to women’s economic insecurity in old age. By normalising 
women’s withdrawal from the pension scheme, these arrangements in a way 
hampered the problematisation of women’s lost or lower pension entitlement. In 
exchange for the lost entitlement, what these women received was quite limited. 
After two years of contribution, a woman would get 60 per cent of the monthly 
average standard remuneration or the equivalent of 18-days of salary (Tamiya 2003). 
This, however, did not concern many policy makers, who had no doubt about the 
assumption that wives were to be economically supported by their husband. 
Although there were some voices which argued for individual pension rights for all
# 07  #
women, including housewives , they were still weak enough to be ignored. The 
issue of the low pension level of female workers attracted even less attention.
However, this did not mean that women’s economic welfare in old age was totally 
ignored. Rather, it was mainly taken up as a problem of derived rights in EPI. Thus,
87 See, for example, deliberations in House o f Representatives, the Social Affairs and Labour 
Committee. 1973. the 71st Diet Session, Nos. 21-22.
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demands for better pensions for women mainly manifested themselves in the political 
pressures for the increase in the Additional Pension for Dependants (APD) for 
spouse and in the Survivor’s Pension (SP). As a result, derived rights in EPI saw 
some improvements during this period. With the pension reform of 1969 and 1973, 
APD for spouse increased from 400 yen per month to 2,400 yen or from 4 per cent to 
4.6 per cent of the total amount of model pension benefit (Yokoyama 2002: 10). The 
benefit level of SP was also boosted with the introduction of the guaranteed monthly 
minimum of 5,000 yen in 1965. This had an immediate impact on widows’ 
economic welfare, raising the average monthly SP from 2,000 yen in 1964 to 5,300 
yen in 1965 (MHW Pension Bureau (Kosei sho Nenkin kyoku) 1968: 1139). The 
1965 Reform also increased the number of widows who could enjoy these 
improvements. Previously, SP was granted to only those who were aged 40 and over 
or those with minor children. However, the reform abolished these restrictions to 
enable all widows to be entitled to SP irrespective of their age or motherhood.
In the background of these improvements for housewives, there was the 
consolidation of the gender division of labour among working population. Changes 
in the labour force from farming to paid employment meant a clearer separation 
between home and workplace, making it more difficult to combine production and 
reproduction. As a result, the gender division of labour proceeded. The rate of 
female labour force participation kept declining until 1975, increasing the number of
o o
‘housewives’ (see Chapter 1) . This trend strengthened the existing gendered 
perception of women as homemakers rather than as productive workers, which in 
turn helped the issues on women’s pensions to be mainly problematised as the low
88 The rate of female employees was on the increase during the same period. However, the rate of 
decline in female labour in the primary sector outnumbered the increase in other sectors.
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level of benefits for wives or for widows rather than the low level or lack of 
women’s pensions in their own right. Indeed, demands for higher APD and SP were 
often promoted under the name of women’s pension rights (fujin no nenkin ken), 
inadvertently accepting the assumptions of marriage as a natural course of women’s 
life as well as women’s economic dependency in marriage -  the very assumptions 
which helped to suppress the level of women’s pensions in their own right. In the 
attempts to improve women’s economic welfare in old age, choices were made to 
increase women’s benefits through derived rights rather than through adjusting the 
system to better accommodate women in their own right.
This choice, however, meant that women who could benefit from these increases in 
benefits were almost entirely limited to wives of the EPI insured. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, NP had no APD, and the eligibility criteria of NP for the 
entitlement to SP were very restrictive. Moreover, for single women, derived rights 
were irrelevant in any case. Therefore, women who did not have an EPI insured 
husband were excluded from the pension rise specifically aimed at ‘women’ during 
the welfare expansion era. The limitation of covering all women as wives, however, 
was not widely taken up as a pressing problem around this time. On the contrary, 
demands for better derived benefits for wives were becoming even stronger in the 
following decade.
4.2 Public pensions in transition: from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s
Ironically for the history of state welfare in Japan, the first year of the welfare era
turned out to be also the year of the first oil crisis -  a turning point for many welfare
states towards welfare retrenchment. As elsewhere, the oil crises in the 1970s and
subsequent economic slowdown quickly replaced the optimism about financing state
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welfare with pessimism among policy makers in Japan. In contrast to the open 
pledge to build an advanced welfare state in the early 1970, the government began 
attacking the expansionary trajectory of welfare expenditure. Also contributing to 
the shift in the government’s attitude was a growing awareness about the population 
ageing and its possible cost for the state welfare. The ‘older people’s problem’ 
began shifting from problems individual older persons were facing in the society 
towards the problems older population would cause to the society (Campbell 1992: 
210-214).
With the government increasingly shying away from the commitment to state welfare, 
the family and communities began being re-introduced into the central stage as the 
key welfare provider. Those who were critical of the larger state welfare maintained 
that rather than modelling on the Westem-style welfare state, Japan should develop 
the Japanese-style welfare society (Nihongata Fukushi Shakai), where individuals, 
families and communities take initiatives in enhancing their own welfare rather than 
depending solely on the state. This view was clearly stated by the government in its
o n
economic plans in the late 1970s . According to this vision, the state’s role should 
be a facilitator rather than a direct provider of welfare. The main welfare provider 
thus should be the family and communities, but especially the former. The perceived 
ideal family in this vision, however, was not the nuclear family but the extended 
family, which would take the main responsibility for providing for the elderly. 
Indeed, in the annual report of MHW in 1978, the three-generational household was 
praised as a hidden welfare asset {Fukushi no Fukumi Shisan) of Japan (MHW 1978).
89 For example, see ‘Showa 50 nen dai Zenki Keizai Keikaku’ in 1976 and ‘Shin Keizai Shakai 7 
kanen Keikaku’ in 1979 found p. 35 and p. 46 respectively in Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo, ed. 1988b. 
Nihon Shakai Hosho Shiryd III jo . Vol. 1. Tokyo: Idemitsu Shoten.
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Thus, the government began presenting policy problems at hand as how to facilitate 
families in an ageing society to take care of their elderly members.
Nonetheless, the immediate post-oil crisis saw an increase rather than a decrease in 
welfare expenditure. The rapid inflation and remaining political pressures for better 
state welfare inhibited the immediate rolling back of public benefits and services. 
On the contrary, the demand for the improvement of state benefits for the 
economically vulnerable strengthened due to their plight in the face of substantial 
inflation. This was also true of public pensions, leading to repeated increases in the 
level of WPE together with that of inflation-indexed contributory pensions despite 
the fact that the former was not indexed to inflation.
Unlike the previous two decades of high economic growth90, however, production 
growth in the mid- to late 1970s was not sufficient to absorb the expanding state 
expenditure. Consequently, the government debt reached to a crisis level by the end 
of the 1970s91. Against this background, by the late 1970s, the ‘reconsideration of 
welfare’ became the catchphrase of the time, and a fundamental reform in social 
security was frequently discussed. Acknowledging the need for a fundamental 
reform of the pension system, the government commissioned various reports from 
the mid-1970s. One of the special advisory groups dedicated to an overhaul of the 
pension system was Nenkin Seido Kihon Kdsd Kondankai (the Discussion Group for 
Basic Ideas for the Pension System, BIPS), which was set up in 1976. In April 1979, 
BIPS published its final report, which recommended basic principles and the 
direction of a fundamental pension reform.
90 The period between the mid-1950s to the early 1970s is conventionally called high growth period 
(Kodo Kezai Seicho ki) in Japan.
91 Another cause of the worsening finance o f the state was large-scale public works, which was one of 
the LDP’s favourite measures to secure their political position.
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Despite the general consensus on the need for a fundamental reform, however, most 
reforms actually introduced before the mid-1980s were mainly focused on short-term 
solutions to issues problematised by these reports. Faced with strong resistance even 
from within its own leading party, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan), the 
government failed to implement recommended long-term measures which would 
necessitate curtailment of benefits and fundamental changes in the system. Some of 
the major issues in question, both materialized ones and postponed ones, were 
directly relevant to women’s pension rights and their economic welfare in old age.
4.2.1 Improving women’s pensions: derived right or in their own right?
By the end of the 1970s, there was a general agreement that women’s pensions were 
one of the most urgent problems to be tackled. While the ‘women’s question’ had 
always plagued policy makers throughout the pension history in Japan (see Chapter 
3), the prominence of this issue in the reform discussions of this period was 
attributable to the rise of national and international gender equality movements. In 
the international arena, the year 1975 was declared as the United Nations 
International Women’s Year, and the World Plan of Action was adopted in the first 
international conference on the status of women held in Mexico City. The UN also 
proclaimed 1976 -  1985 as the Decade for Women to improve the status of women. 
In response to the national and international pressure for gender equality, the 
Japanese government set up a Headquarters for Promoting Plan on Women’s 
Problems (Fujin Mondai Kikaku Suishin Honbu) under the prime minister and, in 
1977, prepared a National Plan of Action to put into effect the World Plan of Action 
in the national context of Japan.
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One of the areas included in the National Plan was women’s welfare in old age, 
including economic security. In particular, the National Plan called for a pension 
reform in order to guarantee better economic security for housewives and widows 
who were not members of NP as well as to equalise the premium rate and 
pensionable age of women and men (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 210). 
Although these issues had been repeatedly raised as problems from various 
viewpoints in Japan, the World Plan and the National Plan gave these claims a 
powerful backing from the viewpoint of gender equality.
However, the two issues -  namely, the low level and insecure nature of derived 
benefits and different treatment of women and men -  were problematised based on 
different dimensions of gender equality. The former issue was problematised based 
on the principle of valuing unpaid work. The World Plan called for the recognition 
of the hitherto ignored economic and social contribution of women’s unpaid work to 
be reflected in social security benefits, especially upon divorce (Weal Fund. 1976). 
In the context of Japan, these international agreements legitimised the 
problematisation of pension rights of divorced non-NP member housewives and of 
the low level of SP. Moreover, the ILO Convention No. 102 gave powerful 
ammunition for those who argued for the improvement of women’s pensions through 
derived rights (Koseidan 1988: 249-251)92. On the other hand, the latter issue -  
equalisation of premium rate and pensionable age -  was promoted based on a clause 
in the World Plan which called for an equal treatment of both sexes. In a way, the 
World Plan, and the National Plan based on it, recommended that gender equality in 
social security be sought through the recognition of gender difference in the form of
92 The provision for widows in Japan, 50 per cent of the pension o f the deceased husband, was lower 
than the recommended level by the Convention.
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contribution as well as through the denial of differential treatment of women and
men.
This multi-faceted nature of demands for women’s pensions in a way led to the 
support by those who were not necessarily sympathetic to the cause for gender 
equality. The calls for providing better pensions for housewives and widows found 
ready allies among conservatives and promoters of the Japanese-style welfare society, 
who implicitly and explicitly supported social systems based on the gender division 
of labour. Similarly, the move to solve the other issue -  differential treatment in 
premium rate and pensionable age -  did not necessarily mean that policy makers of 
the time tried to discourage the gender division of labour or rectify the gendered 
assumption in the pension system. Although the equalisation of premium rate and 
pensionable age was promoted under the rubric of gender equality, it might well be 
the case that it found more supporters among those whose main concern was fiscal 
rather than gender issues. Indeed, while calls for improving derived benefits met 
resistance from some parts of the government, notably Ministry of Finance, on the 
grounds of fiscal constraint (Koseidan 1988: 249-251), raising women’s premium 
rate and pensionable age in line with men’s was introduced relatively swiftly. As a 
result, the calls in Japan for better pensions for women were a curious mixture of 
conservative and feminist tones under the banner of valuing the hidden contribution 
of housewives (naijo no kd).
Moreover, once the need for reform to improve the situation of women was looked at 
beyond the general level and came down to the concrete measures, it was difficult to 
form a consensus within the constraint of historical legacy and vested interests of the 
existing public pension system. This was especially so with the pension rights of
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housewives of insured employees. The fundamental question was whether 
housewives of the insured employees should be covered in their own right or treated 
as dependants of their husband. The appropriate level of SP was also interlinked to 
this question. If housewives were to be covered individually, SP would be 
unnecessary, at least in theory. On the other hand, if they were to be provided as 
dependants, the level of current SP was widely acknowledged as insufficient. To 
make the issue more complicated, many housewives were also covered by NP in 
their own right on a voluntary basis. A series of reports and recommendations for 
the fundamental pension reform showed significant variations in the proposed 
solution to this problem. In contrast, or because of this deep disagreement among 
policy makers, the above mentioned BIPS shied away from recommending any 
concrete long-term directions with regard to women’s pensions. Despite being the 
most influential pension advisory body of the time, BIPS merely summarised the 
points of discussions on housewives’ pensions even in its final report in 1979, and 
failed to paint a coherent picture of how the system should guarantee the pension 
rights of women in general. As a temporary way forward, BIPS recommended an 
increase in APD for spouse and SP, but especially for older widows and widowed 
mothers, within the framework of the existing pension system.
Backed by these national and international factors, derived benefits rose continuously 
even in the late 1970s and the early 1980s when the general trend was towards 
suppressing any pension rise. In the 1976 Reform, APD for spouse was raised from 
4.6 per cent to 6.6 per cent of the male model pension, and in the 1980 Reform, it 
reached to 11.0 per cent (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 2002: 29-36).
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With regard to SP, the overall increase was avoided due mainly to the financial 
concerns strongly put forward by the Ministry of Finance (Koseidan 1988: 249-251). 
Instead, an additional benefit, the Widow’s Addition {Kafu kasari), was created for 
widows aged 60 and over and widows with minor children, providing monthly 
additional benefit of 2,000 yen for the former and 3,000 yen or more for the latter 
depending on the number of children. The minimum guarantee for SP was also 
raised for both EPI and NP to 33,000 yen per month in 1976, which meant that older 
widows became guaranteed at least 41 per cent of the model pension for a single 
male retiree. The levels of both Widow’s Addition and the minimum guarantee or 
SP were continuously raised in the following years roughly in line with the rise in the 
model pension benefit, reaching 10,000 yen for the former (for older widows and 
widows with one child) and 41,800 yen for the latter in the 1980 Reform. This 
meant that, as a result of the 1980 Reform, older widows were guaranteed at least 43 
per cent of the model pension for single male retiree.
Although these improvements in derived benefits were generally welcomed, they in a 
way failed to challenge, or even strengthened, the embedded gender assumptions in 
the pension system (Murakami 1994; Yokoyama 2002). The strengthening of gender 
assumptions in the pension system was most apparent in the newly created Widow’s 
Addition. As the name suggested, widowers were excluded from the provision. This 
was not quite in accordance with the central tenet of the National Plan and the World 
Plan mentioned above, which called for equalising the treatment of women and men. 
Moreover, the beneficiaries of better derived benefits were limited to married women, 
especially wives of the EPI insured, dividing women by marital status and the 
occupation of their spouse.
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On the other hand, defying the gender assumptions in the pension system, an 
increasing number of married women were re-entering the labour market during this 
period. Moreover, the general trend of retrenchment did have an impact and there 
were attempts to contain the expenditure even for housewives by narrowing 
eligibility. Thus, while the provision for housewives was improving, a question of 
which women should benefit as wives was becoming more contentious at the same 
time.
4.2.2 Wives in employment: wage earners or housewives?
Women had been included in the Japanese pension system on the assumption that 
they were first and foremost housewives. In EPI, women were assumed to be 
economically dependent housewives, while in NP, women were assumed to be 
unpaid family workers. When women’s actual lifecourses diverted from these 
assumptions, the pension system showed its limitation to include women in a 
coherent way. This limitation started revealing itself more acutely against the 
backdrop of an increase in married female employees since the late 1960s. In 1975, 
the number of married female workers exceeded that of single working women.
At first, this issue surfaced as a problem of over-privileging dual-earning couples. 
Since EPI did not originally have any restriction on the eligibility for derived rights 
of a spouse, even dual-earning couples were able to receive APD for spouse, and 
upon the death of a spouse, SP in addition to their own old-age pension . When the 
level of these derived benefits was insignificant and married women’s employment 
was a rarity, the double payment did not attract much public criticism. However, as
93 In the 1965 Reform, restriction was introduced f  the receipt o f both one’s own old-age pensions and 
SP.
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demands for increasing women’s pensions through derived rights strengthened and 
their employment rate rose, the anomalies in EPI with regard to the treatment of 
employed wives became more acute and apparent.
This ‘problem’ was one of the reasons why the government was slow to increase the 
derived benefits until the late 1970s: simply increasing APD or SP would worsen the 
‘over-privileging’ of dual-earning couples. On the other hand, the economic 
insecurity of non-employed wives, especially in widowhood, was widely perceived 
as a problem, and there was a strong demand for the increase in the proportion of SP 
from 50 per cent to 70 per cent of the pension of the deceased, based on the ILO 
Convention No.102 (Koseidan 1988: 249-251). In response to this situation, BIPS 
urged the government in its final report to increase APD for spouse and SP for older 
widows and widowed mothers, as seen in the above. At the same time, however, the 
report recommended reforming the benefit structure so as to differentiate the level of 
EPI benefit according to the type of the household (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 
363-364).
The 1980 Reform followed these recommendations and attempted to redefine who 
were eligible for the improved derived benefits. As a result, a new clause was 
introduced to prohibit the receipt of APD for the spouse who had their own public 
old-age or disability pensions. The same reform also banned widows from receiving 
the Widow’s Addition if they were receiving their own public old-age or disability 
pensions. After tightening of the criteria, the level of the Widow’s Addition was 
significantly raised. On the other hand, the government refused to raise the 
proportion of SP itself. The justification for not increasing SP for all widows was 
that the eligibility criteria for SP in the Japanese pension system were too inclusive
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and wasteful compared with major Western systems94. Indeed, there was no 
restriction on age, duration of marriage or existence of children for widows nor 
minimum required membership period for the deceased in order to be eligible for SP. 
In the attempt to rectify this situation, in the 1980 Reform bill, the government 
proposed to abolish SP for childless widows aged below 40 on the grounds that they 
could support themselves by becoming wage earners. This proposal was discarded in 
the negotiations outside of the Diet due to the strong resistance from not only 
opposition parties but also from backbenchers of the ruling LDP. Nonetheless, it was 
apparent that the eligibility for the status of housewife was becoming more 
contentious in the pension system.
These moves, however, did not mean that policy makers began adjusting the pension 
system to include women as wage earners. This was apparent in the treatment of the 
increasing number of married women in part-time employment. Between 1970 and 
1975, the percentage of part-time workers of all female employees rose from 12 per 
cent to 17 per cent (Tamiya 2003). Wives with part-time work presented a question 
whether they should be treated as wage earners or dependants in the pension system. 
Although the assumption in the pension system was that dependent wives had no 
incomes of their own, the jurisdiction decided not to treat part-time working wives as 
wage earners across the board but to decide their status case by case. As a result, 
despite the increase in the number of female employees, the percentage of female 
workers insured by EPI was declining from the peak of 67.3 per cent in 1970. In 
1980, MHW issued a notification to unify the treatment of part-time working wives, 
defining for the first time the thresholds of working hours for the status of dependent
94 See, for example, deliberations in the special committee, House o f Councillors, the Social Affairs 
and Labour Committee. 1973. the 71st Diet Session, Nos. 21-22.
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spouses. By stretching the definition of ‘dependent wives’ to wives with some 
earnings, therefore, the pension system continued to include women mainly as wives.
This decision, however, did not cause much opposition among wives themselves, and 
this was understandably so. For wives in part-time employment, becoming a 
member of EPI in their own right did not necessarily lead to a better deal mainly 
because of their low wages and short tenure. As wage earners, women were required 
to fulfill increasingly more difficult conditions for decent pensions. It was decided to 
equalise the premium rates of female and male workers in the 1980 Reform. 
Moreover, the same reform extended the maximum period of premium payment for 
EPI from 30 years to 35 years in accordance with the lengthening average 
membership period of male employees. Although the minimum required period of 
membership remained the same, lengthening of the maximum years in effect meant 
that the benefit level for the minimum membership period decreased. In contrast, the 
benefits as dependants were improving at the same time, as seen above. Moreover, if 
they wished, housewives of insured employees could join in NP on a voluntary basis. 
And indeed they did. Between 1970 and 1975, the number of voluntary participants 
in NP doubled and it kept increasing. This was partly because of the limited level of 
provision for wives. APD was far below the subsistence level, and the level of SP -  
half of the deceased husband pension -  was admitted by many government officials 
as too low to live on. Even the minimurn guarantee for SP as of 1980 amounted to 
only 34.5 per cent of the model pension for a single man.
Overall, it was becoming more difficult for women to gain decent EPI pensions in 
their own right, while the derived benefit was gradually improving with the 
additional advantage of NP voluntary membership. In order to remain eligible for
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the derived rights, many wives of the EPI insured adjusted their working hours and 
earnings so as not to exceed the threshold for the status of ‘housewife’. This in effect 
meant that exclusion from EPI in their own right was exchanged for better derived 
rights, which in a way preempted the possible political movements for better 
pensions for part-time workers.
Excluded from this deal were part-time working wives of the NP insured. Because 
of the exemption of part-time workers from EPI in principle, it was difficult for them 
to gain the access to EPI in their own right. On the other hand, unlike wives of the 
EPI insured, they were unable to gain much from derived rights. There were no APD 
for dependent spouse in NPI and derived benefits in widowhood from NP were more 
restricted than in the case of EPI. What they could generally expect was a modest 
level of NPI pensions in their own right. It was not surprising therefore that a sense 
of unfairness was to be budding among NP wives. As we see below, this differential 
treatment of wives of the EPI insured and those of the NP insured further 
complicated the equality debates in the Japanese pension system and began being 
regarded as the main problem of women’s pensions.
4.3 Coming of age: the 1985 Pension Reform
By the end of the 1970s, it was widely acknowledged that the existing pension
system was unable to respond to changing socio-economic situations in Japan. The
double-digit growth in the national economy could no longer be expected to absorb
the growing expenditure on public pensions. The demographic profile of the
population in Japan was also fast changing, increasing the number of old-age
pensioners as well as raising their ratio to non-pensioners. Against this backdrop,
from the mid-1970s, a series of recommendations and opinions for a fundamental
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reform were put forward from advisory bodies such as BIPS and ACSS. However, 
the 1980 Reform ended with less than a bang and only introduced changes within the 
framework of the existing system. Consequently, it became a forgone conclusion 
that the next Fiscal Adjustment planned in 1985 would need to introduce substantial 
changes in the pension system. In this planned fundamental reform, women’s 
pension issues were understood as one of the central problems to be tackled.
4.3.1 Women’s pension rights versus equity between households
The issue of women’s pension was not a new problem in Japan, but how it was 
defined as a problem had been different over time. The dominant way women’s 
pension was problematised in the run-up to the 1985 Reform was summarised by the 
final report of BIPS submitted in 1979. The report pointed out three issues as 
problems with regard to women’s pensions -  namely, (1) the voluntary NP 
membership of housewives of the insured employees; (2) the low level of provision 
for widows and; (3) differential treatment between women and men for premium 
rates and pensionable age (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 363-364). Among these 
three, the treatment of housewives was the most fundamental.
The voluntary NP membership of housewives of the insured employees was a
compromise between those who argued for their mandatory NP membership and
those who supported their total exclusion from NP (see Chapter 3). However, many
still saw the settlement as problematic. From the viewpoint of the former, the
problem was the lack of women’s individual pension right. Therefore, for them,
voluntary membership meant a missed target. Women who could not afford to pay
the premium, and therefore would be more in need in case of disability or divorce,
were simply excluded from the scheme rather than being granted a special
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membership with waiver of premium as in the case with mandatory members with 
low incomes. Indeed, as early as in 1975, MHW officially admitted the problematic 
nature of voluntary NPI membership of housewives of the EPI insured, pointing out 
the precariousness of pension rights of non-NPI member housewives (MHW 1975).
On the other hand, exclusion of housewives from NP was proposed on the grounds of 
equity between EPI and NP households. If housewives joined in NP, they were to be 
covered both by their own NP and their husband’s EPI since EPI was a family 
provision. For those whose concern was mainly about equity between households, 
the voluntary membership of housewives even aggravated their concern. Their 
criticism was that the arrangement was in effect a state subsidy for the middle- to 
high-income households. This was because the NP pensions were heavily subsidized 
from general revenues, while the households which were more likely to take out 
wives’ voluntary membership would be those with middle to high incomes. MHW 
was also sympathetic to the demands for equity between households. In the above 
mentioned annual report, MHW also suggested the need to differentiate the pension 
level according to household types, drawing attention to their differential economic 
situations (ibid.). As an example, the report highlighted that single EPI pensioners 
were relatively advantaged over married EPI pensioners because of the relatively low 
level of APD.
Having agreed with both views which were at the basis of opposing positions 
towards housewives’ NPI membership, the MHW report was silent about any 
concrete long-term measures to satisfy both pension rights of housewives and equity 
between households. Instead, in the subsequent years, the voluntary NP membership 
of housewives was encouraged as a short-term solution to the women’s pension
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rights, while APD was repeatedly raised in order to differentiate the provisions for 
single households and couple households.
As had been criticized, these arrangements did not completely satisfy women’s 
pension rights or equity between households. Yet, compulsory membership would 
raise a question of finance: Who should pay the premium for housewives, who were 
technically without incomes? On the other hand, total exclusion was politically 
difficult because of the sheer size of the voluntary members. By the end of the 1970s, 
the voluntary members constituted more than a quarter of the total members of NP, 
and about 80 per cent of the housewives of insured employees were enrolled in NP as 
voluntary members.
The problem of the low level of SP was also interlinked with this issue. The 
government was hesitant to raise the proportion of SP from 50 per cent of the 
pension of the deceased in the fear of further widening inequality between 
households which took out voluntary NP membership and those which did not. 
Because some were covered by both EPI (as a dependant) and NP (as an individual), 
raising SP to a satisfying level for those without NP would mean overprovision for 
those in both schemes.
These uncoordinated, myopic ‘solutions’ to women’s pensions, however, became
themselves considered to be problems. In its final report, BIPS explicitly took up
this issue as a major problem, arguing that the voluntary membership could
destabilize the finance of NP because of the ease to withdraw from the scheme at
whim (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 356-369). While BIPS did not recommend
any long-term concrete solutions to this issue, it emphasised the household as the
basic unit of pension provision and the insurance principle financed by premium
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payment (ibid.). On the other hand, a report submitted by ACSS in 1977 proposed to 
cover women as individuals by establishing a new basic pension scheme for all 
citizens financed by general revenue (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 351-355). 
According to this plan, the various existing public pensions were to become top-up 
provisions in addition to the basic pension. Many other reports, both official and 
unofficial, recommended various approaches falling in between these major two 
reports.
In November 1982, in the attempt to seek common ground, MHW consulted 
academics, business leaders and other key policy makers by sending a questionnaire 
about the ideal form of the reformed pension system. In the accompanying 
documents, MHW emphasized the long-term stability of the system and fairness 
within and across generations as the two fundamentally important principles for the 
reform (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 1988b: 450-453). As a reference point for 
envisioning a new system, MHW for the first time revealed its blueprint of a 
reformed system. First, it suggested an introduction of Basic Pensions (BP) for all 
citizens. However, unlike the one proposed by ACSS, MHW suggested using the 
existing NP and the flat-rate part of EPI for this purpose. The MHW’s version also 
differed from ACSS’s in the financing of BP. The former supported the social 
insurance principle, while the latter insisted on financing BP by general revenue. For 
employees, the eamings-related part of pension was to be topped up. With regard to 
women’s pension rights, MHW suggested that the new system would provide all 
women with their own individual pensions, including the non-employed wives of 
insured employees. The questionnaire was sent to 1,000 people and 639 replies were 
received (MHW 1983). Overall, the view of MHW prevailed. Based on the replies
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to the questionnaire, MHW prepared the reform bill, which passed the Diet in April 
1985 and was promulgated in May the same year.
4.3.2 Establishment of women’s pension rights in 1985 Reform
The 1985 Reform tried to solve three major ‘problems’ -  namely, the divided 
schemes and inequality between them; financial sustainability; and coherency in the 
coverage of women by:
1. Introduction of Basic Pension;
2. Containment of benefit level gradually over 20 years by adjusting calculation 
formula to lengthening contribution years;
3. Increase in the contribution rate;
4. Establishment of housewives’ individual pension right; and
5. Increase in SP.
The new structure laid down by this reform became the framework of the current 
Japanese pension system. Previously separate state pension schemes were 
incorporated into one coherent system, comprised of three tiers. The first tier was 
the flat-rate Basic Pension (BP) which covered all those aged 20 to 59. The second 
tier was an eamings-related part for employees. The third tier was an additional part 
which was mainly constituted of occupational pensions. The minimum membership 
period for pension entitlement was extended for EPI members in line with NP (25 
years) and the full pension was obtainable after 40-years contribution. The 
pensionable age for the first tier was also raised in line with NP (age of 65). It was 
also decided that pensionable age for women were to be raised from 55 to 60 over 12 
years from 1987. The members of different schemes were re-categorised into three 
new groups as Table 4.1 shows.
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Table 4.1 Membership categories of the public pension system after 1985
Categories 
after the 
reform
Definition Premiums to 
be paid
Pension benefit
No.l insured Former mandatory 
members of NP
Fixed amount From 1st tier
No. 2 insured Former members of EPI 
and other schemes for 
employees
Eamings-
related
From 1st and 2nd tiers 
(if available, also 
from 3rd tier)
No.3 insured Dependent spouses of 
the No.2 insured
Exempt From 1st tier
Among the three categories, the No.3 insured was newly created especially for 
housewives of insured employees in mind, who were formerly allowed to join in NP 
on a voluntary basis. To be eligible for this category, a person should be firstly 
married to the No.2 insured, secondly, non-employed or in part-time employment 
with working hours less than three quarters of the full-time employees at the 
workplace, and lastly had annual incomes less than 0.9 million yen95 as well as less 
than half of his/ her spouse’s income.
The reform addressed the most pressing issues pointed out since the mid-1970s. The 
inequality in benefit levels between pension schemes was not eradicated but 
rationalized by the multi-tier system. The financial crisis of NP was averted by 
incorporating it into the financially more secure EPI. Overall financial gains were 
earned by the cut in the benefit level over the next 20 years as well as the rise in the 
premium rate for employees to 12.4 per cent for men and 11.3 per cent for women.
95 The threshold was raised in accordance with the rise in wages in later years.
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More than anything, this major reform was widely publicised as the answer to 
women’s pension problem. It was claimed that the reform established pension rights 
for all women and streamlined existing provisions for women. With the 
establishment of the category No.3, dependent spouses of employees gained their 
own pension rights to the basic provisions for old age instead of being provided 
through additional benefits paid to their husband (see Figure 4.1). As a result, APD 
for spouse became limited to dependent spouses aged below the pensionable age of 
6 596. The introduction of the category No.3 also meant that EPI households which 
were previously unable or unwilling to take out voluntary NP membership of 
housewife could also benefit from NP equivalent, redressing the unfair situations 
where only better-off couples were able to receive higher benefits with the state 
subsidy. With regard to SP, the provision from the first tier was to be limited to 
widowed mothers, while the one from the second tier was to be paid to all widows of 
the No.2 insured regardless of age and motherhood. The ratio of SP from the second 
tier was also raised to 75 per cent of the deceased members’ eamings-related part of 
pensions. On top of this provision, childless widows of the No.2 insured aged 
between 35 and over could receive additional benefit from the age of 40. The 
problem of women’s pension right was apparently solved by establishing 
housewives’ pension rights regardless of their premium payment.
96 There is a transitory adjustment payment (Furikae Kasan) paid to dependent spouses according to 
his/ her date o f birth. Those who were bom on 2nd April 1966 and after would get no additional 
benefits.
165
Figure 4 .1  Changes in the Structure and the Benefit Level for the No. 2 insured
32 Years 40 Years
Paid to
EPI
insured
¥81,300 ¥76,200 Paid to 
No.2
¥50,000
¥76,800
¥50,000 Paid to 
No.3
¥15,000
Total ¥173,100 ¥176,200 Total
Note: the amounts were in prices as o f 1984 
Source: Kosei Tokei Kyokai (2002: 43)
The reform was indeed substantial and thorough. Yet, the renewed pension system 
was a curious mixture of changes and continuities. Partly because of this, the reform 
created another form of ‘women’s pension problem’ as we see below.
4.3.3 Unfair equality? Seeds for contentions
Although the government claimed otherwise, ‘women’s pension problem’ was not 
settled even with the substantial changes brought by the 1985 Reform. The reform 
was criticised from the viewpoints of gender equality and equity between households 
-  the very issues the reform claimed to have tackled. With regard to the former, 
although the establishment of women’ individual pension right was indeed a 
significant step forward for women’s economic welfare in old age, the achievement
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was made by expanding the derived rights. In a way, this resulted in the 
strengthening of the gendered perception of women as economic dependants.
Indeed, rather than challenging the embedded gender assumptions in the system, the 
reformed system as a whole actually strengthened the male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker model more than before. This could be clearly seen in the reformed SP. 
The Basic SP was in effect a continuation of the Widowed Mother’s Pension from 
NP. However, the reform changed the eligibility condition, turning the provision for 
widowed mothers into the derived rights rather than individual rights. Under the new 
law, the Basic SP was to be payable based on the membership record of the deceased 
husband, rather than widowed mothers’ record as in the old system. Moreover, in the 
case of SP from the second tier, women were forced to choose either derived rights 
or individual rights. Even if widows had an entitlement to their own pensions from 
the second tier, they should waive the right in order to receive SP from the second 
tier. Since the majority of women did not have their own pensions higher than three- 
quarters of their deceased husbands’ pensions, most of them chose to give up 
pensions in their own right. This resulted in the situation where the pension levels of 
married women were determined by the level of their late husbands’ pensions 
regardless of their own contribution records.
The assumption of male breadwinner/ female homemaker model could also be found 
in the treatment of widowers. Despite the equalisation of treatment between women 
and men in premium rates and pensionable ages, differential treatment of widows 
and widowers in SP was retained from the old system. Unlike widowed mothers, 
widowers with minor children were not entitled to Basic SP. While SP from the
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second tier provided for widowers as well97, there was an age restriction and a 
waiting period unlike for widows. Only widowers aged 55 and over at the time of 
their wife’s death were eligible for the benefit, which was not payable until the age 
of 60.
The failure of the government to explicitly challenge the gender assumptions in the 
pension system implied that the main concern of the reform for the government was 
not necessarily gender issues. The moves for women’s individual pension right and 
for strengthening the gender assumptions were able to coexist in the same reform 
partly because women’s pensions were problematised within the framework of 
equity between different types of households rather than gender equality. Despite the 
claim of the major change for the establishment of women’s individual pension 
rights, therefore, the 1985 Reform continued using the familiar framework -  derived 
rights as wives. Ironically, however, this period was also the time when feminists’ 
challenges to the gender division of labour were gaining wider recognition, which 
manifested itself in the passing of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law in 1985. 
Thus, the reformed system was soon to reveal its limitation as a pension system in 
the new era.
Neither was the issue of inequity between households settled by the 1985 Reform. 
Although the incoherence in benefit levels and eligibility conditions across schemes 
were apparently managed, inequality in the levels of premium between households of 
different occupations remained. The premium for the No.l insured continued to be a 
fixed amount rather than a proportion of earnings. As often pointed out, this
97 The scope o f Survivors’ Pension is wider than that o f Survivors’ Basic Pensions. Those who are 
entitled to this provision is widows with minor children, widows without children, widowers aged 55 
and over, parents aged 55 and over, grandchildren under 18 and grandparents aged over 55. The 
priority for the provision is given according to the above order.
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arrangement was regressive in nature and unequal with the arrangement for the No.2 
insured, who paid eamings-related contributions. Moreover, the reform added a new 
issue -  the treatment of the No.3 insured. As seen above, the No.3 insured were not 
required to pay any premiums for their entitlement to BP because they were 
technically without their own incomes. This was in a stark contrast with the 
treatment of spouses of the No. 1 insured who also did not have incomes in their own 
name. Unlike spouses of the No.2 insured, they were categorised as the No.l insured 
themselves, and thus they (or more precisely the heads of the household) were 
obliged to pay the fixed amount premiums. This arrangement was criticised as unfair 
because the benefit level of BP for the No.3 insured was completely equal with 
others if the membership period was the same. Even in the public hearings in the 
Diet during the deliberations on the reform bill, some pointed out this clause as 
unfairly advantageous treatment of employees’ wives (Yokoyama 2002: 168-171). It 
was therefore no surprise that the criticism about ‘privileges’ of housewives started 
getting louder after the reform.
The establishment of pension rights for housewives was thus widely regarded as an 
unfair privilege of housewives rather than equality in outcomes because of the 
utilized route -  the derived rights. Presented as conflicting interests between 
households with different work arrangements, the ‘women’s pension problem’ in the 
Japanese pension system turned out to be divisive for women rather than enhancing 
solidarity among women. At the same time, the extension of the derived rights 
meant the strengthening of the gendered assumptions in the pension system. In sum, 
the legacy of the 1985 Reform for women was the stronger assumption of their 
economic dependency in marriage and their division along the line of their husband’s
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occupations. Far from being solved, the women’s pension problem became more 
contentious than ever.
4.4 Conclusion
By the end of the 1960s, the public pension system became widely regarded as an 
important source of incomes in old age. As citizens’ expectations on the public 
provision grew, the demand for its improvement also strengthened. The demands for 
better pensions were often presented as issues of equality and fairness. The demand 
for better EPI pensions for future was strengthened by the argument that non-public 
workers were disadvantaged compared with public workers in terms of the level of 
pensions. In turn, the increase in NP benefits was justified on the grounds of equality 
between workers of different sectors. On the other hand, benefit increase for the 
elderly of the day was demanded on the grounds of fair share of the national resource. 
Against the backdrop of rapid growth in national economy, the level of pension 
benefits was raised substantially to meet these demands in the 1960s and the 1970s.
However, more often than not, the ways issues of inequality were problematised 
were premised upon certain norms and assumptions which legitimised other forms of 
inequality. One of such norms and assumptions was a principle whereby pension 
benefits should be in exchange for monetary contribution in the form of premium 
payment. Another was that a couple household should be the basic unit for 
determining the level of benefit. Thus, marriage was taken for granted as well as its 
intactness. Moreover, it was assumed that most of households would follow the male 
breadwinner/ female homemaker model. These norms and assumptions effectively 
legitimised lower levels of pensions of the contemporary elderly and women’s 
precarious pension rights.
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Nonetheless, this did not mean that pensions of the contemporary elderly or women 
were not problematised. On the contrary, the 1960s onwards saw these two issues 
increasingly being taken up as policy problems. However, the fundamental norms 
and assumptions behind these issues themselves were not seriously challenged 
during this period. As such, effective exclusion of the contemporary elderly was not 
problematised as a structural problem within the pension system which legitimised 
inequality between generations. Rather, it was perceived as a poverty problem of 
economically vulnerable due to socio-economic changes. Thus, more generous 
‘special’ benefits were introduced for the contemporary elderly as a political 
goodwill rather than as a manifestation of their pension rights.
Similar situations were observed with women’s pensions. However, in the case of
women’s pensions, what sustained the above embedded norms and assumptions was
not the unquestioning of inequality but the dilemma of claims for equality made on
the basis of difference. In national and international movements for gender equality,
women’s generally disadvantaged position in social security was problematised and
the redress was demanded by taking into account of the value of hetherto neglected
unpaid work. However, in the context of the pension system in Japan, demands for
gender quality through valuing unpaid work often merged with demands for better
pensions for women as housewives. In other words, practical demands based on the
reality of gender division of labour were joined with, or overtaken by, demands
based on norms of gender division of labour. This dual-nature of ‘gender equality’ in
pensions manifested itself in the No.3 insured in the 1985 Reform. Although the
government claimed that the arrangement solved the problem of women’s pension
rights, it did not fundamentally challenge the norms and assumptions which had
legitimately sustained the gender inequality -  namely, insurance principle based on
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monetary contribution, the household as a basic unit and the male breadwinner/ 
female homemaker model.
Since the 1980s onwards, the dominant discourses on the economic situations of the 
contemporary elderly began to change and the emphasis was put more on their 
affluence. Thus, the issue of the economic plight of the elderly virtually disappeared 
from policy debates as a major policy problem in Japan. In contrast, issues of 
women’s pensions remained being problematised throughout the 1990s but from a 
different perspective as will be seen in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5 Gender Equality in the Childless/ Aged Society
At the turn of the century, Japan saw the destabilisation of various post-war 
institutions. In the labour market, the unemployment rate and atypical working 
patterns kept increasing not only for women but also for men, dispelling the myth of 
the life-long full-time employment for male workers. On the other hand, women’s 
advancement in the labour market further progressed, eroding the ideology of the 
family based on the gender division of labour. In the family, the birth rate continued 
falling to the lower record, while demand for social care services for the frail elderly 
was mounting. Together, the trend revealed that the availability of women’s unpaid 
care work could no longer be taken for granted. These changes challenged the 
existing social security system which was based on the dominant norms of post-war 
years on the relations between women and men, between the young and the old and 
between the state and citizens.
This chapter explores how the transition of norms concerning these relations affected 
the way in which women’s pension was problematised in Japan in the 1990s onwards. 
In so doing, the changes and continuities are traced of the issues of equality and 
fairness among various social groups. First, the chapter looks at the overall trends of 
the pension policies in the 1990s in Japan. This is followed by a section which 
examines the issues problematised during the decade with regard to women’s 
pensions. It especially focuses on a report by an official advisory committee on 
women’s pensions published in 2001. The next section looks at the changes and 
continuities in the way women were treated in the Japanese pension system as a 
result of the 2004 pension reform. The last part summarises the findings and
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considers what ‘problems’ were unresolved and what issues were left 
unproblematised with regard to women’s pensions.
5.1 The childless/ aged society and pension reforms
The 1990s saw the population ageing further advanced in Japan due mainly to the 
continuous decline in the birth rate. The finding that the total fertility rate (TFR) in 
1989 dropped to 1.57 and broke the record low of 1966 was widely publicized in the 
media, dubbing it as the ‘1.57 Shock’. While TFR had been below the replacement 
level since the mid-1970s, and the Japanese ageing had been a well-discussed issue, 
the main focus of policy makers until then had been on the growing number of the 
elderly rather than on the shrinking number of children. As politicians realised that 
the trend of declining TFR was enhancing the population ageing at a faster rate than 
it had been previously predicted, the issue began being taken up as something of a 
‘crisis’ in the 1990s.
The decrease in TFR was at first understood as being caused mainly by younger
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women’s active choice to delay marriage and/or childbearing. Indeed, against the 
backdrop of improvement in women’s education and advancement of gender equality 
movements, women’s aspirations in the labour market were heightening and years of 
women’s full-time employment were slowly extending. However, the public 
attention was gradually shifted from women’s choice to the rigid gender division of 
labour as a main cause of the TFR decline. Faced with the constrained choice 
between their careers and family life, younger women were increasingly shying away
98 The proportion o f children outside the marriage was, and still is, very low in Japan. In 2003, it was 
about 2 per cent o f all the births in Japan, while the equivalent proportion in the same year was 43 per 
cent in Britain and 26 per cent in Germany.
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from marriage and/or childbearing. The proportion of life-long single persons" rose 
from 4.5 per cent to 5.8 per cent for women and from 2.6 per cent to 12.6 per cent for 
men between 1980 and 2000 (Japan Cabinet Office 2004b: 17) 10°. The shift of the 
focus was also accompanied by changes in the government’s attitude. In the face of 
the unabated decline in TFR, the government grudgingly came to accept that, in 
order to reverse the declining trend of birth rate, the conventional gender division of 
labour should be actively challenged (see, for example, Economic Planning Agency 
1997).
Based on this understanding of the issue, the government began explicitly 
acknowledging married women’s role as paid workers as well as encouraging men’s 
participation in childrearing. The government also started to accept that women’s 
unpaid care work was no longer readily available and that a larger state role was 
required to fill the gap. In a way, the government accepted the limitations of the 
‘Japanese-style welfare society’ promoted in the 1970s and 1980s (Nakai 2004; 
Yokoyama 2004). The changing attitude of the government towards childcare was 
clearly seen in the annual report of MHW in 1998, which dismissed the widely held 
view of the indispensability of maternal care for children under three as a myth 
(MHW 1998). In the attempt to increase the birth rate, the government introduced a
99 The proportion o f persons who were single in the age groups 45-54 was used as a proxy. The 
proportion was reached by taking the average o f the proportions of singles aged between 45 and 49 
and between 50 and 54.
100 Although the more rapid increase in single men than in single women since 1990 is an interesting 
demographic phenomenon, the exploration o f the reasons behind it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
While there are many studies on the increase in non-marriage in Japan, most o f them are focused on 
younger people in their 20s and 30s rather than the lifetime singlehood. See, for example, Japan 
Cabinet Office. 2004b. Shoshika Shakai Hakusho (White Paper on the Childless Society). Moreover, 
many o f them are focused on possible contributing factors for women’s singleness and childlessness 
rather than men’s (see, for example, articles in Meguro, Yoriko, and Nishioka Hachiro, eds. 2004. 
Shoshi ka no Jenda Bunseki (Analyses on the Childless Society). Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, Shakai Seisaku 
Gakkai, ed. 2005. Shoshi ka, Kazoku, Shakai Seisaku (Childlessness, the Family and Social Policy). 
Vol. 14. Tokyo: Horitsu Bunka sha.).
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series of policies to facilitate the reconciliation of employment and childrearing from 
the 1990s onwards. In 1991, the government introduced the statutory parental leave 
(amended in 1994). Also, in order to expand the existing social services as well as to 
create new ones for childrearing, a series of five-year plans were produced (Angel 
Plans in 1994 and 1999). The demographic concerns accelerated the shifting of the 
boundaries between the state and the family as well as strengthened the challenge to 
the conventional gender division of labour.
Childcare was not the only area which felt the shortage of women’s unpaid work. 
Indeed, it was long-term care for the frail elderly which first attracted political 
attention. Reliant heavily on informal care by the family, social services for long­
term care in Japan had been negligible in number and questionable in quality. 
However, with the advancement of population ageing and significant changes in the 
family, informal care by the family started to show its limitation. Faced with a 
growing demand for greater state welfare in this field, the government introduced a 
series of five-year plans for the long-term care for the elderly (Gold Plans in 1989, 
1994 and 1999) and the expansion of social services. Moreover, in 1997, the 
government introduced a social insurance scheme for a long-term care (enforced in 
2000), acknowledging for the first time the need to socialise care for the frail elderly 
regardless of their economic status or the availability of other family members.
These policies for the expansion of the state services were, however, accompanied by 
the rigorous curtailment of welfare expenditure under the name of sustainability of 
the welfare system in the aged society. In view of the childless/ aged society, the 
government put the structural reform of the social security system as one of the top
priorities in the mid-1990s. In 1996, chairpersons of eight official advisory councils
\
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of social security related fields had meetings and submitted an interim report, entitled 
‘the Direction of Social Security Structural Reform {Shakai Hosho Kozd Kaikaku no 
Hoko)\ which reinstated the need to contain the rise of the levels of contributions 
and benefits (MHW 1996). In November 1997, the government enacted the Special 
Law to Enhance Fiscal Structure Reform {Zaisei Kozd Kaikaku no Suishin ni kansuru 
Tokubetsu Sochi Ho), which set a numerical target to contain the social security cost. 
One of the most affected areas was the pension system, whose financial situation was 
increasingly being worsened by the rise in the number and the proportion of the 
elderly. Thus, the 1990s onwards saw two opposite trends of expansion and 
retrenchment simultaneously in welfare policies.
5.1.1 Sustainability and retrenchment
A childless society was also an ageing society, where a shrinking number of those in 
the labour market should provide for a growing number of retirees. In the pension 
system, this meant for younger generations that their contributions should keep rising 
while their pension prospects would keep worsening. Indeed, at every official 
population projection in the 1980s onwards, the prospects for actuarial balance of the 
pension funds worsened and as a result the premium rate was continuously raised 
without much real growth in the level of pension101. This in turn nurtured a sense of 
unfairness among the younger generation, who were unlikely to receive the level of 
pensions enjoyed by the current older generation. The limitation of a pay-as-you-go 
scheme in the childless society was repeatedly pointed out (for example, Takayama
101 The rise in premium rate was steeper for women than for men due to the equalisation o f the rates 
between women and men legislated in the 1980 Reform. Between 1980 and 1996, the rate for female 
employees almost doubled from 4.45 per cent (5.3 per cent for men) to 8.675 per cent (same rate for 
men).
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1992; 1998), which further stimulated the demand by younger population for fairer 
distribution of resources between generations.
By the mid-1990s, the dominant view among the Japanese was that the cut in 
benefits was inevitable in order to contain the rise in contribution102. When MHW 
conducted a survey in 1998 on five options for the balance between the levels of 
premium and benefit, the most preferred option was to reduce the benefit level to 50 
per cent of average earnings (from 62 per cent under existing level) and contain the 
rise in premium to 13 per cent103 of monthly remuneration at the maximum (17.15 
per cent of the monthly remuneration to support the existing level of benefit)104. 
Increasingly, the dominant discourse of the pension reforms shifted from the need for 
adequate provision for old age to the need for intergenerational equity and 
sustainability of the pension system.
Against this background, measures to contain the rise of the pension level were fairly 
rigorously pursued in the 1990s. These moves were also in line with the austerity 
budget under the government policies for fiscal restructuring from the mid-1990s 
onwards. While the move towards the containment of pension level itself was not 
unique to this period but noticeable since at least the early 1980s (see Chapter 4), 
pension reforms in the 1990s were fundamentally different from the measures 
actually taken in the 1980s. The latter were mainly focused on fine-tuning of the
102 According to the survey conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister in 1998, about 70 per cent 
of those in the survey (5,000 people in total) agreed with this view. See Asahi Shinbun. 21 June 1998.
103 Unlike the conventions o f official documents in Japan, the premium rates used in this thesis are 
only for employees and exclude the share o f employers unless otherwise stated. Employers pay the 
same premium rate with that of employees.
104 The surveyed groups were 2,000 experts and opinion leaders and 3,300 university students (Asahi 
Shinbun 15 May 1998, 11th July 1998). The five options that MHW presented were as follows: 1) rise 
in premium necessary to support the same level o f benefit with existing system; 2) premium rate of 15 
per cent and replacement rate of 55 per cent; 3) see the above; 4) premium rate of 10 per cent and 
replacement rate o f 37 per cent; 5) abolition o f the eamings-related part from a compulsory public 
pension.
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eligibility conditions so that they would better reflect the maturity of the system. 
Thus, for example, although the 1985 Reform extended the years of membership for 
the model pension from 32 years to 40 years, it did not reduce the replacement ratio 
of the model benefit itself. In contrast, reforms in the 1990s explicitly curtailed the 
level of model pensions in order not to exceed the agreed ceiling for the maximum 
premium rate -  10 per cent at the time.
The most explicit measures for cost containment in the 1990s were direct cuts in 
benefits. In the 1994 Reform, the base of indexation for benefit increase was 
changed from the rise in the average gross wage to that of the average net wage. 
Moreover, in the 1999 Reform, the level of the eamings-related part of pension was 
cut by 5 per cent.
Another major change in this direction was the rise in the pensionable age. This 
option was first proposed in the government’s bill in the 1980 Reform. However, the 
strong resistance from business and labour aborted the proposal at the time. In 
contrast, against the backdrop of further advancement in population ageing, the 
extension of pensionable age was finally enacted in the reforms in 1994 and 2000. In 
the 1994 Reform, the pensionable age was raised from 60 to 65 for the basic part of 
EPI105, which were to be implemented between 2001 and 2013 for men and between 
2006 and 2018 for women. Although the pensionable age for the eamings-related 
part was originally kept as 60 for both women and men, this decision was quickly 
reversed in the 2000 Reform. As a result, the eligible age for the eamings-related
105 Although BP created in the 1985 Reform was payable from 65, members o f EPI had been able to 
receive equivalents of BP and eamings-related second tier from 60 as under the previous system. 
These benefits were called Special EPI Old-Age Pension (Tokubetsu Shikuno Rorei Kosei Nenkin).
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part in EPI also became 65, which was to be introduced between 2013 and 2025 for 
men and between 2018 and 2030 for women.
More fundamentally, this period also saw growing support for private pensions in 
Japan, corresponding to the world-wide trends in this direction. Proposals for 
introducing private pensions as a part of the pension system began being seriously 
considered by the government towards the end of the 1990s. In October 2001, state- 
subsidised defined premium schemes were introduced as a voluntary third tier in the 
pension system (enacted in June 2001). Just when state welfare for the economic 
security in old age came of age in Japan, the share of resources allocated to the 
elderly through the state began being challenged. Although the shift from public 
pensions to private pensions would often disadvantage those with low earnings 
and/or with long life expectancy, the possible negative implications of this move for 
women, who generally fit in the above categories, were not well discussed. •
5.1.2 Equality among women or gender equality?
Rising cost of the pension system notwithstanding, there were a group of people who 
benefited from the system without premium -  namely, the No.3 insured or 
‘housewives’ as commonly referred to. As the pension prospects for future 
pensioners worsened, questions were increasingly raised about the legitimacy of 
providing full Basic Pensions (BP) for housewives without collecting premiums from 
them. These criticisms often took the form of attacks on ‘favourable treatments’ of 
housewives in the pension system, depicting this arrangement and other derived 
benefits in the pension system as regressive distribution of resources from dual­
worker households to male breadwinner/ female homemaker households (for
example, Shiota 1997; 2000). These criticisms easily led to popular discourses on
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housewives as free riders, making women with different marital and employment 
status antagonistic towards each other106.
Criticisms were also raised by some feminists who saw the existing pension system 
as gender reinforcing (Ida 1998; Shiota 1997). They condemned that the pension 
system perpetuated women’s subordinate economic position to men’s by 
encouraging women to become housewives and discriminating against those who did 
not comply. Thus, the pension system was criticised for its gender bias, which 
contributed to distorting the employment behaviour of married women to comply 
with the conventional gender division of labour. This line of criticism was further 
encouraged by concerns about the declining birth rate and ageing society, which 
were increasingly attributed, at least partially, to the rigid gender division of labour 
(CGE 1997; Economic Planning Agency 1997).
On the other hand, the confidence in the public pension system was fast eroding 
among the general public. In the mid-1990s, nearly 11 per cent of the No.l insured
1 07did not contribute to the public pension due mainly to inability to pay (63.8 per
108cent) and to the distrust of the public pension system (41.7 per cent) (MHW 
1997a). This high proportion of non-payment in turn led to the growing sense of 
insecurity about the future viability of the system among those who paid. Thus, the 
government was faced with an increasing need to legitimise the pension system as 
secure, fair and equitable.
106 For a collection of non-academic essays on housewives in the 1990s, see Chuko Shinsho Rakure 
Henshubu, ed. 2002. Otto to Tsuma no tameno Shin Sengyd Shufu ron (New Debates on Housewife for  
Husband and Wife). Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha .
107 This figure excludes those who were legally exempt from premium payment due to low incomes or 
other reasons. The rate o f these people in the same year was 14.1 per cent. The premium for the No. 1 
insured is a fixed amount. In 1997, the premium was 13,300 yen per month.
108 Respondents were asked to choose several reasons which were applicable.
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In an attempt to abate the criticism of gender bias and preferential treatment of 
housewives in the pension system, the government amended the Survivors’ Pension 
(SP) in the 1994 Reform so that it could better reflect a woman’s own record of 
premium payment. As a result, rather than choosing between SP and their own EPI 
pensions as had been the case under the previous regulation, widowed spouses were 
enabled to choose to receive half of their own EPI pensions together with two thirds 
of SP (equivalent to the half of the deceased spouse’s EPI pensions) if this was 
higher. The newly introduced premium exemption for parents (see above) was also 
publicised as a measure for supporting women in the labour market. Nonetheless, 
these measures were far from fundamental. The most criticised arrangement for 
housewives -  exemption of premium -  was left intact and the male-breadwinner/ 
female homemaker model still permeated the overall pension system.
In the preparatory discussions for the 1999 Reform, women’s pension issues 
attracted more attention than before and caused heated debates in various advisory 
committees and discussion groups (see below). Yet, despite the common recognition 
of the problematic nature of women’s pensions under the existing system, there was 
no consensus on what should be done about it. According to a survey by MHW for 
experts and opinion leaders, 20 per cent of those asked supported the status quo of 
the No.3 insured system, while 27 per cent of the respondents supported the 
collection of contributions from the No.3 insured. On the other hand, in the same 
survey, 44 per cent supported the status quo for the moment but favoured collecting 
contributions in future (MHW 1999). Various surveys also showed that citizens 
were divided (Yokoyama 2002: 264-267). Generally speaking, the No.3 insured 
system was supported by more men than women, more younger people than older
people, more No.3 insured than non-No.3 insured, and more non-experts than experts.
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Failing to reach a consensus, the Pension Council (Nenkin Shingikai, an advisory 
body to the Minister of Health and Welfare) recommended in its ‘Opinion’ on the 
1999 Pension Reform that women’s pension issues should be further discussed 
before introducing a fundamental reform (Pension Council 1998). Accordingly, the 
government postponed any fundamental changes in women’s pensions in this reform. 
As a result, the bias towards the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model in the 
pension system was left almost intact throughout the 1990s and carried over to the 
new century.
5.1.3 Valuing care work or population policy?
Pension policies in the 1990s reflected the shift in the attitude of the government 
towards parenting and the gender division of labour. In a series of pension reforms 
in the decade, the government tried to adjust the pension system to be in harmony 
with newly introduced ‘family friendly policies’. In the 1994 Reform, exemption of 
premium payment was introduced for employees on parental leave for a child under 
one year old. Previously, the employees on leave were required to keep paying the 
premium based on the pre-leave wage level. However, the new clause exempted this 
obligation for employees while their pension benefits were to be calculated based on 
their pre-leave wages (enforced in 1995). In 1999, the premium payment was also 
exempted for employers’ side while the employees were on statutory parental leave. 
These arrangements were a significant step forward for parents, especially for 
employed mothers, the majority of whom previously had to settle the matter by 
shouldering the cost of childbearing and rearing by themselves.
However, originating from demographic and economic imperatives, the expansion in
state welfare of this period in general did not necessarily mean the strengthened
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social rights of citizens in Japan (Peng 2000). This limitation could be clearly seen 
in the newly introduced pension policies. The premium exemption for parents on 
leave was framed as a part of the effort to enhance the birth rate rather than to protect 
pension rights of parents or to reflect the value of care work (Pension Council 1998). 
As such, the premium exemption was available only to those who were directly 
relevant to the main policy goal -  namely, parents. Although statutory care leave 
was also introduced in the same year with parental leave, those on the former were 
still required to pay the premium based on the pre-leave salary. While the state 
welfare was significantly expanded in the area of care for the frail elderly during this 
period, the improvement of pension rights of carers was not included in the welfare 
package for the long-term care.
The premium exemption was not only targeted to parents but also focused on those 
whose opportunity cost of having children was more likely to be high. Thus, only 
employed parents were eligible for the premium exemption. If employees left the 
workplace rather than taking out parental leave, they simply lost their membership in 
the second tier. These people were to be re-categorised either as the No.3 insured (if 
their spouse was an employee) or as the No.l insured (if their spouse was a non­
employee or if there was no spouse), both of which did not have an access to 
eamings-related part of pension benefits. Furthermore, while the No.3 insured were 
exempted from paying premium to BP, the No.l insured were required to pay the 
fixed amount premium even during the period of childbearing and rearing. Thus, the 
arrangement treated parents differently according to the employment status of their 
own and of their spouse.
184
While the inconsistent treatment of different groups of carers (including parents) was 
partly due to the design problem of the pension system in accommodating women 
(see previous chapters), this flaw in the system could have been overcome if the 
policy goal had been to value care work itself or to mitigate pension disadvantages 
due to care work. Considering the narrow scope and incoherency in accommodating 
care work in the pension system, the newly introduced pension policies were limited 
as care credits, which were often expected to enhance the pension rights of those 
with main care responsibilities, of whom the majority were women.
5.2 Women’s pension problem
In the 1990s, gender equality was repeatedly taken up in the mainstream political 
arena as a key issue to be tackled in Japan. While this development was a result of 
national and international feminist movements, it was also helped by the political 
environment and economic imperatives of the time (Osawa 2000). In the mid-1990s, 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was generally not enthusiastic 
about gender equality, was in coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Japan 
and the New Party Sakigake, both of which were headed by female leaders and key 
advocates of gender equality. Moreover, as the link between the declining birth rate 
and the rigid gender roles came to be widely accepted, the gender division of labour 
began being understood as an obstacle for viable economy and social reproduction 
rather than a useful mechanism to enhance them. The issue was no longer ‘only’ 
about gender equality but also, and more importantly for some, about the national 
economy.
Against this background, the Council for Gender Equality (CGE, Danjo Kyddo
Sankaku Shingikai) was set up by government ordinance in 1994 to define the goals
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for a gender-equal society and to recommend measures to achieve them109. In 1996, 
CGE submitted a report entitled ‘Danjo Kyodo Sankaku Bijon: Nijuisseiki no Arata 
na Kachi no Sozo (A Vision of Gender Equality: Creation of New Values for the 
Twenty-first Century, hereafter referred to ‘the Vision’)’, putting forward 
recommendations and some concrete policy proposals in order to achieve a gender- 
equal society (CGE 1997). Among them, the need to eradicate the gender bias in 
taxation and social insurance systems was explicitly pointed out.
The revision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1997 (enforced in 1999) 
also further challenged discriminatory practices which often stemmed from gender 
biases. The government’s move towards gender equality culminated in the passage 
of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society in 1999. As a result, the criticisms of 
the gender assumptions in various social institutions, including the public pension 
system, were further heightened.
5.2.1 Committee on Women’s Pension
Despite the mounting criticisms, the pension reforms in the 1990s did not directly 
address ‘women’s pension problems’ as we saw in the previous section. Still, by the 
end of the 1990s, there was a common understanding among policy makers that 
some measures should be taken. Indeed, in the same report which recommended 
postponement of gender-related reforms in 1999, the Pension Council also urged the 
government to set up a committee consisting of experts on related fields to discuss 
issues on women’s pensions in the aim for fundamental reforms (Pension Council 
1998).
109 CGE was subsequently upgraded to be a statutory body in 1997.
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Accordingly, a special committee was created in July 2000 to look into issues on 
women’s pensions, taking into consideration the Civil Code, taxation, social security 
and actuarial viability. The committee, the Study Group on the Pension System 
which Responds to Changes in Women’s Lifestyles (SPWL, Josei no Raifu Sutairu 
no Henka nado ni Taidshita Nenkin no Arikata ni kansuru Kento kai), was the first of 
its kind in Japan which directly and solely addressed the gender dimension of the 
pension system. SPWL consisted of 16 members, of whom 9 were women. Their 
background was diverse from pension experts to a ‘housewife’. In December 2001, 
after 17 sessions of heated debates, SPWL produced its final report, entitled as ‘The 
Pension System in which Women’s Own Contribution Bears Fruit (,Josei Jishin no 
Koken ga Minoru Nenkin SeidoY (SPWL 2001).
As the title of the report implied, the report explicitly acknowledged the gender bias 
embedded in the pension system and called for a change. In reforming the pension 
system, the report recommended that the general goal should be to create ‘a pension 
system in which women’s own contribution bears fruit’ and that the current systems 
should be changed ‘from pensions for male breadwinners to pensions for individuals’ 
(ibid: 14). The reformed system should recognise the employment records of both 
male and female workers, who combined family responsibilities and various forms of 
paid work, so that individual workers could accumulate their own pension 
entitlement to both basic and eamings-related parts. Thus, the report was clear about 
its support for a dual-earning couple model as the norm in the future pension system. 
This was a significant change from the past when women were assumed to be 
housewives in the pension system without much second thought.
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In accordance with the above general goal, the report put forward three principles 
based on which women’s pension should be reconsidered. They were:
- Neutrality of the pension system to life choices of individuals;
- Increase in the number of ‘supporters’ of the pension system;
- Improvement of the pension system for women’s economic welfare in old age.
However, the report stopped short of putting forward any concrete policy 
recommendations on some of the key issues as inherently value-laden choices. The 
aim of the report was limited to ‘summarise the basic directions and important points 
at issue in order to contribute to the national debates in future on issues on women’s 
pensions (ibid: 1)’. Thus, although the report pointed a normative goal and basic 
principles to follow, it largely left the final decision on some of the key aspects in 
reforming the pension system to further discussions among the general public.
Despite this limitation, the report was still important in the sense that it helped to 
shape how issues of women’s pensions were to be considered in the next major 
pension reform scheduled in 2004. The following sub-section thus examines the 
report in more detail.
5.2.2 Points at issue
The SPWL report first acknowledged the mismatch between the existing pension 
system and the reality due to ‘the changes and diversification of women’s lifestyles’, 
suggesting the need to re-examine the overall pension system from the viewpoint of 
women’s pensions (ibid: 1). Using extensive statistics, the changes in women’s lives 
were captured in two areas -  the labour market and the family (ibid: 2-5). In view of 
the further increase in single elderly households due to ageing population and
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prevalence of nuclear family households, the report emphasised the growing 
importance of adequate pensions for women.
Then, the report mapped out major points at issue with regard to women’s pensions. 
In the SPWL report, women’s pension problems were summarised as follows:
1. discrepancy between the model pension and women’s reality;
2. relatively low level of women’s pensions;
3. a sense of unfairness between women; and
4. economic insecurity for single older women
The first issue -  the discrepancy between the model pension and the reality -  was 
perceived as problematic because the existing model did not represent most women’s 
life courses, thus, did not give women any idea about their pension prospects. The 
model pension in the government publications remained a male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker couple as a basic unit throughout the 1990s. In this model, the wife was 
depicted as a non-employed wife, who did not have any entitlement to EPI pensions 
in her own right. While this model was far from the reality for the majority of 
women, who were alternately in and out of the labour market either as part-time or 
full-time paid workers, these women were simply invisible in the official documents.
The second issue -  women’s lower pensions -  was explained as the result of their 
shorter membership period and lower wages. The report argued that the pension 
system could mitigate this problem to a certain extent by extending the coverage to 
part-time workers and by adjusting the system to avoid disadvantaging parents.
The third issue -  a sense of unfairness between women -  was understood in the 
report as a result of the premium exemption for the No.3 insured and the arrangement 
for SP.
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The last point was the acknowledgement of the greater risk of poverty among older 
women because of the combined consequence of longer life expectancy, increase in 
divorce in later life and low or no pension entitlement to eamings-related pensions in 
their own right. Related to this issue, the report pointed to the need to rethink 
pension arrangements for divorcees and widows.
Based on this framing of the problems, the report highlighted the following six areas 
in which these four problems were to be addressed:
the model pension;
the coverage of part-time workers;
supporting measures for parenting;
- the arrangement for the No.3 insured; 
the survivor’s pension; and
- pension splitting upon divorce.
As noted above, although the report presented general directions for the future 
pension system, it did not recommend concrete policies to solve these problems the 
report itself pointed out. Among the above six areas to be tackled, the report was 
clearer about some and completely vague about others.
The report was most clear about the reform direction of the model pension. It 
recommended that the future model should assume certain period of women’s 
employment and that the dual-eaming couple should be the basis of the model. The 
report also pointed out the need to show the pension prospects of several household 
models apart from the dual-eaming couple model in order to reflect the diversity in 
household types.
Another issue which the report clearly showed its position was about extending the 
coverage to part-time workers by lowering the threshold and changing the definition 
of ‘dependant spouse’. The report endorsed this change as a means to enhance the
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level of women’s pensions. It also justified its position from five other viewpoints. 
Firstly, given the rise in non-regular workers, it was becoming increasingly necessary 
to include employees with various working patterns. Secondly, by significantly 
lowering the threshold for pension coverage, incentives for married part-time 
workers to contain working hours or earnings below the threshold would be reduced. 
Thirdly, the number of contributors to the pension system would increase, which was 
invaluable in the aged/ childless society. Fourthly, it would make the pension system 
fairer by requiring contributions from all people with earnings regardless of their 
marital status or working patters. Lastly, by collecting contributions regardless of 
employees’ working patterns, labour cost would become fairer between businesses 
which hired more part-time workers and ones which did not.
On the other hand, the report avoided showing any preferred directions for another
measure it took up as a way to improve women’s pensions -  namely, support for
parents. The hesitancy of the report to point any directions on this issue reflected the
deeply divided opinions among the members of SPWL. Concerned about the
childless society, some members of SPWL argued for special arrangements on the
grounds that childbearing and rearing should be supported by the pension system,
which was one of the systems most affected by population ageing. On the other hand,
opponents of this position argued that support for parenting was outside the remit of
pension policies and should be done in other policy areas such as childcare. Yet
another opinion was put forward by those whose primary concerns were the lower
level of women’s pensions. They argued for the need to introduce special
arrangements in order to mitigate the pension disadvantages due to childbearing and
rearing. However, others expressed their reservations about this proposal from a
gender perspective, pointing out the possible gender reinforcing effects of these
191
measures. Some also expressed their concerns about the implications of these 
measures for inequality between parents in different pension categories (Nos. 1-3) 
and between parents and other carers. Failing to reach a consensus among the 
members, the report did nothing but merely presented these competing viewpoints.
Another issue for which the report was vague about its position was with regard to 
the treatment of the No.3 insured. Indeed, the report was least clear about this issue. 
The report acknowledged the treatment of the No.3 insured as ‘an important problem 
relevant to the basis of the pension system,’ and pointed out the great need for 
reforms (SPWL 2001: 53). Nonetheless, it did not recommend any particular reform 
directions, but merely listed possible alternatives.
This inability of the report to present any concrete policy proposals was again a 
reflection of the deep division in SPWL on this issue. As it was generally accepted 
that public old-age pensions should be available to all citizens in principle, removal 
of BP from the No.3 insured was not seriously considered as an option. Thus, the 
presented viewpoints and suggested reform options in the report were focused on 
whether and how contributions should be collected from the No.3 insured. The 
report introduced opposing alternatives. Most of the reform options put forward 
were supportive to collect contributions either from the No.3 insured themselves or 
from their spouse. Proponents justified their position under the name of equality and 
fairness between households and pointed out that one-earner households were 
generally found in higher income groups. Removing this ‘housewife privilege’ was 
also supported from a gender perspective, which argued for the elimination of gender 
bias and gender reinforcing effects from the pension system. On the other hand, 
there was an opposing opinion against collecting contributions on the grounds of the
double premium payment from a wage. Proponents of this position offered an option 
to raise the upper earnings limit for the premium so that the high earning employees 
would pay more to justify the ‘free benefit’ for their dependent spouse. As a 
concluding remark for this issue, the report only expressed its wish for a national 
consensus to emerge among citizens after extensive discussions.
Less vague but still far from clear was the reform direction of the survivor’s pension 
-  another major issue perceived as problematic with regard to fairness among women. 
First, the report emphasised the importance of SP for many survivors, explicitly 
declining some arguments for the curtailment or abolition of derived rights in order 
to completely individualise the pension unit (SPWL 2001: 74). Then, the report 
acknowledged the need to revise SP to achieve better equality and fairness. However, 
when it came down to the concrete measures, the report again resorted to listing 
possible alternatives and presenting the pros and cons of each option for further 
discussion among the general public. Although the report was clear about the need 
to equalise the treatment between widows and widowers, it took a vague position 
about the adjustment between the entitlements to SP and women’s own old-age 
pensions. In order to rectify possible disadvantages for widows with their own EPI 
pension entitlement, it was necessary to strengthen the link between one’s own 
premium payment and the overall benefit level. However, this could lead to 
exceptionally high benefit levels for some widowed spouses from dual-eaming 
couples, raising a question about equality and fairness between dual-eamer 
households and single-eamer households. As in the case with the issue on the No. 3 
insured, the report did not commit to any of the presented options.
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In contrast, the report was explicit about its approval of pension splitting upon 
divorce. Although the report pointed out several contentious issues for further 
discussion, most of them were focused on technical matters and none was 
fundamentally questioning the legitimacy of the practice. The report’s support for a 
measure to strengthen the derived rights was in a way contradictory with the 
proposed goal of the new pension system -  the individually based entitlement. 
However, the report was silent about the possible conflict of principles, but depicted 
pension splitting on divorce as a measure to reduce the risk of poverty for single 
older women.
Overall, the report was reluctant to commit itself to any opinions when the issues 
were of contentious nature. Especially, when the issues at hand were explicitly 
related to the question about equality and fairness, the report merely summarised 
competing opinions and left the final decision to national discussion on the grounds 
that policies for these issues were ultimately dependent on chosen values. There 
were three key issues for which the report shied away from suggesting preferred 
options. One was the choice of basic unit for the pension system between the 
household basis and individual basis. Another was the choice of the premium base 
between the ability to pay {ono futari) and the entitlement to benefits (deki futari). 
The third choice was about equity. Which equity should be prioritised, between 
different types of households or between individuals? For each of these choices, the 
report simply presented several competing viewpoints. By leaving the decision on 
these basic principles to future national discussions, the report was unable to 
recommend any solutions to most of the contentious issues with regard to women’s 
pensions.
5.2.3 Neglected inequality
The SPWL report was relatively comprehensive in covering issues which had been 
perceived as problematic with regard to women’s pensions. As major problems, the 
report pointed out the embedded assumptions on the gender division of labour, lower 
level of women’s pensions, a sense of unfairness among women and women’s 
economic insecurity in old age (see above). However, when it came to discuss the 
areas relevant to the problems and possible redressing measures for each problem, 
there were some viewpoints that the report neglected or underemphasised.
One example was with regard to the problem of women’s relatively low level of 
pensions. The report attributed it to women’s shorter membership period and their 
lower wages. However, the overall focus of the report was on the first when it 
pinpointed the areas to be reformed in solving the problem. Accordingly, the main 
redressing measures the report suggested were those that were considered to facilitate 
women’s continued membership in the pension scheme as wage earners -  namely, 
extension of the coverage to part-time workers and more special arrangements for 
parenting periods, and possibly also for caring periods. The report did not suggest 
any measures to mitigate the effect of women’s lifetime lower wages on their 
pensions. By underemphasising the need to include such a measure, the report pre­
empted discussions on a possible way forward to loosen the link between earnings 
and benefit levels. Thus, although women’s lower pensions were taken up as a 
problem, the suggested solutions were less likely to be significant in their effect.
The issue of women’s economic welfare in old age was also taken up in another form
in the report -  namely, the need to guarantee economic security for single older
women. However, as the description of the problem in the above sub-section showed,
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single older women were understood mainly as widows or older divorcees. 
Consequently, the proposed measures were limited to the strengthening of the 
derived rights as former wives, such as pension splitting upon divorce and 
improvement in survivor’s pensions. The report was completely silent about 
pensions of an increasing number of never-married older women despite the 
possibility that these women would also face longer old age with lower pensions. 
While more relevant reforms to never-married single women would be measures to 
boost the level of pensions in women’s own right, reforms proposed for this purpose 
were focused on part-time workers and parents (see the above), both of which these 
women were less likely to be.
What these two examples suggested was the failure of the report to problematise the 
systematically disadvantaged economic position of older women vis-a-vis older men. 
In the report, despite the reference to women’s relatively low level of pensions, 
gender inequality in pension outcome was never mentioned explicitly. As a result, 
although the report drew attention to women’s economic welfare in old age as one of 
the most important issues with women’s pensions, it failed to take up the male- 
centred structure of the pension system as a problem. Thus, proposed reforms did 
not challenge the structure of the pension system itself which reproduced the gender 
inequality in the labour market in the form of the pension gap. While one of the 
major causes to create these differences in the labour market -  structural gender bias 
-  began being challenged in the society, there were not many criticisms which 
challenged the resultant pension gap in old age as gender inequality.
One of the reasons for the neglect of gender inequality in pension outcome could be 
attributed to the perception of fairness. The gender gap in pensions was often
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legitimised as a neutral consequence of gender differences in life courses and wage 
levels. As such, reproducing these differences in the pension outcome itself was not 
necessarily considered to be unfair. At the basis of this reasoning was the unspoken 
understanding or unquestioning acceptance that, under social insurance systems such 
as the Japanese pension system, only those who paid into the pension system should 
be eligible for the benefit and that it would be unfair if the level of benefit was not 
proportionate to a certain extent to the level of premium payment. This perception of 
fairness manifested itself in the problematisation of the No.3 insured. Despite the 
insurance principle in the Japanese pension system, this category of people -  often 
referred to simply as ‘housewives’ -  were eligible to the full BP without paying any 
premium in their own name because of their status as a dependent spouse of 
employees. It was therefore no surprise that this arrangement was widely regarded 
as unfair to the extent that it was taken up as a major problem in the report.
The way the issue of the No.3 insured was framed as a problem and its possible
solutions suggested in the report also revealed other possible reasons why the gender
inequality in pension outcome failed to be perceived as a problem. The issue was
taken up as a problem of inequality and unfairness between households in the
premium payment as well as of the embedded gender assumptions which would
reinforce the gender division of labour. The proposed reforms for the arrangement of
the No.3 insured were thus focused on how the contributions should be collected
from the No.3 insured and how to eliminate the gender-reinforcing effects in the
pension system. However, these two viewpoints were in a way incompatible with
the quest for gender equality in pension outcome. Firstly, taking a household as a
basic unit for equality and fairness would often legitimise the income inequality
between women and men, as the history of gender pay gap under the name of family
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wage would attest (Osawa 1998). Even those who called for an individually based 
system from a gender equality perspective often fell in the trap of the couple basis 
when it came to the question of equality and fairness in pension outcome (for 
example, Shiota 2000). Secondly, arrangements which contained the danger of 
gender-reinforcing effects would often mitigate the gender inequality in outcome in 
social security schemes in a gender unequal world. Thus, removing these 
arrangements would not usually lead to the narrowing of the gender inequality in 
outcome. Rather, in the worst cases, it could aggravate the situation. This was 
especially the case in the proposed measures in the report because, while the 
assumptions on the gender division of labour in the pension system were heavily 
criticised, the hidden assumption of male life courses as the norm was not explicitly 
taken up as a problem. Thus, in the discussions of the model pension, for example, 
what were problematised were the ‘atypical’ life courses of women, rather than the 
pension structure which was based on life courses closer to men’s.
Fairness in the system was one of the most discussed issues as the women’s pension
problem. However, what was considered to be unfair was not the inequality between
women and men but the inequality between different types of households where
women were covered as wives and as wage earners. Although the overall direction
was towards the individualisation of pension entitlement, equality and fairness in
outcome remained to be sought on a couple basis. Even the principle of guaranteeing
women’s economic security in old age -  one of the three basic principles in the
suggested reform -  was overshadowed by the arguments for equality and fairness in
sharing the cost (premium payment), for a fair system (closer link between the levels
of premium and benefit) and for gender equality (neutralisation of the assumptions
on women’s and men’s life courses). This limitation of the report was compounded
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by the limitation in the political feasibility of actually introducing the suggested 
reform measures in the pension reform in 2004.
5.3 Intergenerational equity and gender equality
In March 2001, the government announced the Outline of Social Security Reform, 
which established the philosophy and basic direction of the Japanese social security 
system for the future (Seifu Yoto Shakai Hosho Kaikaku Kyogikai 2001). Among 
other things, the Outline pointed out a growing sense of unfairness about the system 
among younger people who were required to pay the increasing cost. The Outline 
emphasised the need to ensure a fair share of the cost according to one’s economic 
means regardless of age, implying that older people were not necessarily 
disadvantaged economically. The Outline was also explicit in its willingness to 
encourage the labour market participation of all citizens. It stated that individuals’ 
wish to work should not be hindered by the social security system regardless of age, 
sex and disability. This suggested that the gender bias based on the male 
breadwinner/ female homemaker model was fast losing its legitimacy even within the 
government.
The explicit attempt of the government to redraw the intergenerational relations and
gender relations in the social security system was again deeply related to the
demographic trend and economic concerns. While the national economy was slow to
recover, the population ageing was further advancing despite a series of ‘family-
friendly’ policies in the 1990s. Indeed, the population estimate in 2002 revealed that
even married couples were increasingly delaying childbearing and/or reducing the
number of children (MHLW 2004b: 209). As a result, the population ratio of those
aged between 20 and 64 and those aged 65 and over was estimated to become 1.4 to
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1 in 2050 compared with 1.9 to 1 in 2004 (ibid.). With the prospect of decreasing 
revenue and increasing social security cost, policy makers felt the need for a 
structural reform of the social security system more than ever.
The link between the social security reform and economic concerns manifested itself 
in the cabinet decision on the basic direction for social security reform announced in 
2003no. Social security reform was taken up as one of the key areas for fiscal and 
economic policies and structural administrative reform. In accordance with the 
general direction of the administration for the ‘small government’, the priority was to 
contain the growth in welfare expenditure. With regard to the pension reform 
scheduled in 2004, the government explicitly stated that the existing pension level 
was unsustainable, and that the balance between the levels of benefit and premium 
needed reconsideration in order to enhance intergenerational and intra-generational 
equity, sustainability and credibility of the system. As in the case with the Outline of 
Social Security Reform in 2001 (see above), gender equality in the pension system 
was largely framed as a problem of negative incentives embedded in the system for 
women’s labour market participation, and intergenerational equity as a need to 
ensure the fair share of the cost by the elderly. These two ways of framing 
‘problems’ largely dictated the direction of the pension reform in 2004.
5.3.1 The 2004 Reform
The 2004 Reform was expected to introduce contentious changes which had been 
postponed in the 2000 Reform -  namely, a long-term stabilisation of pension finance 
and women’s pensions. Anticipating heated debates, the government started formal
110 Cabinet decision announced on 27th June 2003 ‘Keizai Zaisei Un’ei to Kozo Kaikaku ni kansuru 
Kihon Hoshin 2003 (Basic Policy Direction on Economic and Fiscal Administration and Structural 
Reform in 2003)
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discussions and consensus building on the pension reform well in advance. In 
January 2002, the government commissioned the Pension Division in the Social 
Security Council (PDSSC, Shakai Hosho Shingikai Nenkin Bukai)111 to discuss the 
direction of the next pension reform scheduled in 2004. PDSSC submitted its 
‘Opinion on the Pension Reform’ to the government in September 2003 (PDSSC 
2003). While there were growing voices which called for fundamental changes in 
the pension system, the Opinion recommended adjustments on the existing system 
rather than an overhaul in the 2004 Reform, citing the need for further national 
discussions. Then, the Opinion presented concrete proposals on the basis of five 
basic viewpoints for the reform -  namely, sustainability, credibility, adjustment to 
diversified employment patterns, neutrality to individual life-course choices and the 
coordination with other social systems.
Drawing upon the Opinion by PDSSC, MHLW published a reform proposal in 
November 2003. The MHLW proposal was largely in line with the Opinion by 
PDSSC, focusing on adjustments of the existing system rather than a structural 
reform. There were two major areas which were addressed in the MHLW proposal. 
One area was sustainability and credibility of the pension system and the other area 
was adjusting the pension system in order to accommodate diversifying working 
patterns and changing life courses of citizens.
With regard to the issue of sustainability and credibility of the pension system, the 
previous pension reform in 2000 stipulated that measures be introduced in the 2004 
Reform to increase the state subsidy to the pension fund from one third to one half of
111 As a result o f administrative restructuring, eight official advisory councils, including the Advisory 
Council on the Social Security System, were merged and became the Social Security Council in 2001. 
The former Pension Council became the Pension Division of the Social Security Council.
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the benefits. The 2000 Reform had also laid down that the premium rate should be 
increased from the 2004 Reform112. Accordingly, the MHLW proposal for the 2004 
Reform included these revisions. In addition to these measures to increase the 
revenue of the pension fund, the reform introduced an arrangement to contain the rise 
in benefits. Under the revised system, the benefit was adjusted not only with 
changes in prices but also with changes in the number of the insured and changes in 
life expectancy. Thus, if the birth rate further declined and/or life expectancy 
lengthened, the pension rise would be automatically contained113. Moreover, in the 
attempt to recover citizens’ confidence in the system, it was proposed to impose a 
statutory ceiling on the maximum premium rate as 10 per cent114 when population 
ageing becomes most severe. MHLW also suggested introducing a floor below 
which the model pension would not fall. The proposed level of the floor by MHLW 
was between 50 to 55 percent of earnings of average male workers. These proposals 
were mainly accepted by the government and included in the pension reform bill. 
However, the resource allocation between generations was tipped slightly towards 
the younger during the negotiations within the government. The government bill 
submitted to the Diet set the premium ceiling at 9.15 per cent and the floor at 50 per 
cent.
On the other hand, there was a considerable discrepancy between the MHLW 
proposal and the government bill with regard to the other major area -  the mismatch 
between the system and the diversified labour as well as people’s life courses. Under 
this category, MHLW proposed some measures to better accommodate the elderly,
112 The increase in the premium rates was postponed in the 2000 Reform due to the weak economy.
113 However, the nominal benefit level was to be guaranteed under the new system. Thus, even if 
negative rate of these two population factors was larger than positive rate o f price inflation, the growth 
rate would be nil rather than negative.
114 If combined with the share o f the employers’, the rate was to be 20 per cent o f earnings.
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the disabled and women as wage earners. It also put forward some proposals to 
strengthen women’s pension rights and mitigate the economic insecurity in old age. 
While the government accepted the proposed measures targeted at the elderly and the 
disabled, it significantly weakened the proposals with regard to issues related to 
women’s pensions.
The government was most reluctant to introduce changes in the arrangement for the 
No.3 insured. Originally, MHLW proposed two measures to tackle this issue. One 
was to narrow the definition of the No.3 inured and reduce the number of the eligible 
people by extending the EPI coverage to part-time workers. However, the 
government postponed the coverage of part-time workers, citing the need to assess 
various effects of the move on business and labour as well as coherency with other 
systems. The bill, and the subsequent law, simply stated that, after considering all 
these factors, necessary measures should be taken to extend the coverage to part-time 
workers in the next pension reform scheduled for five years later.
Another measure proposed by MHLW with regard to the No.3 insured was to 
introduce pension splitting between married couples in order to move towards an 
individually based pension system. According to the proposal, the premium paid by 
employees with No.3 insured spouse was to be regarded by law as the joint premium 
of the couple, thereby splitting the entitlement to the eamings-related part equally 
between them. Although this measure was still based on the derived rights, MHLW 
explained it as a transitory arrangement until the gender gap in the labour market was 
eradicated. If implemented, this measure could have narrowed the gender pension 
gap significantly as well as enhance the individualisation of pension.
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However, this proposal was significantly weakened in the government bill, which 
limited the pension splitting to divorced couples or couples in special situations 
defined by ministerial ordinance of MHLW. On the other hand, the bill included the 
clause which stated that the premium paid by employees with a No.3 insured spouse 
was regarded as the joint premium of the couple. Although it could be argued that 
this clause was necessary in order to give the grounds for the pension splitting upon 
divorce, this clause also in effect legitimised the BP entitlement of the No.3 insured, 
who remained to be exempted from premium payment under the proposed bill.
Despite these setbacks, some proposed changes with regard to women’s pensions 
were accepted in the government bill. One was to adjust the system to better 
accommodate women as wage earners. This inevitably meant that family 
responsibilities of workers should be taken into account in the pension system. Thus, 
the 2004 Reform further expanded the arrangement for employed parents. The 
maximum length of premium exemption during parental leave was extended from 
one year to three years per child (until the youngest child reached the age of three). 
Moreover, a new clause was introduced to prevent pension disadvantages during the 
parenting period. With the new clause, the wage level before childbirth was to be 
used for pension calculation purposes if employees’ earnings should decline due to 
shorter working hours in order to care for children under three115.
Another accepted change was to readjust the balance between women’s entitlements 
as wives and as wage earners. In the MHLW proposal, and in the subsequent 
government bill, the survivor’s pension was to become a top-up to one’s own old-age
115 In order to be eligible for this clause, parents should utilise shorter-working arrangements for 
parents provided by the same employers. If, on the other hand, a parent left the workplace and got a 
new job as a part-time worker, she or he would have to leave EPI in principle and therefore not 
eligible for this new measure.
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pensions payable up to the level under the previous system -  half of one’s own and 
half of the deceased spouse’s pension or three fourths of the deceased spouse’s 
pension, whichever was the higher. While this meant that the level of pensions 
widows would receive was actually the same as under the previous arrangement, the 
change in the principle was explained as an improvement to better acknowledge 
women’s own premium payment record in the overall pension level.
The individualisation of pension entitlement was further enhanced by a clause for 
pension splitting on divorce in the bill. Although the government rejected the 
pension splitting within the marriage (see the above), it accepted the measure upon 
divorce in view of the growing demands against the backdrop of the increase in 
divorce among older couples.
The acknowledgement of women’s wage-earning role also meant a certain 
curtailment of provisions which stemmed from the assumption of women’s economic 
dependency. The MHLW proposal, and subsequently the government bill, shortened 
the payable period of SP from the second tier from lifetime to five years for childless 
widows116 aged below 30. In defence of this change, the government cited young 
widows’ ability to accrue pension rights as wage earners.
The pension reform bill submitted by the government passed the Diet and was
117enacted with few revisions in June 2004 . While the 2004 Reform modified the
underlying gender assumptions in the pension system to a certain extent, there were 
some gender issues both the MHLW proposal and the government bill avoided to
116 There is no provision for widows without children from the first tier.
117 This did not mean the absence of opposing voices. The bill was forced through the Diet while the 
opposition parties were boycotting the session in relation to the scandals about the evasion of pension 
contributions by key MPs o f ruling LDP.
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take up. One example was the differential treatment of widows and widowers. Even 
after the 2004 Reform, widowers remained excluded from the provisions for 
widowed parents from the basic tier, and they had to face stricter conditions to 
receive SP from the second tier. Indeed, these clauses had been repeatedly taken up 
as problematic and the Report on Women’s Pensions in 2001 recommended them to 
be equalised (SPWL 2001). However, both the Opinion by PDSSC and the MHLW 
proposal rejected to introduce the equalisation in the 2004 Reform citing the 
significant gender gap in economic situations. Thus, the move was postponed 
without a definite deadline, and the government bill did not refer to it at all.
As this example of the hesitancy to remove the gender assumptions demonstrated, 
the 2004 Reform could also be characterised by continuities with regard to women’s 
pensions. Overall, change in underlying gender relations in the pension system was 
incoherent and slow in progress.
Conclusions
The rapid progress in population ageing in Japan led to a significant shift in the
responsibilities for welfare in the 1990s. Perceiving the rigid gender division of
labour as a cause of the declining birth rate, the government began taking on a new
role to enable citizens to combine paid and unpaid work. In contrast to the 1980s
when women’s unpaid work was celebrated as a part of the Japanese-style welfare,
the gender division of labour became problematised in the 1990s as a part of the
population problem which would destabilise the welfare system. On the other hand,
the dominant political discourse on the ‘older people’s problem’ changed from the
need to mitigate the economic plight of the elderly to the need to share the cost of
population ageing between generations. This in turn enhanced the changes in the
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relations between generations, between women and men and between the state and 
citizens for welfare provision.
Pension reforms in the 1990s and onwards were part of the state’s responses to these 
demographic changes. Especially, the adjustments were most recognisable in the 
distribution of resources between generations. The older people’s share of resources 
on the individual level was significantly curtailed in order to contain the increase in 
the cost for the younger generations. Moreover, in an effort to increase the number 
of contributors, the government explicitly encouraged citizens to stay in the labour 
market regardless of their age, sex or disability.
Nonetheless, there was a notable exception in the government’s emphasis on the paid 
employment for all citizens -  namely, housewives of the employees. Throughout the 
1990s, the government was reluctant to change the treatment of the No.3 insured in 
the pension system despite the increasingly vocal criticisms about the arrangement. 
The 2004 Reform was an anticlimax for those who had expected to see some changes 
in the treatment of the No.3 insured in the pension system. The revised law not only 
left most of the ‘unfair privileges of housewives’ intact but also strengthened their 
entitlement by acknowledging explicitly that their premium was regarded as being 
paid through their employed spouse. As a result, problems with women’s pensions 
kept being presented as unfairness and inequality between women of different 
household types. When gender was taken up as a problem, it was usually framed as 
a problem of the embedded gender bias towards male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker model in the pension system.
This problematisation of women’s pension issues, however, was not revolutionary in
the sense that it did not challenge the existing framework which had shaped the way
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pension issues were discussed for more than half a century in Japan -  namely, the 
prioritisation of equity between households and the unquestioning of the male- 
oriented norms in the pension formula. Because of the focus on the household as a 
unit, the gender gap in pensions was often neglected as a major inequality problem. 
Moreover, calls for neutralising gender bias in the pension system did not necessarily 
lead to challenging the male-oriented norms embedded in the pension formula. 
Problematising the ‘housewives’ privileges’ in the pension system also helped to 
divide women along the line of their husband’s status rather than unite them through 
their disadvantaged position as primary unpaid workers. This again distracted 
attention from the ‘privileges’ of husbands who could gain from both wives’ unpaid 
work as well as from the male-oriented pension system.
The cost of unproblematising the gender gap in pensions may be arguably increasing 
as a result of recent pension reforms in Japan. As the level of the state pension was 
on the decrease, the importance of private and occupational pensions is likely to be 
further enhanced. This raises concerns about the possibility of widening inequality 
within a generation, especially between women and men. Is the gender gap in 
pensions narrow enough to justify the neglect of the issue in the 1990s? Is the 
pension prospect for today’s younger women better than for today’s older women 
due to the growth in women’s labour market participation? In the subsequent 
chapters, the economic situations of older women in the 1990s are looked at in detail, 
and the gender impact of the recent reforms are considered taking into account 
today’s working-age women’s balancing of paid and unpaid work.
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Part Three
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Chapter 6 Equality and economic welfare in old age in the 1990s
As the public pension system matures, it is often claimed in recent years that older 
people are now enjoying a standard of living as high as the rest of the population. 
Accumulating research indeed suggests that the relative economic status of the 
elderly has improved since the mid-1970s (Disney and Whitehouse 2001; OECD 
2001b). Some even claim that older people fair better than the younger population. 
For example, Takayama (1992; 1998) argues that rather than being poorer, the 
elderly in Japan are better off than the young or the middle-aged when assets held are 
taken into account. Despite this improved economic status, he continues, the elderly 
are still treated as economically disadvantaged in social security and tax systems, 
leaving the rest of the population worse off. A similar view is presented by Kono 
(1991) from a wider perspective of well-being. Applying Preston’s hypothesis118 to 
Japan, he suggests that the growth in the number of older population has led to the 
improvement of their relative well-being. These views on the elderly as the winners 
in a competition for limited resources have encouraged calls for readjusting resource 
redistribution between the generations. Citing the affluence of pensioners and 
criticising the purported intergenerational inequity, the main focus of discussions 
about pension reforms has increasingly shifted from the adequacy of pension levels 
to the affordability of the system.
On the other hand, there are also reports on persisting poverty among the elderly in 
Japan. In 2000, 45.5 per cent of the households on means-tested social assistance
118 In the context o f the US, Preston argued that the growth in the number o f the older population 
contributed to the improvement of their well-being, while the decrease in the ratio o f younger 
population served to worsen their relative position. See, Preston, S.H. 1984. Children and the Elderly: 
Divergent paths for America's Dependent. Demography 21 (4):435-457.
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benefits were those headed by a person aged 65 and over119 (MHLW 2002). This 
demonstrates that poverty is still the reality for many older people. What these two 
conflicting pictures about the economic situations of the Japanese elderly suggest is 
the existence of considerable inequality among them. Moreover, although reports on 
poverty in old age are rarely explicit about the gender implications, women’s 
disadvantaged economic status in old age can be easily suspected.
The main aim of this chapter is to examine rather neglected issues in recent pension 
reforms in Japan -  namely, inequality among older people and women’s economic 
welfare in old age -  and consider whether the marginalisation of these issues is 
justifiable. By looking at the actual economic situations of the elderly in the 1990s, 
this chapter helps to critically consider trends in pension reforms of the time in Japan. 
In order to capture a relative picture, the income situations of the elderly in Japan are 
compared with those in Britain and in Germany .
The chapter first looks at cross-national variations in the welfare mix for 
intergenerational resource transfers in the three countries in the mid-1990s. This is 
followed by an analysis of the implications of these differences for intra-generational 
inequality and poverty risk among older people. Attention is especially paid to 
gender inequality and the economic situations of older women. The next section 
focuses on poverty in old age, and situations of the most vulnerable social group are 
examined. This is followed by consideration of differential economic situations 
among women. In the final section, these findings are summarised and discussed. 
The explanation of the data used in this chapter can be found in Chapter 2.
119 The proportions o f  other types o f  households were as follows: single-mother households 8.4 
per cent, disabled person’s households 38.7 per cent; others 7.4 per cent.
120 See Chapter 2 for the rationale for the choice o f Britain and Germany for comparison. In this 
chapter, data for the UK are also categorised as those o f Britain to avoid the confusion.
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6.1 Intergenerational transfers through the state, the market and the family
The economic welfare of older people as a group is determined by their overall share 
of resources in a society. While resources are transferred across generations in a 
variety of forms, they are usually channelled through the state, the market and the 
family. A prime example of intergenerational transfers through the state is the public 
old age pensions, while private pensions are generally understood as a transfer 
through the market. On the other hand, family transfers to older people usually take 
the form of support from their adult children.
Incomes are grouped into three income sources as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6. 1 The three income groups and their definition
Income group Definition
Working incomes Income from work, sick pay paid by governments. Employers’ 
contributions to social security are excluded.
Capital incomes Occupational pensions, property incomes and all kinds of 
private transfers
Social transfers Accident and disability benefits, public retirement benefits, 
unemployment benefits, maternity allowances, public child 
and/or family allowances, all income-tested and means-tested 
benefits. All kinds of in-kind benefits are excluded.
Source: Yamada (2002: 28)
The combination of these three channels varies across countries, resulting in 
diversity among welfare states in their intergenerational transfer systems. This is 
true with Britain, Germany and Japan, each of which combines the three channels in 
a distinctive way, suggesting cross-national differences in the relations between 
generations, between women and men, and between the state and its citizens. Figure
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6.1 shows the average composition of incomes per capita in old age in Britain, 
Germany and Japan.
Figure 6. 1 Mean disposable incomes of those aged 65 and over by source of 
income, the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s*
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* See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f the data for each country 
Source: OECD (2001) Chart 2.5
Note that the figure does not distinguish between intra-household transfers and own 
incomes nor does it specify the form of incomes due to the limitation o f the original 
data. Thus, incomes can be o f the older people, o f their spouse and/ or o f their adult 
children within a household. Also, public pensions are not separated from other state 
benefits such as means-tested benefits. Moreover, private pensions are categorised 
as capital incomes despite possible state subsidies.
Although the aggregation of different kinds of incomes prevent us from capturing 
possible differences in the sense of entitlement o f the elderly, the above three broad 
categories are suffice for the main interest here -  to grasp a general picture of income
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situations of the elderly in the three countries. Indeed, these limitations 
notwithstanding, the figure still demonstrates striking differences in the importance 
of particular resource channels among the three countries. In Germany, the state 
plays a more direct and important role in intergenerational resource distribution than 
the market. In contrast, in Japan, resources are distributed more through the market 
in the form of earnings (either one’s own or of household members). The market is 
also an important distribution channel in Britain, but the resource from this route is 
more likely to take the form of capital incomes rather than earnings.
Further cross-national differences can be found when taking account of family 
transfers. Although hidden in the above figure, monetary transfers across 
generations can also occur on a household level. This is especially true in Japan, 
where the rate of multi-generational living is relatively high. In 1995, 52 per cent of 
women and 45 per cent of men aged 65 and over lived with their adult children 
(Japan Cabinet Office 2002: Figure 1.1.4; see also Chapter 1). On the other hand, 
this source of income is not as important in Britain or in Germany. In Britain, the 
rate of multi-generational living was 2 per cent among older men and 6 per cent 
among older women in the mid-1990s (ONS 1999: Table 1.10), while in Germany 
the rate had dropped to 1.3 per cent by 1990 (Scharf 1998: 9). Japan’s heavier 
reliance on working incomes in the above figure should be interpreted in this context. 
While the labour force participation rate of older people in Japan is indeed higher 
than in Britain or in Germany (see below), it can be said that Japan also relies more 
heavily on the family for economic welfare in old age than the other two countries.
While each country has a distinctive feature in the mix of three resource channels, 
the figure also shows some changes in the composition of income sources in old age
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between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. Among the three countries, Japan saw 
the most significant changes in its intergenerational transfer system. While the 
decade strengthened the respective feature of income mix in Britain (strong reliance 
on the market) and in Germany (strong reliance on the state), the change in Japan 
during the period was more of a fundamental nature; the share of the most important 
income source in Japan -  working income -  decreased by more than 20 percentage 
points in the decade. Although incomes from the labour market remained important 
in the mid-1990s in Japan, its share declined significantly to be replaced by incomes 
from social transfers. Major social transfers in old age being public pensions, the 
figure suggests that the importance of public pensions was rapidly growing in Japan.
Notwithstanding these cross-national variations, the resultant performance of the 
intergenerational transfer system in each country is similarly high in terms of the 
delivery of resources across generations. Table 6.1 shows the relative disposable 
income of older people compared with those in working age in Britain, Germany and 
Japan.
Table 6. 2 The percentage of mean disposable incomes of older age groups 
compared with those aged 18 to 64, the mid-1990s
Aged 65-74 Aged 75+
Britain 80 74
Germany 93 78
Japan 89 87
Source: OECD (2001) Table A.7
Although the rate is somewhat lower in Britain, the relative disposable incomes of
older people in all the three countries are not substantially lower than those of
younger generations. Other studies also demonstrate that the proportion of average
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disposable incomes of the elderly in major post-industrial countries is more than 70 
per cent, usually around 80 per cent, of those of younger population (for example, 
Disney and Whitehouse 2001). In the case of Japan, cross-national comparisons 
indicate that the average disposable incomes of the Japanese elderly are higher than 
those in many other advanced economies (Yamada 2002). The Ministry of Health 
and Welfare in Japan (MHW) also stressed in its annual report of 2000 the 
improvement in the income level of the elderly, showing that the average income per 
capita of all households in 1997 was about 2.2 million yen while that of older 
households121 was 2.1 million yen122 (MHW 2000: 31).
That all the three countries manage to distribute considerable economic resources to 
the elderly despite the differences in the income composition suggests the high 
substitutability of income sources and welfare arrangements (Borsch-Supan and 
Miegel 2001; OECD 2001b). Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean the 
similarity in their effects on individual elderly persons. Firstly, certain income 
sources are considered to be more preferable than others by social norms, 
discouraging people from turning to these income sources. Although one income 
source may be substituted by another in theory, the actual choice of income sources 
on an individual level can be relatively constrained. This means that a certain mix of 
income sources is not necessarily chosen for one’s maximum economic gains. For 
example, in Japan, against the backdrop of changing intergenerational relations, 
many older people began trying not to become a ‘burden’ on their children by 
choosing separate living even when this would lead to significant economic
121 The household which was comprised of only those aged 65 and over, or those aged 65 and over 
with unmarried dependants under 18.
122 No equivalence scale was applied. The average size o f all households was 2.95 persons, while that 
of older households was 1.56 persons.
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downgrading (Iwata 1996). This has important implications for older people’s 
economic welfare.
Secondly, the apparent high substitutability of different income sources for high 
performance does not distinguish between the differential impact of each source on 
the intra-generational distribution of resources. The sufficiency of resource share of 
the elderly as a group does not necessarily guarantee that the resource is distributed 
equally within the generation. Each income source and type of welfare arrangement 
can be significantly different in terms of equality in resource distribution among 
older people. In the next section, income inequality among older people is examined 
in detail.
6.2 Intra-generational inequality
Having significant resources distributed to older generations, the question then 
becomes one of the distribution within the generation. Generally, inequality is wider 
in incomes which have a strong link with the market than those with some 
mechanisms for redistribution. This point is also true with public pensions as the 
difference in the extent of inequality between flat-rate pensions and eamings-related 
pensions demonstrates (Daly 2000; Rake 1999). In the case of Britain and Japan, 
however, the link with the market is more direct, taking the form of private pensions 
for the former and earnings (of one’s own and/or of one’s family members’) for the 
latter. On the other hand, in the case of Germany, the link with the market is
• 1 9 0mediated by the state, taking the form of eamings-related public pensions
123 See below for a brief account of the German pension system. See also Appendix 7.1 for more 
detailed description.
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Maintaining the link with the market in various ways, each retirement income system 
of Britain, Germany and Japan has its own weakness with respect to inequality.
Indeed, the main contributory factor to widening intra-generational inequality in the 
three countries was the most important income source of the respective countries 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s (Yamada 2002: Chart 5.4). Thus, in the 
case of Japan, earnings (of one’s own or of family members’) were the biggest cause 
of inequality among older people. On the other hand, in Britain, the most affecting 
factor was capital incomes, while in Germany, it was social transfers. This suggests 
that not only the type of income sources but also their designs affect the extent of 
inequality among the elderly.
Among the three countries, only Japan had wider income inequality among older 
people than among younger people in the mid-1990s (Yamada 2002: Table 3.1). The 
Gini coefficients of Japanese older people in terms of incomes were at least 12 per 
cent larger than the Gini coefficients of younger age population in the mid-1990s, 
while those of British and German older people were 7 to 12 per cent smaller than 
the Gini coefficients of younger age population (ibid.). The Japanese system tended 
to widen inequality within a generation if not between generations. Indeed, it is 
well-known in Japan that as a cohort grows older, the inequality in incomes within 
the same age group increases. When Tachibanaki (1998) triggered a heated debate 
on widening inequality in Japan, some opponents argued that the phenomenon was 
an age effect which became more explicit due to population ageing rather than actual 
changes in income distribution within a cohort (Otake 2000). These 
counterarguments, however, inadvertently admitted by default that the Japanese
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redistribution system was not effective enough to redress the inequality within the 
older generation (Tachibanaki 2000).
The differential extent of inequality among older people in the three countries 
suggests the importance of the composition of income sources as well as the design 
of each scheme for intergenerational transfer. Especially, earnings -  an important 
income source in old age in Japan -  play the most significant role to contribute to the 
inequality among people of pensionable age (Iwata 1996; Kimura 1996; Nagai 1998; 
OECD 2001b; Yamada 2000; Yamada 2002). Considering that paid employment in 
old age is expected to be further encouraged by the government in the aged society, 
inequality in old age is more likely to persist under the current redistribution system 
in Japan.
If the inequality among older people is as severe as in Japan, poverty in old age can 
still be a reality for many older people in the country. This has profound gender 
implications. In old age, women outnumber men in the population, but the former 
are generally poorer than the latter. The degree of disadvantages, however, can again 
be different between countries.
6.2.1 Gender inequality
The intergenerational transfer systems of Britain, Germany and Japan emphasise 
different resource channels for incomes in old age. This section looks at inequality 
in major income sources of the three countries in the mid-1990s. In order to 
distinguish gender differences in income situations rather than in economic welfare, 
this section disregards the effects of family transfers and focuses on personal 
incomes.
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In the British intergenerational transfer system, incomes from the market took up a 
relatively large share of the total incomes in old age. These incomes from the market 
were mainly in the form of private pensions, which had developed as occupational 
pensions in the 1950s and the 1960s and as personal pensions in the 1980s. However, 
women were generally disadvantaged in private pensions both in coverage and in 
benefit levels. Only one third of older women had incomes from this source in the 
mid-1990s, including survivors’ pensions, compared with two thirds of older men in 
the same period (Ginn and Arber 2001a; 1999a). Moreover, the inequality in 
benefits had increased among those with private pensions during the same period. 
Women’s median income from this source fell from 65 per cent to 56 per cent of 
men’s (ibid.).
With fewer benefits from private pensions, incomes from other sources were more 
important for women than for men. However, having generally had a weaker link to 
the labour market even during the so-called ‘working age’, older women were less 
likely to be in the labour market than older men. In 1996, only 3 per cent of older 
British women were economically active, while the figure was 8 per cent for men 
(EC 1997).
On the other hand, the majority of both women and men over state pension age124 
drew their incomes from the state to a varying extent. In 1996, 96 per cent of elderly 
women and 99 per cent of elderly men had state pensions in Britain (DWP 2001). 
Nonetheless, the relative value of the basic state pension had declined significantly 
since the 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the level dropped below that of means-tested
124 The statutory pensionable age in Britain is 60 for women and 65 for men, which are to be equalised 
gradually at 65 by 2020.
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social assistance. With regard to the state eamings-related pensions (SERPS), much 
of the redistributive nature was removed by the reforms in the 1980s to the detriment 
of women. In terms of the total income, the median for older women was 62 per cent 
in the early 1990s, while this rate was 71 percent of that of older men’s in the mid- 
1980s125 (Ginn and Arber 2001a; 1999a).
In contrast to the British system, the German intergenerational transfer system relied 
less on earnings and private schemes for distributing resources for the elderly in the 
society. The trend for early retirement further reduced the share of earnings in the 
total incomes of older people. However, the link to the market was retained through 
the public old-age pensions, which were strictly eamings-related. It was explicitly 
acknowledged that the goal of the German state pension system was to maintain 
one’s economic status throughout the life course rather than redistribution between 
different income groups within the generation (European Commission 2002).
The strong emphasis of German public pensions on the link between benefits and 
contributions resulted in the gender inequality in pension benefits. In 1996, women’s 
average monthly pensions was 42 per cent of men’s for blue-collar scheme and 49 
per cent for white-collar scheme in the Old Lander, while in the New Lander, the rate 
was 64 per cent and 60 per cent respectively (calculated from Scharf 1998: Table 
3.1).
On the other hand, in Japan, the link to the market was more direct, and earnings still 
played an important role in overall retirement income. Women were disadvantaged 
both in access to and gains from this income source. In the mid-1990s, only 13 per
125 The median gross personal income of those aged over 65 based on General Household Surveys 
1993 -  1994.
cent of women aged 65 and over had incomes from employment compared with 37 
per cent for male counterparts (MHW 1998: Table 26). With regard to incomes from 
the labour market, recent survey showed that earnings constituted about one fifths of 
women’s personal incomes, while it amounted to about one third for men126 (Japan 
Cabinet Office 2002: Figure 1.1.9).
However, as seen in the previous section, the relative share of incomes from social 
transfers was growing rapidly in Japan, reflecting the growth in coverage and 
maturity of the public pension system. Unlike the labour force participation rate, the 
gender gap in the access to this source was almost none; 94 per cent of women aged 
65 and over and 96 per cent of male counterparts received public pensions of any sort 
(MHW 1998: Table 58). Nonetheless, women receive much lower benefits from this 
source than men. In 1997, women aged between 65 and 74 had social transfers of 44 
per cent of men’s, while the rate was 46 per cent for women aged 75 and over (Japan 
Cabinet Office 2002: Figure 1.1.9). With all these disadvantages, women aged 65 
and over had personal incomes only 34 per cent of that of male counterparts in the 
same year (ibid.).
Considering women’s generally lower individual incomes as well as longer life 
expectancy, the significant gender gap in personal incomes in Britain, Germany and 
Japan suggests that women in all the three countries face greater risk of poverty in 
old age than men. In the next section, poverty in old age is further examined.
126 The data in both reports are based on Comprehensive Survey o f Living Condition o f the People on 
Health and Welfare, 1998. The ratio of earnings to the total incomes for those aged between 65 and 
74 were around 25 per cent for women and 40 per cent for men. The calculations for all the figures in 
this section include those who had no incomes. Among those aged 65 and over, 17 per cent o f women 
and 4.8 per cent men had no incomes.
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6.3 Poverty in old age and the social minimum
Despite the overall high level of intergenerational transfers in Britain, Germany and 
Japan, the inequality in intra-generational transfers resulted in the failure to eradicate 
poverty for some older people in all the three countries. Figure 6.2 shows the 
percentage of people whose incomes were below 50 per cent o f median disposable 
income in the mid-1990s by age group.
Figure 6. 2 Percentage of population that is below poverty line*, the mid-
1990s**
 Britain
 Germany
 Japan
18 - 25 2 6 -4 0  41 - 50 51 -64  65 -  74 75+
Age
Note: * Fifty percent of disposable income of the entire population.
** See Table 6.1 for the specific years of the data for each country 
Source: OECD (2001) Chart 2.2
In all the three countries, the risk of poverty was still relatively high in advanced old
age. While low income among younger cld was not especially pronounced in
Germany, this was still the case in Japan and Britain. However, the most noticeable
feature o f the Figure is the significantly high rate among older people in Japan.
About one fifth of those aged between 65 and 74 had incomes below the poverty line,
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and more than a quarter of those aged 75 and over did so in the mid-1990s. 
Although people in advanced old age in Britain were also most likely to be in 
poverty of all the age groups, their likelihood was still much less than in Japan. 
Moreover, the British rates for older people were not much different from those of 
Germany, which had the lowest rate of low incomes in old age of the three countries. 
This suggests the exceptionally high risk of poverty in old age in Japan.
Across welfare states, older people with low incomes relied heavily on social 
transfers. While these incomes could be non-means tested benefits such as public 
pensions, the lowest income groups were more likely to receive means-tested 
benefits. Reflecting the gender gap in incomes, the recipients of these social 
minimums were heavily gendered. In Britain, 15 per cent of women aged 65 and 
over and 7 per cent of male counterparts were on income support in 1993 -  1994 
(Ginn and Arber 1999a: 321). On the other hand, in Germany, 6 per cent of the 
recipients of social assistance benefits in 1995 were those aged 65 and over. Out of 
the benefit recipients over the age of 60 in 1995, 69 per cent were women, while the 
rate was 86 per cent among those aged over 75 (Scharf 1998: 79). In the case of 
Japan, the largest recipients of social assistance benefits were households headed by 
those aged 65 and over. In 1995, these households constituted 42 per cent of all 
households on income support (MHW 2000: 413). On an individual basis, out of the 
benefit recipients aged 65 and over, 61 per cent were women, which constituted 22 
per cent of all the recipients, compared with 14 per cent for older men, in 2000 
(Japan Cabinet Office 2002: Table 1.3.6).
The social assistance rate, however, has limitations as an indicator of the extent and 
intensiveness of poverty. Firstly, means-tested benefits are well known for having
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low take-up rates. Depending on the stigma attached to the receipt of benefits and 
policies to encourage or discourage the take-up, the rate can be different across 
countries even when the actual numbers of eligible people are similar (Tachibanaki
1 77and Urakawa 2006) . Secondly, depending on the indexation of the benefits to the
prices or wages, the relative value of social assistance can change in relation to old 
age pensions, affecting the eligibility to means-tested benefits. Lastly, the absolute 
value or generosity of national minimum varies across countries (see Eardley et al. 
1996a; 1996b; Kohl 1993). Thus, poverty rates defined by the number of social 
assistance recipients cannot be directly compared cross-nationally to produce relative 
pictures of the poor. Rather, they reveal more about the welfare system of a country.
This is especially so when complemented with the data which show the resource 
share of the poorest in the society. The experience of poverty can be significantly 
different depending on the institutional arrangements for those with the lowest 
income in the society. Figure 6.3 shows the mean disposable income of the poorest 
elderly in proportion to that of people aged 18 to 64.
127 Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2001) offered a comparison table for the take-up rates in Britain, 
Germany, Japan and the US estimated by various authors. The estimated rate for Japan was much 
lower than those for other countries. The authors estimated the take-up rate in Japan in 1995 as 19.7 
per cent. In contrast, the estimated take-up rates were 80 per cent for Britain in 1985, 37 per cent for 
Germany in 1993 and 67 per cent for the US in 1989 (estimated respectively by Duclos, J-Y. 1995. 
Estimating and Testing a Model of Welfare Participation: The Case o f Supplementary Benefits in 
Britain. Economica 64 (253):81-100., Riphahn, R.T. 2001. Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The 
Take-up of Social Assistance Benefits. Review o f  Income and Wealth 47 (3):379-398., Blank, R.M., 
and P. Ruggles. 1996. When Do Women Use Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food 
Stamps? Journal o f  Human Resources 31 (l):57-89.). As the reasons for the low take-up in Japan, 
Tachibanaki and Urakawa pointed out the strictness o f means tests, no granting o f benefits to 
applicants with extended family members as potential supporters, insufficient dissemination of  
information on benefits and strong stigma (pp. 126-127). Soeda also pointed out reluctance o f the 
government to implement policies to raise the take-up rate and unwillingness o f eligible people to 
apply due to weak sense o f welfare rights and strong sense of shame as the contributing factors for 
low take-up rate in Japan (Soeda, Yoshiya. 1988. Seikatsu Hogo Seido no Tenkai. In Tenkanki no 
Fukushi Kokka, edited by Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan 
kai.).
225
Figure 6. 3 Mean disposable income of the lowest income quintile of people aged 
65 and over (percentage of mean disposable income of people aged 18 to 64, the 
mid-1990s*
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* See Table 6.1 for the specific years of the data for each country 
Source: OECD (2001) Chart 2.1
Among the three countries, Japanese older people again faired the worst by this 
criterion. In the mid-1990s, the older Japanese in the lowest income quintile had 
disposable incomes o f only about a quarter o f the national average, while the rates 
for British and German counterparts were around 35 per cent and 40 per cent 
respectively.
In the mid-1990s, the Japanese intergenerational resource transfer system provided 
the least for those in need. It can be argued that the social rights in Japan did not 
bring much to the people in old age in the mid-1990s. These cross-national 
differences become more pronounced when looking closely at the income situations 
of those who have had a relatively weak link to the labour market, namely, older 
women.
226
6.3.1 The most vulnerable
Deprived of the intra-household transfers, solo-living older women are generally the 
most vulnerable to poverty. Moreover, solo-living in old age is more prevalent 
among women than men due partly to the former’s longer life expectancy. While 
this is true with Britain, Germany and Japan, the risk of poverty is significantly 
different across the three countries in all living arrangements, including solo-living 
women. Table 6.2 shows the rate of those aged 75 and over whose incomes were in 
the bottom quintile of the entire population by their living arrangements.
Table 6. 3 Percentage of those aged 75 and over who are in the lowest income 
quintile* of the entire population, the mid-1990s**
Age 75+
All
older
old
Single women 
living alone
Women living 
with spouse only
Single persons living with others (and 
the person is not household head)
Britain 38.5 47.4 39.3 12.6
Germany 30.8 42.7 14.8
Japan 33.5 78.7 58.5 18.2
Note: .. Data not available.
* Per capita income with the OECD standard equivalence scale.
** See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f the data for each country 
Source: OECD (2001) Table 7.1.
Overall, the risk of falling into the bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution was
lowest for German older people, which corresponds to the rate of low incomes
among this age group shown in Figure 6.2. The lower poverty risk in Japan
compared with Britain appears to be contradictory with Figure 6.2 in the above
section. However, this can be partly explained by the possibility that the elderly with
incomes below 50 per cent of national median incomes existed well beyond the
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bottom income quintile. The overall differences across countries are, however, 
dwarfed by the gaps between women not only between countries but also within a 
country.
In Germany, women had the lowest risk of falling into poverty in any living 
arrangements compared with women in Japan and in Britain. Nonetheless, among 
German women, the living arrangement did matter. The gap between the rates of 
women living alone and of those living with spouse was quite substantial. Overall, 
the table indicates that, in Germany, as far as women lived with their spouse, the risk 
of falling into the lowest income quintile was lower than both the population average 
and that of all older old. It can be said that their retirement-income system was based 
on the assumption of the existence of a male-breadwinner in a household.
In the case of Japan, the most noticeable feature is the exceptionally high risk of 
poverty among single women living alone. Almost 80 per cent of women in this 
category were in the lowest income quintile in the mid-1990s, while the equivalent 
rate was 43 per cent and 47 per cent for the German and British counterparts 
respectively. Furthermore, women in couple households were also exposed to a 
significantly high risk of falling into the lowest income status. On the other hand, the 
overall poverty rate of all older old in Japan was not significantly lower than the 
other two countries. This implies that, at least for women, income security in old age 
in Japan heavily relies on other kinds of living arrangement such as multi- 
generational living. If one of the main objectives of the public pension system is 
poverty prevention, its achievement is far from a success story for Japanese women.
Contrary to women in Germany and Japan, British women saw relatively smaller
differences in the risk between solo-living and living with a spouse. Although living
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alone did bring higher risk, the difference was the smallest among the three countries. 
Moreover, unlike the other two countries, the overall rate for older old and the rate 
for a couple did not show much difference. This means that the risk of poverty was 
relevant to many pensioners regardless of living arrangements. Considering the high 
rate of poverty among British older old in general, it can be said that the British 
system assumes a couple as a unit like in Germany, but provides too little resources 
to the elderly to distinguish the favouring of couples over single women.
The high likelihood of poverty in old age offers a gloomy prospect for women who 
live alone. This is especially true of Japan, where only those in multi-generational 
households were doing well. Moreover, the number of solo-living older women is on 
the rise in Japan (see Chapter 1). While the largest increase was seen in the elderly 
couple households, women in this living arrangement were the reservoirs of solo- 
living women, given their longer life expectancy than men.
On the other hand, social transfers, especially public pensions, were often designed 
to mitigate the economic loss in widowhood. This raises a question: to what extent 
did the loss of a male breadwinner have an economic impact on women in Britain, 
Germany and Japan in the mid-1990s? Table 6.3 demonstrates the extent to which 
widows were worse off or otherwise than women in couple households in the mid- 
1990s. The table also shows the extent to which certain factors affected on the 
income inequality between the two categories of women in each country.
Table 6. 4 The ratio of disposable income of widows living alone to that of pure 
couples, the mid-1990s****
Total Portion o f the differences that is attributed to
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difference Working 
income 
per capita
Public
pension
per
capita
Private
pension
per
capita
Other
public
benefits
per
capita*
Tax and 
contributions 
per capita
Other
income
items
Household 
economies 
of scale**
Pure*** couple to widow (65-74)
Britain -28.6 -5.7 12.6 -10.7 9.2 4.1 i oo bo -29.3
Germany -7.1 0.5 27.4 2.5 -0.1 -1.8 -6.4 -29.3
Japan -37.5 -21.5 -1.8 0.7 0.8 8.4 5.3 -29.3
Pure*** couple to widow (75+)
Britain -22.3 -1.1 8.4 -12.8 13.9 2.4 -3.9 -29.3
Germany -25.2 0.0 2.5 -1.4 0.3 -1.0 3.6 -29.3
Japan -33.1 -15.1 7.3 0.0 2.9 10.5 -9.4 -29.3
* ‘Other public benefits’ include means-tested benefits.
** A mechanical result o f the equivalence scale 
*** Couple without children
**** See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f  the data for each country
Note: The figures are not based on panel data, thus they do not show actual loss borne by individuals. 
Source: OECD (2001) Table 7.2
In all the three countries, widows had significantly lower disposable incomes than 
women in a couple. While the state benefits generally operated to narrow the income 
gap, earnings worked to the opposite direction. Still, apart from the loss o f 
economies of scale, there were cross-national variations in the main contributing 
factors for the income inequalities between the two groups o f women.
The largest income gap between widows and wives can be found in Japan. The 
crucial contributing factor to the inequality was working incomes. This confirms the 
relative importance of, as well as the large gender gap in, earnings in old age in 
Japan. Although other factors were generally favourable to Japanese widows, the
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loss of earnings was by far greater than the total gains. Another noticeable feature of 
Japan was negative impact of public pensions for younger widows. Although the 
effect was relatively small, the fact that public pension disadvantaged widows at all 
was quite different from the situations in Britain or Germany, where widows had 
considerable gains from this source.
In contrast, in Germany, younger widows saw the least economic disadvantages 
compared with women in a couple household. The former received incomes only 
about 7 per cent lower than the latter. The most important positive factor was public 
pensions, which almost cancelled out the loss of economies of scale for younger 
widows. On the other hand, this can also mean that women without survivors’ 
pensions could be significantly worse off.
In the case of Britain, public benefits (both pensions and other benefits) brought 
widows some gains. Especially, the gains from ‘other’ public benefits were 
substantial compared to Germany and Japan, suggesting the important role of means- 
tested benefits in the country. However, almost half of the gains from public sources 
were cancelled out by the loss in private pensions. This confirms the disadvantages 
of private pensions for women.
These accounts do not exhaust possible causes for cross-national differences in the
vulnerability of widows. The data being a snapshot of older women’s situations
rather than panel data, some factors which may have had effects on inequality among
women were not necessarily captured by the results. Nor can the cohort differences
such as in Germany be fully explained. The various extents of disadvantage can also
be attributed to differences in the maturity of pensions, the workings of pension
systems, demographic factors and labour market practices.
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that none of the three intergenerational transfer 
systems under consideration provided enough to compensate for the loss of male 
breadwinners. The more the share of resources from the market was important in old 
age, the greater the disadvantages solo-living widows faced. Depending heavily on 
earnings of the male breadwinner even in old age, Japanese older women who lived 
alone were the most vulnerable to poverty.
Widows are not the only group of solo-living older women. The growth in marital 
breakdown and the decline in marriage suggest a significant increase in the number 
of non-widowed single older women. Deprived of family transfers as well as derived 
benefits, these women can only rely on personal incomes of their own in old age. On 
the other hand, these women might have had a greater chance to accumulate 
significant pension rights in their own right through employment. This suggests the 
diversity of women’s economic situations within a country along the line of marital 
status. In the next section, different economic situations among women are further 
examined with a focus on old-age pensions.
6.4 Differences among women
Many older women receive their resources from the public pension system, but their 
entitlements are not limited to entitlements as wage earners but include those as 
wives and as mothers. Moreover, these entitlements are usually stratified, 
advantaging the entitlement as wage earners the most (Sainsbury 1996; 1994). This 
generalisation can be applied to the three countries under consideration to a certain 
extent. While the pension systems of Britain, Germany and Japan treat the three 
entitlements quite differently, the economic status of older women in the mid-1990s
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showed some cross-national similarities in the inequality by marital s ta tu s128. 
Figures 6.4.1 to 6.4.3 show the ratio of own pensions to that o f gross earnings o f 
average workers by marital status.
Figure 6. 4. 1 Mean value of own pensions for people aged 65 and over as a 
percentage of gross earnings of average production worker, the mid-1990s*, 
Britain
100
%
Married Married N ever Divorced W idowed
men w om en married w om en wom en
wom en
■  Private pensions 
□  Public pensions
* See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f  the data for each country 
Source: Casey and Yamada (2002) Table 5.5
128 While marital status and care responsibilities do not necessarily overlap, the assumption is less 
problematic with women o f  this generation than with younger women.
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Figure 6. 4. 2 Mean value of own pensions for people aged 65 and over as a 
percentage of gross earnings of average production worker, the mid-1990s*, 
Germany
Married men Married N ever married Divorced W idowed  
w om en w om en w om en wom en
* See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f  the data for each countiy
Note: The benefit levels o f private pensions for Germany and Japan are omitted due to the 
insignificance o f the ratios.
Source: Casey and Yamada (2002) Table 5.5
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Figure 6. 4. 3 Mean value of own pensions for people aged 65 and over as a 
percentage of gross earnings of average production worker, the mid-1990s*, 
Japan
100
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7 0
Married men Married N ever married Divorced W idowed  
w om en w om en w om en wom en
* See Table 6.1 for the specific years o f the data for each country
Note: The benefit levels o f  private pensions for Germany and Japan are omitted due to the 
insignificance o f the ratios.
Source: Casey and Yamada (2002) Table 5.5
The figure shows that the ranking of pension benefits by marital status was the same 
across countries. In all the three countries, the rate o f never-married women was 
lower than that of married men to a varying extent. Among women, the highest rate 
was attained by never-married women, the second highest by widows, the third by 
divorcees and the lowest by married women. Assuming the link between the marital 
status and the labour force participation, it can be said that life-long link to the labour 
market brought women better benefits than the status o f wife (including in 
widowhood) did in all the three countries. The gap between married women and 
never-married women suggests that women at least of this generation had to face the 
choice of either marriage or employment for their own better economic prospects in
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old age. The failure of maintaining the chosen course -  divorce -  resulted in 
considerable economic loss for women. This was especially true of Germany, where 
the gap between divorcees and widows was considerable.
Nonetheless, there are some noticeable cross-national differences. In Britain, the 
inequality in the statutory pensions was not pronounced among women apart from 
the low benefit level of married women. In contrast, the inequality was profound in 
private pensions along the line of marital status. Research also suggests the 
inequality along the line of class (Ginn and Arber 2001a; 1999a). Class difference 
was simply reflected in the differences in both coverage and benefit levels of private 
pensions, dividing women further.
On the other hand, the noticeable feature with Germany is the high rate attained by 
widows as mentioned above. This suggests generous derived rights in the country. 
However, in Germany, inequality among women can be explicitly seen along the line 
of occupation and region (Scharf 1998; Scheiwe 1994) as well as marital status. 
Indeed, research suggests that while the success in the marriage market is the surer 
way for the income security in old age in the Old Lander (west), this was not 
necessarily the case in the New Lander (east) (Allmendinger, Bruckner, and 
Bruckner 1993). Reflecting the differential gender relations in each Lander, for 
women in the former East Germany, pensions in their own right were a more 
important source of incomes in old age (Chamberlayne 1994). Still, the average 
monthly own pensions of women in New Lander did not reach the level of men in 
the blue-collar scheme in New Lander, let alone to the level of men in the Old 
Lander (Statistisches Bundesamt 1997: Table 19.4.10).
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In contrast, in Japan, research suggested that employment history of women did not 
always affect the pension inequality among women. In the mid-1990s, there was not 
much difference in the levels of benefits among women who mainly worked part- 
time, who were self-employed or who undertook no paid work over their lifetime 
(MHW 1997b). This is partly due to the strong derived rights in the Japanese 
pension system (see Chapters 3 to 5). This suggests that inequality among women 
can be significant along the line of marital status and their husband’s economic status.
In sum, all the three countries have a potential division among women due to their 
income inequality along the line of class, occupation, region and marital status. 
However, the quoted statistics also suggested that none of the inequality was as large 
as the inequality between women and men.
6.5 Conclusion
The first part of this chapter saw large differences in the composition of older 
people’s incomes in Britain, Germany and Japan. Despite these variations, all the 
three countries were apparently successful in the mid-1990s in transferring 
considerable resources to older generations. In a way, this confirms the claim of 
high substitutability of differential income sources, which can provide a basis for 
proposals to shift the boundaries between the state, the market and the family for 
providing resources in old age. While the boundaries can shift in any directions, the 
recent trends towards a larger share of private pension income suggests that the claim 
is more likely to be employed to justify the smaller direct role of the state in 
intergenerational resource transfers.
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However, the claim of high substitutability ignores research evidence which suggests 
the limited substitutability on an individual level due to the different legitimacy of 
each income source. Also, the claim does not pay much attention to the possible 
differences in the impact of each income source on inequality between the elderly. 
The examination of intra-generational distribution of resources has implied that the 
differential mix of income sources has significant implications for inequality within a 
generation.
Income inequality is intertwined with gender inequality, and without awareness of 
gender differential impacts of certain income sources, the significance and the 
limitation of each component of income cannot be fully captured. The emphasis on 
the market is generally detrimental more to women than men due to the persistent 
gender inequality in the labour market. The trends towards a larger share of private 
pension income and longer working life thus can have a negative impact on the 
extent of income inequality within a generation. Moreover, unless the adequacy of a 
social minimum is guaranteed, people with low incomes -  who tend to rely more on 
incomes from public sources -  may see their share of resources in a society decrease.
Nonetheless, the three-country comparison has also demonstrated that redistribution 
through the state does not always narrow the inequality. Women’s disadvantages in 
the labour market can be compounded by the institutional arrangements in statutory 
pension systems. Depending on the design, even the public pension schemes can be 
the cause of inequality. This is exemplified in Germany where the public pension 
system is the biggest factor for inequality in old age in the mid-1990s. The strong 
link between the levels of earnings and benefits is more detrimental to women, who 
generally have weaker positions in the labour market. The bias towards male
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workers in the public pension system, however, is true not only with Germany. To a 
varying degree, both British and Japanese systems are not free from this criticism. 
Since women form the majority of pensioners, without having women in mind in the 
design of retirement-income systems, the problem of poverty and inequality in old 
age cannot be solved.
This is certainly true of Japan, where those with low incomes had the least share of 
resources in the society in the mid-1990s. Moreover, these poor people were more 
likely than not to be older women. While these two issues were not often brought up 
as primary problems in the mid-1990s in Japan, gender inequality in incomes in old 
age and older women’s risk of poverty were in a way more serious than in Britain or 
in Germany.
The questionable effectiveness of the Japanese redistribution system and the high 
poverty proportion among older women also raise concerns about the economic 
welfare in old age of younger women, who are expected to receive their state old-age 
pensions under a less generous regime. Moreover, changes in the norms and 
population profile mean that it is increasingly a risky strategy to count on the 
traditional provider -  the family -  for the economic welfare in old age.
On the other hand, women’s greater risk of poverty in old age is often regarded as a
historical legacy, and thus less relevant to today’s younger women. This optimistic
view is mainly based on recent socio-economic changes such as the increasing
participation of women in the labour market. Some measures have also been taken to
better accommodate women’s life courses in public pension systems, exemplified by
credits for care period. These moves have led to the situation where more women
are included in the social security system in their own right rather than as
239
‘dependants’. Yet, there is also persistent direct and indirect discrimination against 
women, which still disadvantages women as wage earners.
In the next chapter, the effects of institutional differences of the pension systems of 
Britain, Germany and Japan on the gender pension gaps and women’s economic 
welfare in old age are examined, using hypothetical female individuals.
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Chapter 7 Women’s Prospects for A Better Future: Simulations
Many public pension systems are based on men’s typical life courses in determining 
the level of model pensions. This is also the case with the Japanese pension system 
despite a series of recent pension reforms. This raises questions about women’s 
pension levels. The main aim of this chapter is to examine the impact of recent 
pension reforms on women, and to discuss the policy implications. For this purpose, 
the relative performance of the Japanese pension system is compared with that of 
Britain and Germany in terms of gender equality in outcome and women’s economic 
welfare in old age.
The main aspect to be examined is the cross-national differences and similarities in 
the overall effects of women’s three entitlements -  namely, as wage earners, as 
carers and as wives -  on the pension outcome. Although simple comparisons of 
pension regulations can reveal differential emphasis on women’s three entitlements 
to a certain degree, many women gain their pension rights through more than one 
entitlement as wage earners, carers and wives over their lifetime. In order to 
examine the overall effects of the combination of these three entitlements, this 
chapter uses simulations based on hypothetical individuals’ life courses. By building 
stylised life courses, simulations can help illuminating the institutional differences in 
the effects of various combinations of the three entitlements (see Chapter 2 for the 
merits and limitations of this method).
In order to explore the contributing factors to the results, the following sub-questions 
are asked:
How effectively does each system mitigate the disadvantages caused by
lower earnings, shorter job tenure or non-full time working?
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How effectively do credits for care work mitigate the disadvantages in the 
labour market caused by care commitment?
How effectively do derived benefits for dependent spouse contribute to boost 
women’s pensions in each system?
This chapter first briefly describes the pension systems of Britain, Germany and 
Japan as of 2004. The next section introduces some assumptions and model life 
courses for simulations. Then, it explains three criteria based on which the 
simulation results are analysed. This is followed by the analysis of simulation results 
of the pension systems in Britain, Germany and Japan in terms of women’s economic 
welfare in old age and the gender pension gap, using the above criteria. The next 
section discusses the limitation of the results. The last section summarises the 
findings and discusses the policy implications of these results for future female 
pensioners in Japan.
7.1 The pension systems of Britain, Germany and Japan129
Public pension systems of Britain, Germany and Japan take the form of social 
insurance, and thus eligibility is generally gained through the payment of 
contributions. Nonetheless, there are some special arrangements for carers and/or 
parents with young children in all the three countries. Ignoring transitional 
arrangements, the statutory pensionable age in all the three countries is 65 for both 
women and men. In the following, each system is briefly described in turn.
129 The information on the pension systems of Britain and Germany was obtained from the on-line 
database o f the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC). 2001-2004. [cited 2001 - 
2004]. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm. The information 
on the Japanese pension system was obtained, unless otherwise stated, from Kosei Tokei Kyokai, ed. 
2002. Hoken to Nenkin no Doko (Trend o f  Social Insurance and Pensions). Tokyo: Kosei Tokei 
Kyokai
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Britain
The basic structure of the British public pension system is as follows:
Flat-rate tier (BSP) + eamings-related tier (S2P)
It has a flat-rate basic part, Basic State Pension (BSP), and an additional eamings- 
related part, State Second Pension (S2P)130. In principle, membership of the state 
pension is limited to those with earnings above the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL). If, 
however, the earnings are above LEL but below the Lower Earnings Threshold 
(LET), people are exempted from contribution but treated as if they have paid at the 
level of LET.
The level of BSP is determined by the length of contributions, but there are 
supplementary benefits for dependants. The full BSP is payable with 44 years of 
contribution. The required years for full BSP can be reduced for those with care 
responsibilities under the Home Responsibility Protection (HRP). The minimum 
required contribution period for BP is 11 years.
With regard to S2P, the level is determined by the length of contributions and the 
level of earnings, but there are redistributive mechanisms installed for those with 
lower wages. There are also credits for carers. However, there are no supplementary 
benefits for dependants.
In widowhood, surviving spouses can use the deceased partner’s membership record 
for their BSP as well as inherit a half of the deceased spouse’s S2P up to a statutory 
ceiling of S2P.
130 From 1978 to 2002, the eamings-related part o f state pension in Britain was referred to as the State 
Eamings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS).
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Germany
The German public pension system has only eamings-related tier. The main public 
pension schemes, GVR, are divided along the line of blue-collar jobs and white- 
collar jobs, both of which have similar regulations. There are thresholds for both 
earnings and working time in order to gain the access to the schemes. People in 
short-term employment (up to 50 working days per year) are exempted from 
contribution payment, and those who work 15 hours or more a week must pay 
contributions regardless of their earnings.
The level of benefits is determined by the length of contributions and the level of 
earnings. There are no supplementary benefits for dependants. The minimum 
required contribution period is 5 years. Certain interruptions of employment are 
credited such as years spent in military service, registered unemployment, sick leave 
and time spent for care.
In widowhood, 55 per cent of pension benefit of the deceased is payable to the 
surviving spouse with a ceiling. For widows or widowers who have raised children, 
additional pensions are granted according to the number of children raised.
Japan
The basic structure of the Japanese public pension system is as follows:
Flat-rate tier (NP) + eamings-related tier (EPI)
It has a flat-rate basic part, National Pension (NP), and an additional eamings-related 
part, the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI). The membership of NP is mandatory 
for all those aged 20 to 59 regardless of their employment status or occupations.
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Certain categories of people are exempted from paying contributions, which include 
dependent spouses of employees, students, those on disability pensions or social 
assistance benefits. Those with extremely low incomes can also be exempted from 
paying contribution by request. However, the head of the household has the 
responsibility to pay the premium for NP on behalf of those in the household. Apart 
from the case for dependent spouses, the exemption leads to reduced benefits to a 
varying degree.
The level of NP is determined by the length of contributions. The full NP is payable 
with 40 years of contribution or credits (exemption period). The minimum required 
membership period for NP is 25 years.
With regard to EPI, the membership is limited to regular employees in principle. 
Part-time workers are covered if their working hours are equal to or more than three 
fourths of regular employees’. The minimum required contribution period for EPI is 
one year. However, to be eligible for EPI, one should be also entitled to NP, for 
which 25 years of membership is necessary. The level of benefits is determined by 
the length of contributions and the level of earnings. However, credits are available 
for parents on parental leave. There are also supplementary benefits for dependants.
In widowhood, surviving spouses can receive an equivalent of the sum of half of 
their own EPI and half of their deceased spouse’s EPI pension or 75 per cent of the
1 o 1
deceased spouse’s EPI pension, whichever the higher . There is also age addition 
for older widows.
131 Survivors with annual incomes of 8.5 million yen or over are disqualified.
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7.2 Model Cases
Hypothetical life courses are applied to the pension systems of Britain, Germany and 
Japan to produce pension results for model cases. In order to compare institutional 
factors of pension systems in different socio-economic settings, economic and 
political changes over time and differences across countries are contained and 
stylized.
Firstly, it is assumed that each pension system remains constant with the rules as of 
2004 throughout one’s working life. These regulations include legislated changes to 
be phased in over time, treating them as if they were already fully implemented. 
Secondly, the level of thresholds, ceilings and credits for benefits and taxation are 
assumed to be raised in line with the growth in wages and prices, whichever the 
higher, unless otherwise stated. Lastly, the real value of future pension levels is 
adjusted using the most relevant government projections for the indexation 
regulation in each system. This means that different projections are used across
1 T )countries as shown in Table 7.1 . While these projections may not necessarily be
robust ones, taking the government projections at face value is justifiable by the main 
objective of this study. The objective is to examine the resource redistribution in 
each society as the respective government implicitly or explicitly sees fit, rather than 
to examine the robustness of the governments’ projected outcomes. The adjusted 
benefit levels are shown in today’s monetary value.
132 See Appendix 2 for more details on pension adjustments in each country.
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Table 7.1 Relevant government projections for adjusting the benefit value by 
country
Bases for benefit 
adjustment
Government 
projections used in the 
calculations
Rates
Britain Basic pension: inflation
Eamings-related pension: 
production growth
Expected real production 
growth
2 per cent of 
increase per 
annum
Germany Gross wages, contribution 
rate, the ratio of 
pensioners to contributors
Minimum replacement 
rate guaranteed by law
43 per cent of 
average earnings 
in 2030
Japan Net wagesm , the ratio of 
pensioners to contributors, 
life expectancy
Total rate of expected 
decrease in the benefit 
level
15 per cent 
decrease in 
benefit by 2023
The model life courses of hypothetical individuals are also standardised and 
simplified based on several assumptions as follows:
1. The model is based on individuals, but the entitlements gained through partners 
are also taken into account and shown separately;
2. It is assumed that the working life begins at 20 and the retirement starts at 65;
3. Men’s average gross earnings are used as a standard in each country. The wage 
level for each hypothetical individual is determined by applying a fixed 
proportion to men’s average gross earnings across countries rather than using 
nationally different real gender gap in wages134. To simplify, only a flat life-time
133 For the pensioners aged 68 and over, the benefits are indexed to inflation.
134 The ratios o f full-time female employees’ average earnings to men’s are 76.5 per cent in Britain, 
71.2 per cent in old Lander, Germany and 64.5 per cent in Japan in 2004 (Source: ; Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings, Britain; website of Federal Statistical Office, Germany and Basic Survey on 
Wage Structure, Japan)
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earnings profile is used instead of age-specific wage profiles135;
4. When a model individual is married, the wife and husband are modelled as being 
the same age. Benefits for widows are calculated at the time of retirement to 
avoid indexation affecting the outcome;
5. In the models, the forms and the combination of paid and unpaid work are 
significantly simplified by necessity. Care responsibilities in the model women’s 
life courses are limited to child care. This is because the requirements in child 
care in terms of time are relatively predictable and easier to stylize than other 
types of care such as care for the frail elderly or disabled persons.
6. The simulation includes only public pension schemes. Although private pensions 
are important part of incomes in old age in Britain, and increasingly so in 
Germany and Japan, incomes from private sources are ignored because the 
primary interest in this study is the explicit redistribution through the state.
In this study, one benchmark case of a man and six cases of women are used. The
life course of each hypothetical case is as follows.
7.2.1 The benchmark
The benchmark case is a single man with an uninterrupted employment record
between the age of 20 and 64, that is, he has a contribution record of 45 years. His
earnings during the working life are at the same level with the average male earnings
(see Table 7.2). The net earnings denote the earnings net of income tax and social 
1security contributions .
135 There are no significant differences between flat and age specific profiles for Japanese women, 
who are the main focus of the thesis.
136 See Appendix 3 for the calculations o f the net earnings.
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Table 7. 2 Average male annual earnings, 2004
Gross earnings Net earnings
Britain £24,236 £17,524
Germany €46,164 €24,895
Japan ¥5,427,000 ¥4,219,824
Note: For Germany, the figure is calculated from the monthly salary for white-collar male employees 
in old LSnder. This is because unlike in Britain or in Japan, blue-collar workers and whilte-color 
employees in Germany belong to separate public pension schemes. The formulae for pension 
calculations are constructed in such a way that significant earnings gaps between white-collar 
employees and blue-collar workers and between old Lander and new Lander are mitigated to a certain 
extent. The monthly salary for white-collar male employees was 3,847 euros for the former and 2,881 
euros for the latter in 2004. Monthly wage for blue-collar male workers was 2,681 euros for old 
Lander and 1,994 euros for new Lander in the same year.
Source: Calculated from MHLW (2004a) for Japan, website of Federal Statistical Office Germany; 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings for Britain.
7.2.2 Female Hypothetical Cases
All the hypothetical female cases except for Case 1 are married. They are in paid 
employment for certain years of their lives on full-time and/ or part-time bases. 
Their earnings levels are defined as a percentage of the average male earnings of 
each country. For the full-time employment, the ratio is set at 65 per cent. For the 
part-time employment, it is fixed at 40 per cent and 20 per cent. Based on the 
benchmark case above, hypothetical women’s earnings during their working lives are 
as in Table 7.3. Each hypothetical woman’s pension result is to be calculated based 
on these earnings and specific years of employment and care.
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Table 7. 3 Model women’s annual earnings as a percentage of men’s
65% 40% 20%
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
Britain
(£)
15,753 11,841 9,694 7,782 4,847 4,304
Germany
(€)
30,007 18,098 18,466 12,351 9,233 7,192
Japan
(¥)
3,527,550 2,792,237 2,170,800 1,756,145 1,085,400 1,074,590
Hypothetical Case 1: Continuous employment
The first hypothetical case is a single woman without a child who is employed all her 
adult life. She has an uninterrupted working record on a full-time basis. This case 
illustrates the effect of gender wage gap on women’s pension levels in each pension 
system. This case examines whether lifetime earnings gap between women and men 
is reproduced or mitigated through the pension systems. Since the results of this case 
imply what level of pensions women would get if they follow the life course of 
model men bar earnings levels, the results of this case is also used as a reference 
point for the following cases.
Hypothetical Case 2: Nearly continuous employment
The second case is a working mother who is in full-time employment. During her 
working life, she has one year interruption for maternity and/ or parental leave at the 
age of 30. This kind of working trajectory is what the Japanese pension system
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assumed in its arrangements for those who are on maternity/ parental leaves until the 
2004 reform137.
Hypothetical Case 3: Interrupted employment, mix o f part-time and full-time 
working
The third case is a married woman with a child, who interrupts her employment until 
the child gets older, and resumes paid work first on a part-time basis then on a full­
time basis. She earns 65 per cent of male average earnings when full-time, and 40 
per cent when part-time. The interruption for childcare is for 6 years between the 
age 30 and 35, and part-time working is for 4 years between 36 and 39. At the age of 
40, she switches to full-time and remains so until her retirement at the age of 65.
Due to cross-national differences in the regulations, women in the three countries are 
covered by different rights during the period of the career break and part-time 
working. In Britain and Germany, the model women are covered as mothers during 
the six-year absence from the labour market. After the six years, the British case is 
covered as a wage earner. On the other hand, the German case is treated as a 
working mother and able to have her earnings upgraded for the purposes of pension 
calculation until the child reaches 10 years old. In contrast, the Japanese case is 
covered as a mother only for the first three years -  the statutory maximum for care 
credits. For the remaining period of the career break, she is covered as a dependent 
wife, assuming her husband is insured by EPI. Once she resumes employment, it is 
assumed that she is included in EPI in her own right even when she works part-time.
137 The 2004 reform in Japan extended the period o f pension credits for those on parental leave from 
one year to three years. However, the statutory income replacement benefit is payable only up to one 
year.
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Hypothetical Case 4: Interrupted employment, mix o f part-time and full-time 
working
The fourth case is exactly the same with Case 3 except for the earning level during 
the part-time employment. In this case, she earns 20 per cent of male average 
earnings when working part-time. Since this level of earnings falls below the 
threshold for the coverage as wage earners in Japan, the Japanese case is covered as a 
dependent spouse while she is in part-time employment.
Hypothetical Case 5: Interrupted employment, part-time working
The fifth case is again a married woman with a child, interrupting her employment 
for 6 years for parenting. However, this time, she works only part-time for the rest of 
her working life after the six-year break. After staying at home looking after the 
child between the age of 30 and 35, she works part-time at 20 per cent of male 
average earnings for 4 years until the age 40, and afterwards at 40 per cent until she 
retires. This case represents another prevalent working pattern among women, albeit 
at various levels of earnings in reality. It illustrates the effects of part-time working 
and lifetime low earnings on the level of final pensions.
Hypothetical Case 6: Withdrawal from the labour market
The last case is another married woman with a child. This time, she first takes 
parental leave for the statutory maximum period, but decides not to go back to the 
labour market afterwards. It is assumed that her husband has enough earnings to 
financially support her and the child, but not enough to pay voluntary contributions 
on her behalf for her pensions. This model illustrates the effect of entitlement as 
wives in contrast to the ones as mothers or as wage earners.
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7.3 Results and criteria for assessment
Pension benefits of all the cases are calculated according to each country’s pension 
formula and rules for benefit adjustment, social security contribution and taxation138. 
Pension benefits for all the hypothetical cases are calculated accordingly, and the 
results are shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7. 4 Pension results per annum, gross
Bench­
mark
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Britain(£) 5,580 4,801 4,793 4,716 4,716 4,505 2,062
Germany
(€)
16,065 10,442 10,892 9,660 9,232 7,000 3,002
Japan (¥) 1,770,700 1,418,500 1,418,500 1,321,300 1,301,100 1,131,200 881,800
These simulation results are assessed in terms of three principles, each of which is 
measured by a separate criterion. To distinguish the influence of taxes and social
1 TOsecurity contributions, net benefits are presented where relevant . These principles 
are as follows.
Intra-generational redistribution between different life courses
Previous chapters have shown that the Japanese public pension system uses men’s 
average earnings and working trajectories in setting the model pension. To what 
extent the redistribution mechanism in the system, if any, redresses the effects of 
deviation from the norm such as being a woman, an employee with lower-than-
138 Examples of actual calculations o f pension benefits are shown for the benchmark case o f each 
country in Appendix 4.
139 See Appendix 5 for calculations of pensions net of income tax and social security contributions.
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average earnings, a wife and a mother? In order to answer this question, the relative 
value of pensions is measured as a proportion of the pension received by an 
individual on average male earnings with continuous employment record.
Intergenerational redistribution
Women’s economic welfare in old age is determined not only by the extent of intra- 
generational redistribution but also by the relative economic status in a society. In 
order to examine women’s pensions from this perspective, the relative value of 
pensions is measured as a proportion of national average earnings. The national 
average earnings here include earnings of both women and men but only of those 
aged between 15 and 64.
Poverty prevention
One of the main objectives of old age pensions is to prevent older people from falling 
into poverty. While all the three countries have means-tested income support, the 
rationale for the old age pensions is to keep pensioners from receiving these benefits. 
Thus, the study examines to what extent pensioners are secure from this risk and how 
better off or otherwise they are than those on means-tested benefits. In order to do 
this, the relative value of pensions is shown vis-a-vis the level of the nationally set 
level for income support and the level for minimum guaranteed pension benefits 
where they exist.
7.4 Results: Intra-generational redistribution
The first principle to be examined is intra-generational redistribution between
different life courses. Given the generally fewer gains of women as wage earners,
the most important factor in pension systems for women is arguably the extent of
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redistribution within a generation. Figures 7.1.1 to 7.1.3 show the pension levels o f 
women relative to m en’s in each country. The standard against which the benefits 
are compared is the pension level o f the benchmark case, that is, the pension received 
by an individual on average male earnings with continuous employment record. The 
closer the model’s outcome is to 65 per cent, the stronger the link between wage and 
benefits is, thus, more a woman would need to combat gender wage gap in the labour 
market in order to receive equivalent level o f pensions to that of m en’s.
Figure 7. 1. 1 Women’s total pensions as per cent of average men’s pension, 
Britain
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Figure 7. 1. 2 Women’s total pensions as per cent of average men’s pension, 
Germany
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Figure 7. 1. 3 Women’s total pensions as per cent of average men’s pension, 
Japan
00%
90%
50%
40%
2 0 %
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
:
Case 6
Case 1: Continuous employment
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Case 3: 10 years full-time —► 6 years break — *  4 years part-time (40% o f  male average) —*  full-time 
Case 4: 10 years full-time —> 6 years break —> 4 years part-time (20% o f male average) —► full-time 
Case 5: 10 years full-time —> 6 years break —*■ part-time (4 years at 20% —► the rest at 40%)
Case 6: 10 years full-time —» Withdrawal
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Among the three pension systems, the British system resulted in the least gender 
pension gap and the German system the largest, with the Japanese system in between. 
These results reflected the differential extent of strength in the link between earnings 
levels and benefits and between the labour market attachment and benefits. In 
Britain, the flat-rate element, care credits and redistributive pension formula 
significantly narrow gender gap in public pensions. Japan also has a flat-rate part, 
but its care credits are relatively limited and the eamings-related part is not 
redistributive. In contrast, in Germany, there is only eamings-related part in its 
public pensions. Although care credits in the German pension system are relatively 
generous, they are not substantial enough to allow most women to receive a 
comparable level of pensions with men’s. This suggests that care credits alone, 
however generous, cannot overcome the inequality caused by lifetime pay gap, even 
if they may redress an income drop during the first year(s) of childrearing for 
pension calculation purposes. This point is further explored in the following.
To further examine how each system redistributes between different life courses, 
intra-generational redistribution is broken down as between different wage levels, 
between different care commitments, and between wage earners and dependent 
spouses. In order to simplify, these redistributions are categorised into three groups 
as wage earners, as mothers and as wives respectively, and each is looked at in turn.
7.4.1 As wage earners
With the increase in female employment as well as persistent gender inequality in the
labour market, the extent of redistribution between those with different wage levels
and employment histories has a significant implication for gender equality in
pensions. To what extent does each system redistribute between wage earners with
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different lifetime earnings? Among the models, Case 1 (continuous employment) is 
best suited to see the effect o f lower pay per se. Figure 7.2 shows the results for 
Case 1 in the three countries broken down into flat-rate part and eamings-related part.
Figure 7. 2 Pensions as wage earners as per cent of average men’s pension, Case 
1
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The figure confirms that the German system reproduces most closely the earnings
gap in working life -  65 per cent. On the other hand, British and Japanese systems
redistribute and provide benefit level of about 86 per cent and 80 per cent o f the
benchmark case respectively. Given the fact that the German pensions consist of
only eamings-related tier, it may not be surprising that the German system
redistributes the least o f the three. On the other hand, Britain and Japan have flat-
rate basic tiers, and in the simulation, both British and Japanese models receive full
basic pensions. Compared between the two countries, the ratio of the full basic
pension to m en’s total pension level is higher in Japan than in Britain -  about 38 per
cent and 30 per cent respectively. However, in the case o f Britain, the eamings-
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related part is also redistributive. As a result, the Japanese model has a wider gender 
gap in final pensions than that o f the British equivalent.
This redistribution ranking is repeated in all the other cases for the benefits derived 
from the entitlement as wage earners (see Appendix 5). The British cases especially 
stand out by their high proportion to the average men’s pension level. Even with 
lifetime low earnings such as in Case 5 (part-time working after age 40 until 
retirement), the British hypothetical woman can still receive more than 70 per cent of 
average m en’s pensions as a wage earner (see Figure 7.3). This is a drop o f only 15 
percentage points from Case 1 despite the difference o f 25 percentage points in 
earnings between the two cases in most o f their lives.
Figure 7. 3 Pensions as wage earners as per cent of average men’s pension, Case 
5
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■  Earnings-related part 
m Flat-rate part
Britain Germany Japan
Case 5: 10 years full-time —► 6 years break —» part-time (4 years at 20% —► the rest at 40%) 
Note: Benefits shown are only those gained through the entitlement as wage earners.
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This is in a stark contrast with Germany where Case 5 receives less than 40 per cent 
of average men’s -  about 25 percentage points less benefit than Case 1. While Case 
5 in Japan fares better than the German counterpart, it still receives only about half of 
average men’s -  about 30 percentage points less than Case 1. These results 
demonstrate not only the effectiveness of a flat-rate tier but also the potential of a 
redistributive eamings-related tier in order to mitigate the effect of gender pay gap on 
the pension outcomes. This confirms the importance of loosening the link between 
the level of benefits and the performance in the labour market such as earnings and 
length of employment.
Indeed, in the British system, differences in the wage levels sometimes even lose 
their significance. Figure 7.4 shows the pension results as wage earners for Cases 3 
and 4 (four years of part-time working with earnings of 40 per cent and 20 per cent 
of male average respectively).
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Figure 7. 4 Pensions as wage earners as per cent of average men’s pension,
Cases 3 and 4
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Case 3: 10 years full-time —► 6 years break —> 4 years part-time (40% o f  male average) —> full-time 
Case 4: 10 years full-time —► 6 years break — *  4 years part-time (20% o f  male average) —► full-time 
Note: Benefits shown are only those gained through the entitlement as wage earners.
The figure demonstrates that, in Britain, the wage difference of as many as 20 
percentage points does not necessarily affect the final benefit levels. This is due to 
the flattening effects on benefit levels embedded in S2P for low earners. If earnings 
levels fall between LEL and LET as in both Cases 3 and 4, these earnings are treated 
as if  they were at the level o f LET although the contribution level is based on the real 
earnings.
On the other hand, in Japan and in Germany, the differences in earnings level, even if  
they are small and for a brief period, do have an impact on the level o f benefits140.
140 Japan also has a threshold under which all earnings are treated as if their levels are equivalent to 
the threshold, which is about 1.2 million per annum in 2004. Unlike Britain, however, the premium 
level is also calculated based on the threshold rather than actual earnings. In reality, many married
261
However, contrary to the general redistribution ranking, the extent o f  the gap 
between these two cases is more pronounced in Japan than in Germany -  about 5 
percentage points and 2 percentage points respectively. This is mainly due to the 
difference in the level o f the threshold for coverage. In Japan, earnings at the level 
o f 20 per cent o f male average earnings are below the threshold and thus not covered 
in their own right141, whereas in Germany, the same level o f earnings are over the 
threshold and thus the woman in Case 4 can accumulate pensions as a wage earner. 
The significant drop in benefits in Case 4 compared with Case 3 in Japan suggests 
that the decision on the treatment o f low earnings, the level o f thresholds and the 
introduction o f notional earnings as in Britain have significant impacts on women’s 
pensions as wage earners.
In summary, as wage earners, Japanese women can benefit from the redistributive 
mechanism o f the flat-rate part in the pension system unlike German women. 
However, this is relevant only if women are included as wage earners. The 
simulations demonstrated that the Japanese system disadvantages certain women in 
part-time employment by excluding them as wage earners from the system. 
Moreover, the non-redistributive nature o f the earnings-related part in Japan still 
significantly depresses women’s relative pensions, especially o f those with low 
earnings, unlike the situations in Britain. This implies considerable difficulties faced 
by Japanese non-regular workers in gaining a comparable level o f pensions to m en’s 
as wage earners.
people with low earnings do not pay contributions because the ceiling for the status o f  dependent 
spouse in EPI is higher than this level (1.3 million in 2004).
141 This is, however, only if she is married to an EPI insured employee and works shorter hours than 
three quarters o f regular em ployees’ working hours. If not, she has to be covered in her own right.
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7.4.2 As mothers
By the early 1990s, all the three countries introduced credits for childcare period in 
the pension system. While these credits vary in their nature, length, and value across 
countries, they are all expected to mitigate pension disadvantages which might be 
caused by parental commitment. Given the fact that the majority of those who take 
the main childcare responsibilities are mothers, the effectiveness of care credits in 
compensating for the disadvantages as wage earners is important to women who 
choose to become a mother. In the simulations, all the female models apart from 
Case 1 take some time out of the labour market for childcare purposes.
Figure 7.5 shows the total pensions for Case 1 and Case 2 in the three countries. The 
benefits are broken down into those gained through the contribution as wage earners 
and those gained through care credits for parents. Among all the cases, Case 2 takes 
the shortest leave, one year, and follows exactly the same employment trajectories 
with Case 1 except for this point. The figure shows completely different effects of 
this one-year parental leave on women’s pensions in the three countries.
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Figure 7. 5 Pensions as wage earners and as mothers as per cent of average
men’s pension, Cases 1 and 2
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In Japan, taking one-year parental leave does not make any difference in the final
pension level at all. This confirms the compensatory nature o f the credits for
employees in the Japanese pension system discussed in Chapter 5. On the other hand,
the final benefit level for Case 2 in Germany is higher than that o f Case 1 by about 3
percentage points. This is because mothers in Germany can combine the entitlement
through employment and through motherhood as well as the relatively high value of
the credits. In Case 2 in Germany, however, the credits during the leave does not
fully compensate for the forgone entitlement because her previous earnings level is
slightly higher than average earnings o f the insured. Still, her gains as a mother in
the following two years more than compensate for this loss. Indeed, Case 2 in
Germany gains by far the highest total value o f credits as a mother among the three
countries; equivalent to 4 per cent o f average m en’s pension level. In contrast, in
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Britain, the total benefit level for Case 2 is slightly lower than that o f Case 1 (by 0.1 
percentage point). This is because the former’s previous earnings were much higher 
than what the credits offer.
If, on the other hand, the career break for parenting is for more than 3 years, the 
British system grants the largest proportion o f benefits via care credits among the 
three countries. Figure 7.6 shows the level o f the combined benefits as wage earners 
and as mothers for Case 6 (complete withdrawal from the labour market after 
childbirth).
Figure 7. 6 Pensions as wage earners and as mothers as per cent of average 
men’s pension, Case 6
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The figure demonstrates that women with a long career break are more likely to 
receive a higher proportion o f benefits based on their own ‘contributions’ in Britain 
than in the other two countries.
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Nonetheless, as in the other two countries, the total benefit level of Case 6 does not 
reach the level of Case 2, let alone of Case 1. This is also true with cases 3 to 5, 
which have paid much longer and higher contributions than Case 6 over lifetime as 
wage earners (see Appendix 5). This implies that current care credits in the British 
pension system penalize parenthood, despite its inherent incentives for full-time 
parenthood for an extended period142.
In sum, only the German system has the potential for those with children to exceed 
the benefit level of full-time female employees by combining employment and 
parenthood. Furthermore, the supporting arrangements for employees with children 
under 10 may help to enhance pension levels further for parents. On the other hand, 
for higher-than-average earners, the final pensions are suppressed in Germany 
because the guaranteed value of the credits is the equivalent of average earnings of 
the insured.
In contrast to the German system, the Japanese system does not grant any extra 
benefit to parents for their care work. Although parents on statutory leave are 
guaranteed the same level of pensions as if there was no career break, this credit is 
granted only to those who retain the tie with the employer during the leave. Thus, 
for those who are not employees during the caring period for whatever reasons, 
Japan’s credit system does not help mitigating the pension disadvantage. However, 
for higher-than-average earners, the Japanese care credits can offer more than the 
German equivalent.
142 S2P gives credits to those in full-time parenting for children under 6, while BP offers special 
arrangement for those who stay at home to care for children under 16 (18 if the child is in full-time 
education).
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Compared with these two countries, British parents fare the worst in the sense that 
they are more likely to have their pensions reduced if they take time off for childcare 
purposes despite the generous creditable period in the pension system. Considering 
that the statutory leave fathers can take for childcare reasons does not last even for 
one year in Britain143, the losers of this arrangement in terms of pensions are more 
likely to be mothers.
7.4.3 As wives and widows
The entitlement as wives is traditionally one of the main routes for women to receive 
pensions. In many welfare states, pensions for surviving spouses are a well 
established derived right. Moreover, as a relatively new development, some pension 
systems offer dependent spouses their own benefits through derived rights while their 
partner is still alive.
Nonetheless, considering the precarious nature of the derived rights, especially 
against the backdrop of significant socio-economic changes, it may be argued that a 
better pension system for women is one which is least dependent on the entitlement 
as wives and widows in providing decent benefits for women. To what extent do the 
three countries institutionally rely on the entitlement as wives to provide for women?
Among the three countries, only Britain and Japan have derived benefits payable 
directly to dependent spouses in addition to survivors’ pensions. In the simulations, 
Case 6 (complete withdrawal from the labour market after childbirth) represents the 
life course which should benefit heavily from the entitlement as wives where it exists.
143 The maximum period o f statutory parental leave fathers can take is the shortest in Britain, while 
maternity leave is the longest of the three.
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Figure 7.7 shows the benefit outcomes which include the entitlement as wives but 
exclude survivors’ pensions.
Figure 7. 7 Pensions as wage earners, as mothers and as wives as per cent of 
average men’s pension, Case 6
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□  Wage earner
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Case 6: 10 years full-time —* Withdrawal
As the figure shows, the Japanese system proves to be more generous to 
economically inactive wives than the other two countries. Case 6 in Japan receives 
about the half of average m en’s benefit in total, while the British and German 
counterparts receive 37 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. As a result, Japan has 
the least gap in the total pension amount between Case 1 (continuous employment) 
and Case 6 (complete withdrawal) among the three countries. While the gap 
between the two cases is about 30 percentage points in Japan, it is 49 percentage 
points in Britain and 46 percentage points in Germany (see Appendix 5).
Moreover, the Japanese pension system has the widest definition for ‘dependants’.
Only the Japanese pension system offers derived benefit as wives to Cases 3 to 5,
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pushing their basic pensions to the full benefit level (see Appendix 5). Although 
British women in Cases 3 to 5 also receive full basic pensions, this is due to care 
credits -  Home Responsibilities Protection -  rather than derived rights.
These results demonstrate that the Japanese system uses the derived benefits more 
widely than the other two systems as a safety net against non-coverage. Even if 
women fail to be covered as wage earners or as carers, they can still turn to the 
entitlement as wives in Japan, provided that their husband is insured through EPI. 
Indeed, in Japan, it is possible to receive full BP via the entitlement as a dependent 
spouse. However, this also means that in Japan, life-time marriage is more rewarded 
than motherhood compared with the other two countries. If unemployed and single, 
Japanese people are not entitled to any credits or derived rights even if they are 
parents of young children with main care responsibilities.
Nonetheless, if survivors’ benefits are taken into account, the comparative position of 
each country alters. Figures 7.8.1 to 7.8.3 show the pension levels of model cases in 
widowhood.
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Figure 7. 8. 1 W omen’s total pensions including survivors’ pensions as per cent
of average men’s pension, Britain
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Figure 7. 8. 2 Women’s total pensions including survivors’ pensions as per cent 
of average men’s pension, Germany
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Figure 7. 8. 3 W omen’s total pensions including survivors’ pensions as per cent
of average men’s pension, Japan
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Looking at the total level of pensions in widowhood, Japan now turns out to be the 
least generous. Unlike Britain or Germany, the total benefit level o f widows in the 
simulation for Japan never reaches the equivalent level o f the deceased husband’s. 
This suggests the persistence o f gender inequality in outcome in Japan.
There are, however, noticeable commonalities across the three countries. Firstly, in 
all the three countries, survivors’ pensions significantly narrow the gender pension 
gap. In the case o f Britain, all widows except Case 6 receive levels of pensions
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which even exceed the level of average men’s 144. These results testify to the 
persistent importance of traditional women’s entitlement -  derived rights as widows 
-  for women’s chance to receive the level of pensions comparable to men’s.
Secondly, to a varying degree, almost all model widows in the three countries receive 
a higher level of pensions than Case 1 despite the formers’ lower lifetime earnings. 
This implies single older women’s higher poverty risk in the country. Moreover, in 
Germany and in Japan, the benefit gap among women with differential work histories 
is reduced (in Japanese cases) or sometimes even levelled off (in German cases) in 
widowhood if the late husband’s benefit levels are similar. This suggests possible 
division among women along the line of employment status and marital status.
These outcomes, however, do not fully illustrate women’s prospects for economic 
security in old age. The lower gender inequality in Britain does not necessarily mean 
that British women are better off than those in Japan or in Germany. Important as 
they are, women’s economic well-being in old age is not solely determined by intra- 
generational redistribution and gender equality. The resource distribution between 
the generations and the relative economic position in a society also matter 
considerably. The next section examines the results from the perspective of 
economic welfare in old age.
144 If widows are compared with widowers, it is possible that gender pension gap persists because 
widowers can also inherit half o f the eamings-related pensions o f the deceased spouse in Britain. If 
the eamings-related state pension of the deceased wife is assumed to be the maximum level, that is, 
her earnings over lifetime were at or over upper earnings limit (31,720 pounds in 2004/05) -  the 
widower’s total pension would be 146 per cent o f that o f the benchmark case. If, on the other hand, 
the lifetime earnings of the deceased wife was 65 per cent o f the male average as in the simulation and 
followed the life course similar to Case 2, the total pension o f widowers would be 128 per cent o f the 
benchmark case.
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7.5 Results: Intergenerational redistribution and poverty prevention
Old-age pensions are in effect a form of redistribution between generations. How 
much resources are allocated to pensioners via public pensions varies across 
countries. Among the OECD countries, Britain is often ranked as less generous in 
pension provision, while Germany as one of the most generous and Japan somewhere 
in between (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, in all the three countries, the ability to 
prevent pensioners from receiving means-tested benefits is often considered as a 
litmus test for the success of pension systems. Thus, the relative positions of 
pensions to means-tested benefits are still an important indicator not only of 
adequacy but also of the success of the system. Does the cross-national generosity 
ranking also hold true with the simulation results? How does this affect women with 
various employment trajectories on their economic status in old age? To what extent 
are the pensioners in the simulation better off or otherwise than those on means- 
tested benefits? In order to answer these questions, the benefit level of public 
pensions for each case is compared with national average earnings and the means- 
tested benefits.
Figures 7.9.1 to 7.9.3 show the pension levels of all cases relative to national average 
earnings as well as to the social minimum in each country. Both benefits and 
earnings are after income tax and social security premiums145.
145 Cross-national ranking in gross benefits is the same with that of net benefits, although taxation 
significantly contributes to the redistribution between generations in all the three countries.
Figure 7. 9. 1 Total pensions and social minimum relative to the national 
average earnings, Britain
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Note 1: The line denotes the level o f  social minimum benefits.
Note 2: Those on income support can receive additional benefits such as housing cost or heating. 
However, these benefits are excluded from the benefit levels shown above.
Figure 7. 9. 2 Total pensions and social minimum relative to the national 
average earnings, Germany
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Note 1: The line denotes the level o f social minimum benefits.
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Note 2: Those on income support can receive additional benefits such as housing cost or heating. 
However, these benefits are excluded from the benefit levels shown above.
Figure 7. 9. 3 Total pensions and social minimum relative to the national 
average earnings, Japan
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Note 1: The line denotes the level of social minimum benefits.
Note 2: Those on income support can receive additional benefits such as housing cost or heating. 
However, these benefits are excluded from the benefit levels shown above.
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4 years part-time (40% of male average) —* full-time 
4 years part-time (20% of male average) —» full-time 
► part-time (4 years at 20% —> the rest at 40%)
The simulation results confirm the general order o f pension generosity mentioned 
above. Despite its wide gender inequality, all cases in Germany receive much higher 
relative pensions than in Britain or in Japan. In contrast, British cases, which have
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Case 1: Continuous employment 
Case 2: 10 years full-time —> 1 year break —* 
Case 3: 10  years full-time —*■ 6 years break —► 
Case 4: 10 years full-time —» 6 years break —* 
Case 5: 10 years full-time —> 6 years break —> 
Case 6: 10 years full-time —► Withdrawal
the narrowest gender gap in the benefit level, have the smallest resource share of the 
three countries. Indeed, all cases in Britain receive pensions below the level of 
means-tested benefits. Even the benchmark case is only marginally above the level. 
While survivors’ pensions boost the total amount of women’s pensions above the 
means-tested benefit level except for Cases 1 and 6, they are still hovering around the 
border of the income support level (see Appendix 5). In contrast, in Germany, all the 
benefits for widows except in Case 6 are brought up to about 90 per cent of average 
net earnings (see Appendix 5). This is as much as about the double of what Japanese 
or British widows can expect.
These results suggest that in order to guarantee women’s economic security in old 
age via public pensions, the extent of resource distribution between generations is an 
important factor to be considered. This would be especially the case for those who 
are less likely to have other assets or incomes to supplement the public pensions.
To explore the situations of women who are most disadvantaged in terms of their 
own assets, Case 6 is best suited. Figures 7.10 and 7.11 show the total level of 
pensions for Case 6 in widowhood relative to national average and means-tested 
benefits. As the figure demonstrates, even with Case 6, the German system still 
achieves much higher level of pensions relative to the society average than Japanese 
or British counterparts. In contrast, in Britain, survivors’ pensions do not even bring 
up the pension level to the national minimum. In the British system, the level of 
pensions goes below the means-tested benefits if one lacks or insufficiently accrues 
the entitlement as a parent and a spouse (as in Case 1) or as a wage earner (as in Case 
6). In other words, in Britain, women need to be breadwinners themselves as well as
276
married to a breadwinner in order to gain economic security in old age from public
pensions.
Figure 7. 10 Women’s total pensions in widowhood relative to the national 
average earnings, Case 6
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Figure 7. 11 Total pensions in widowhood relative to social minimum, Case 6
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In sum, women in Germany are more likely to enjoy better standard o f living in old 
age compared with Japanese or British counterparts despite the widest gender gap in 
pension levels. The difference between Germany and the other two countries further 
widen in widowhood. These results point to the importance o f looking at both 
gender relations and intergenerational relations when considering women’s pension 
issues. Furthermore, incomes at 40 per cent o f average earnings being a lower end o f 
often-used poverty lines, pension levels on or below this line in Japan and Britain 
pose questions about the role o f public pensions and raise concerns about the 
economic welfare o f these pensioners.
7.6 Some limitations of the results
In interpreting the results o f the simulations, there are some limitations to bear in 
mind. One is that the employment histories o f model cases are highly standardised
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by necessity. In the real world, unlike the models, women change their employers 
and their employment status more often than men in general. By smoothing the 
employment histories of model cases, the outcomes of simulations may have 
produced higher benefit outcomes than women in reality may actually be able to 
expect. Indeed, one of the serious problems women face is to find a decently paying 
full-time job after a break for child-raising (see Chapter 1).
The possible distortion of resulting benefits is also caused by the fixed rate of pay 
gap across countries. While the pay ratio of average full-time female employees to 
men’s is more than 75 per cent in Britain in 2004, it was about 70 per cent in the 
former West Germany and 65 per cent in Japan. Thus, apart from the problems 
inherent in averaging of wages, the pension results for women in Britain and 
Germany are more likely to be limited to an illustration rather than a closer 
representation of reality.
The third issue to be considered is the effects of number of children on mothers’ 
pension outcomes. While all the mothers in the simulations have only one child, this 
is of course not the case in reality. This is especially relevant to cases in Germany 
where mothers and widows may receive extra benefits or considerations if they have 
two or more children.
The last issue to be taken into account is with regard to widow’s benefits. In the
simulations, all the female cases except for Case 1 are modelled to be married to an
employee with male average earnings. This, of course, is not true in real world, and
thus the resultant benefit level of widows varies significantly and may be much lower
than the model cases. On top of the possibilities of lower widow’s benefits, there are
also risks of no widow’s benefits in reality. Not all women are married, and not all
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marriages last for a lifetime. In the case of non-marriage or divorce, the benefits 
from this route are none or at least significantly reduced. Indeed, concerns for this 
risk have led many welfare states, including Britain, Germany and Japan, to 
introduce new arrangements for pension settlements for divorcees. However, these 
new development are not included in the simulations.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the simulations have revealed the possible 
implications of the inherent assumptions on the relations between women and men, 
between generations and between the state and citizens for women’s old-age 
pensions.
7.7 Summary of the findings and implications for future reforms in Japan
It has often been pointed out that gender gaps in pay, working patterns and 
contribution period are the direct causes of lower women’s pensions. As such, some 
argue that solutions to the issue should be sought by employment policies rather than 
by pension policies (see Chapter 5). According to the proponents of this position, the 
problem is not with the pension system but with the practices in the labour market. 
Nonetheless, the simulation results illustrated significant differences in the extent of 
the gender pension gap and poverty risk in Britain, Germany and Japan despite the 
standardization of pay gap and life courses of the model women. This suggests that 
disadvantages in the labour market can be mitigated by the design of redistribution 
systems in a society such as taxation and social security. Thus, the resultant extent of 
pension gap is not a simple sum of the inequalities during the working life but the 
combination of the workings of the labour market and the pension system. This 
means that gender inequality in pensions can be tackled from these two sides.
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There are four major ways to narrow the gender pension gap via the pension system. 
First is to loosen the link between earnings and benefit levels. The simulation results 
have shown significant effects of a flat-rate tier and a redistributive eamings-related 
tier in narrowing gender gap in pensions. Having the widest gender pay gap of the 
three countries, this kind of measures are needed in Japan more than the other two 
countries to narrow the gender gap in pensions. Although the Japanese pension 
system has a flat-rate tier, the eamings-related tier is not redistributive. Thus, 
Japanese women would benefit significantly from measures such as differential 
formulae for various income bands in the eamings-related part exemplified in Britain.
The redistributive arrangements in the pension system are relevant only to those who 
are included in the system. This leads to the second measure, that is, to make the 
system more inclusive for irregular workers by lowering the threshold to the 
membership. The thresholds can be based on earnings and/ or time. In either case, 
part-time workers and short-time contract workers tend to be excluded from pension 
systems as wage earners. Among the three pension systems, the earnings and time 
thresholds in the Japanese system are the highest. Where Britain and Germany 
include part-time workers in the pension system as wage earners, Japan excludes 
them, leading to their lower total pensions as wage earners. In order not to 
disadvantage irregular workers, therefore, the thresholds should be constructed in 
such a way that most wage earners of various working patterns can be included in the 
system. Having the highest rate of female part-time working of the three countries, 
Japan urgently needs to reconsider its treatment of irregular workers for the purpose 
of pensions.
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The third possible measure to compensate for the disadvantages in the labour market 
is to loosen the link between length of labour market attachment and the level of 
benefits. The reasons for individuals’ shorter contribution periods vary, but women 
often cite care responsibilities as one of the main reasons. Thus, credits for care 
work are one big step forward for boosting women’s pension prospects. While all 
the three countries under consideration have care credits, the least inclusive one can 
be found in Japan. In the country, care credits are regarded as compensation for 
employed parents rather than as rewards for contribution through care work or as a 
means to narrow the gender pension gap (see Chapter 5). In a way, care credits in 
Japan retain a strong link with the labour market. Consequently, as the simulation 
results have shown, mothers in Japan are more likely to be covered as dependent 
wives rather than as parents during their career break compared with their 
counterparts in Britain or in Germany. Considering the limitation of marriage-linked 
derived rights in terms of gender equality and equity among women (see Chapter 5), 
Japan needs further reforms on its care credits in order to better accommodate 
women with care responsibilities in their own right.
Nonetheless, the simulation outcomes have also illustrated the limited effect of care
credits in narrowing the gender gap in final pensions. The results suggest that,
setting aside implications for the gender division of labour, how care credits are
constructed is less influential for narrowing the pension gap than how redistributive
the overall pension system is. In other words, lower earnings is the largest
determining factor of lower benefits, and care credits for children, at least in the
current forms, are not enough to counter the lifetime low pay. This is true even with
the German pension system, which has the most thorough and generous care credits
of the three pension systems examined in this chapter. Despite its generous care
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credits, the gender pension gap in Germany is generally larger than that of Japan or 
Britain. This limited effect of care credits is in a way not surprising given the fairly 
short period the credits can realistically cover out of the whole working life. Thus, 
although care-based entitlement is sometimes considered as the solution to women’s 
pension plights as a means to strengthen women’s individual pension rights, its 
limitation in actual effects on narrowing the gender pension gap should be well 
acknowledged.
The fourth measure to narrow the gender pension gap is granting benefits as 
dependent spouses. The simulation results have shown the significant role played by 
derived benefits, especially survivors’ pensions, in narrowing the gender pension gap 
as well as mitigating the risk of poverty in old age. Although degrees vary between 
cases and across countries, it is noticeable that none of the female hypothetical cases 
succeed in achieving a comparable pension level with men’s without derived benefits. 
Derived benefits are often criticised from a gender perspective as well as from a 
viewpoint of equity and fairness among women (see Chapter 5). However, care 
should be taken in reducing or removing these benefits in order not to risk further 
widening the gender pension gap and/ or threaten women’s economic security in old 
age. This is especially relevant to Japan, which currently uses the entitlement as 
dependants quite extensively to provide for women.
However, in reality, these four points are not necessarily the measures proposed by 
those who advocate gender equality. In the next concluding chapter, the dilemmas of 
gender equality in pensions in Japan are summarised and discussed.
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Part Four
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
The previous chapters have examined the historical trajectories of women’s old-age 
pensions in Japan and analysed the factors which affect women’s economic welfare 
in old age. This concluding chapter summarises the findings and suggests the 
implications for future policies and further research. The chapter first looks at the 
scope and limitations of the thesis. This is followed by discussions on the perceived 
equality and fairness in the process of pension reforms in Japan. The next section 
considers the implications of the way pension issues are problematised in the country 
from a viewpoint of women’s economic welfare in old age and gender equality in 
outcome. Then, policy implications of the study are discussed. The last section 
summarises the contributions of the thesis to the study of state welfare and suggests 
possible directions for further research.
8.1 The scope and limitations of the thesis
Redistribution systems in any welfare state are based on social norms and political 
priorities which shape and are shaped by the way certain issues are considered to be a 
problem. The thesis is an attempt to capture this dynamic in the context of the public 
old-age pension system in Japan. The focus is on the assumptions made about the 
family, gender roles and state welfare that are embedded in the problematisation and 
non-problematisation of certain inequalities in the history of the Japanese pension 
system. The central research questions which have guided this study are firstly, why 
gender inequalities in pension outcomes are rarely problematised in Japan even by 
advocates of gender equality, and secondly, what are the implications of this neglect 
for women’s economic welfare in old age and for gender equality in outcome.
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As the thesis itself has confirmed, ‘women’ are not a monolithic social group. 
Women differ from each other according to their class, marital status, nationality, 
ethnicity and ‘race’ to name but a few. While the thesis has looked at the diversity 
among women in terms of their employment history, the emphasis is put more on 
their similarities rather than infinite differences among them. This is because I 
believe it is strategically important to stress similarities among women rather than 
differences in order to challenge the male-oriented norms and principles embedded in 
the pension system.
The main focus of the thesis is on discourses which try to legitimise certain forms of 
resource distribution within a society. As such, the thesis does not discuss the 
‘affordability’ of the suggested gender equality measures in the pension system. This 
omission can be justified because the research is based on the premise that the 
perception of affordability depends on the legitimation of certain forms of 
redistribution.
Another area which is not addressed in the thesis is occupational pensions and 
private pensions. Inequalities in these forms of pensions are more likely to be greater 
than those in state pensions with significant gender implications. Moreover, recent 
moves to curtail state pensions may enhance the importance of these income sources 
in old age. Nonetheless, there have been few debates on gender equality and fairness 
with regard to occupational and private pensions in Japan. This is partly because the 
membership in these pension schemes is voluntary in principle and thus these 
pensions are perceived as a form of company fringe benefit and/or savings rather 
than a means of redistribution between citizens. Moreover, these pensions are often 
paid in lump-sum or for only limited years rather than life time. Because of these
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differences from public pensions, the thesis has focused on state pensions and 
discourses on equality and fairness in their distribution.
8.2 Problems of women’s pensions: Gender equality, neutrality and difference
Discourses of equality and fairness abound in welfare reforms. The quest for 
equality and fairness, however, does not necessarily mean the pursuit of equality in 
outcomes. Indeed, in recent years in Japan, the dominant discourse on gender 
equality in the pension system does not equate gender equality with equal share of 
resources between women and men but with gender neutrality of the pension 
entitlement. As such, discussions on ‘women’s pension problem’ were centred on 
gender bias embedded in the pension system, which favourably treat male 
breadwinner/ female homemaker households.
The thesis has explored why gender inequalities in pension outcomes are rarely 
problematised in Japan even by advocates of gender equality in recent discussions on 
pension reforms. The answer to this question is sought by examining how a certain 
boundary of state welfare and the way it redistributes resources have been 
problematised or legitimised in the history of the Japanese public old-age pension 
system. In so doing, attention is paid to the changes and continuities of embedded 
assumptions in the pension system, which helped to promote certain approaches to 
competing issues of equality and fairness at certain point of time. These assumptions 
include not only about gender roles but also about inter-generational support and the 
state’s role for welfare provision.
The historical analysis (Chapters 3 to 5) has suggested several factors which have 
contributed to the marginalisation of the issue of the gender pension gap as a
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problem in Japan. These factors are intrinsically connected, reinforcing each other. 
In brief, they are:
the assumption of equal redistribution of resources within a household;
- the narrow definition of contribution; 
the structural division among women;
- the dominant emphasis on gender neutralisation as a route to gender equality 
without challenging the practical male-oriented nature of the pension system, 
and;
the assumption that lifetime employment can lead to economic security in old 
age.
The first contributing factor to be noted is a long established assumption of 
egalitarian intra-household redistribution. Combined with the assumption that most 
people marry to form a male breadwinner/ female homemaker household, this 
assumption has helped to divert attention of the general public from the level of 
women’s individual pension benefits and hence from the significant gender pension 
gap. Due to this assumption, the dominant focus in the debates on pension equality 
has been on the balance of pension levels between different types of households 
rather than between individuals throughout the history of the Japanese pension 
system.
Using the household as a basic unit for equality in outcome legitimised the 
differentiation of benefit levels based on the household type rather than on 
individuals’ contribution. Thus, derived benefits for dependants were continuously
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increased in the 1970s and the 1980s in order to differentiate the benefit levels of 
single households, single earner couple households and dual-earner couple 
households, culminating in the creation of the category No.3 in the 1985 Reform.
Although the legitimacy of the male breadwinner/ female homemaker household as a 
normative model is now under serious attack, the assumption that incomes are pooled 
and shared equally within a household remains generally intact in debates on pension 
reforms. This can be well illustrated by an apparent contradiction of principles 
enacted by some advocates who argue for individualising pension entitlements. 
While some challenge the legitimacy of derived pension entitlement on the grounds 
of unequal share of individuals’ contribution, they seldom oppose the use of 
households as a base unit when discussing appropriateness of the level of pension 
benefits (for example, Shiota 2000). In a way, this is understandable because family 
members are obliged by law to support each other. However, the legally backed 
norm cannot be equated with actual situations. Moreover, even if incomes are shared 
equally within a household, the roles as a provider (usually husband) and as a 
dependant (usually wife) have significant implications for power relations between 
them. Indeed, this inequality in power relations has been a fundamental cause for the 
feminists’ attack on the gender division of labour within the household. It is ironic, 
therefore, that even those who support the individualisation of pension entitlement on 
the grounds of gender-reinforcing effects of derived benefits often seem to accept the 
assumption of egalitarian intra-household redistribution by their relative silence on 
the issue of pension inequality in outcome between wife and husband.
Another contributing factor is a narrow definition of ‘contribution’ in the Japanese 
public pension system, whereby the ‘contribution’ is solely equated with premium
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payment. When the strong link between the levels of benefit and paid premium is 
unquestioned in the name of an insurance principle, differential benefit levels among 
pensioners, including the pension gap between women and men, are more likely to 
be accepted as fair consequences rather than problematised as unequal. This can be 
in a way understood as a deliberate policy of the government. In the course of 
pension development, the Japanese government has repeatedly emphasised that the 
Japanese pension system is based on social insurance principle, which requires 
premium payment for the receipt of benefits. While there are calls for switching the 
finance of the pension system from an insurance based system to a tax based system, 
few policy makers have forcefully argued that other activities such as unpaid care 
work should also constitute contribution. On the other hand, those who stress the 
redistributive nature of social insurance are now on defence. The need for further 
redistribution in the Japanese social insurance system has been rarely discussed in 
debates on pension reform. Indeed, although care credits were introduced in the 
1990s for parents in the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI), they were framed more 
as a part of family policies rather than as the recognition of the value of care work or 
a measure to improve women’s pensions. As the Japanese word for ‘contribution’ 
suggests, contribution for social insurance (hokenryo, literally, fees for insurance) is 
understood as a completely different entity from contribution in a general sense 
(kdken, literally, contribution).
The division among women in the pension system has also helped to marginalise the
issue of the gender pension gap as a policy problem. Because the dominant
discourses on ‘women’s pension problem’ are focused on the conflicting interests of
various categories of women, their similarly disadvantaged position as women, who
generally receive much lower pension benefits than men due mainly to heavier load
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of unpaid work and fewer gains from the labour market, is often neglected. The 
division among women in the pension system was first created at the introduction of 
National Pension (NP), when non-employee wives were divided between mandatory 
members (wives of the self-employed) and voluntary members (wives of employees). 
The division among women deepened from the 1970s as the derived pension rights 
of the latter were strengthened and the number of dual-earner employee households 
increased. As public pensions began being regarded as an important source of 
income in old age, married women’s lack of or weak entitlement to old-age pensions 
upon divorce was repeatedly taken up as a problem. However, constrained by the 
narrow definition of the ‘contribution’, the issue was sought to be solved by 
improving derived benefits rather than attempting to better accommodate women as 
contributors. This manifested itself in the creation of the category No.3 -  no 
obligation of premium payment for full pensions -  in the 1985 Reform and the 
introduction of pension splitting upon divorce in the 2004 Reform. However, 
because those who can benefit from these arrangements are limited to dependent 
spouses of the EPI insured, these derived benefits are often perceived as an extra 
burden without benefits by people excluded from the arrangement such as single 
persons, the No.l insured and dual-earner couples. The issue was increasingly 
framed as a problem of free riders (housewives) versus contributors (female 
employees and wives of the self-employed). As such, the focus of criticism is often 
on ‘housewives’ rather than on husbands who are free-riders of women’s unpaid 
work and beneficiaries of the male-centred pension system, obscuring the gender 
pension gap as a problem.
Another contributing factor to the marginalisation of the gender pension gap as a
problem in recent pension reforms is the dominant discourse which emphasises
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gender neutralisation as a route to gender equality without challenging the practical 
male-oriented nature of the pension system. When the gender bias in a welfare 
system is problematised, derived benefits often become a target of criticism. Indeed, 
prominent feminists, especially academics, have criticised derived pension benefits 
as manifestations of underlying gender bias for the male breadwinner/ female 
homemaker household model, which encourages women’s economic dependency. 
Moreover, in the case of Japan, it is difficult to defend derived benefits as women’s 
practical interests or as rights based on contribution through unpaid work. This is 
because of the division between women along the line not only of their own 
employment status but also of their marital status and their spouse’s employment 
status. Nonetheless, opinion polls still suggest strong support among the general 
public for derived benefits, including the most controversial arrangement of the 
premium exemption for dependent spouses (the No.3 insured). As a result, debates 
on gender equality in the pension system tend to be centred on the appropriateness of 
the removal of derived rights. Left unproblematised are the underlying gender bias 
for male workers (such as the disregard of unpaid work as contribution and other 
disadvantagedeous rules for women as wage earners) and the resultant gender 
pension gap.
Using the male worker as the basis of the model pension can be traced back to the
origin of the Japanese public pension system, which was based on the strong
assumption of the gender division of labour. Established as a means to control
industrial labour during the Pacific War, the first public pension schemes were
exclusively for regular workers. Because of the dominant norms and assumptions of
women’s primary roles as wife and mother, female workers were treated in the
public pension system as temporary members. The strong belief in the differential
292
social roles of women and men even led to the perception of their equal treatment as 
unfair.
This underlying assumption on gender roles did not change substantially in post-war 
Japan. In the era of pension growth, EPI benefits were improved so as to live up to 
the claim that the benefits were to provide for the household via the male 
breadwinner rather than for individuals. This pre-empted the question of gender 
equality in pension outcome. Women were expected to benefit from EPI through 
their husband, thus they were not expected to receive the equivalent level of pensions 
with men, who were the breadwinners. While this kind of explicit assumption of the 
gender division of labour is now widely regarded as problematic, the male-oriented 
nature of the pension system itself is still largely left unquestioned. Therefore, the 
‘gender neutralisation’ in the current form -  accepting the male model as the norm -  
has a danger of accepting gender inequality in outcomes as a neutral consequence 
and thus ‘fair’.
Related to all these factors is the last contributing factor for the general neglect of 
gender gap in pensions as a problem, that is, the lack of questioning of the 
assumption that those who have engaged in paid employment for lifetime would be 
able to receive sufficient pensions in their own right. This assumption obscures the 
issue of possible economic vulnerability of those who have been in the labour market 
over their lifetime. This assumption is well illustrated in another assumption that 
poor single women are predominantly widows or divorcees so that the risk of poverty 
among solo-living older women can be mitigated by strengthening derived rights. 
However, even if we suppose these assumptions are valid for today’s pensioners, this 
does not mean that they remain valid for all female pensioners in the future.
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There are two main reasons for this scepticism. One is the recent changes in the 
extent in the state responsibility for providing economic welfare in old age. As a 
result of recent pension reforms, the explicitly stated guaranteed level of public 
pension benefits has been significantly curtailed. The other reason for the concerns 
about women’s pensions in their own right is the persisting gender inequality in paid 
and unpaid work. Due to their disadvantaged position as wage earners, women are 
more likely to receive lower pensions than men even if they have engaged in full­
time employment for most of their lives. Considering these two issues, it can be said 
that the failure to take up the gender pension gap as a policy problem not only leaves 
the situation intact but also risks the danger of further threatening women’s economic 
welfare in old age. However, few have questioned whether women’s life-time paid 
employment can guarantee them economic security in old age in their own right.
8.3 Gender equality in outcome and women’s economic welfare in old age
In response to the general neglect of issues with regard to the gender pension gap, 
this thesis has examined, firstly, whether this neglect is justified by the economic 
situation of the contemporary elderly and, then, considered the implications of the 
neglect of women’s economic welfare in old age and gender equality in outcome.
The examination of income statistics of the elderly in the mid-1990s has revealed
that, although the level of incomes of the elderly as a group was not significantly
lower than that of younger generations, income inequality among the elderly was
quite significant in Japan. Moreover, women as a group were worse off than men
using any measures when individual incomes are compared. Cross-national
comparison also demonstrated that the extent of both intra-generational inequality in
old age and the gender pension gap was significantly greater in Japan than in Britain
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and Germany -  two European countries which have many commonalities with Japan 
in their gender models and the public pension systems. These results suggest that the 
relative marginalisation of the issue of the gender pension gap as a problem in Japan 
is not justifiable based on incomes of the contemporary elderly.
In order to explore the implications of the dominant way of problematisation of 
women’s pensions, simulations based on hypothetical individual models were 
conducted -using the pension rules of Britain, Germany and Japan. The simulation 
demonstrated:
significant cross-national difference in the extent of the gender pension gap 
despite the standardisation of model life courses and earnings over lifetime;
the limitation of care credits; and,
- the importance of derived rights for women’s economic security in old age.
The first finding to note is that the design of the pension system matters for the 
gender pension gap. Although many policy makers in Japan argue that the gender 
pension gap is a mere reflection of gender inequality in the labour market and thus 
the solution should be sought through employment policies (for example, Hori 1997), 
the simulation results demonstrated that the design of the pension system is also an 
important factor for the gender pension gap.
This also raises a question about the purported ‘gender-neutrality’ of the pension
system in Japan. In many western countries, this questioning has led feminists to
criticise the male-centred nature of the apparent ‘gender neutrality’ of the pension
system in the last couple of decades. As a possible measure to redress this male-
oriented nature of the system, care credits have been introduced in some countries in
the hope of compensating for pension disadvantages due to care commitments.
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Japan has also introduced care credits in the 1990s, although their scope is quite 
limited and the feminist nature of their origin is dubious.
Despite this apparently positive development for women’s pension rights, the 
simulation results have implied that these credits can be limited in their effect in 
narrowing the gender pension gap. The negative effect of women’s life-time lower 
wages can be much larger than the positive effect of care credits, at least in the three 
pension systems under consideration. Thus, pension systems which redistribute 
more between lower and higher incomes but have only moderate care credits such as 
in Britain have a narrower gender pension gap than those which redistribute less 
between different income groups but have generous care credits such as in Germany. 
This suggests that policies for ‘valuing care work’ need to be accompanied by 
redistributive measures between haves and have-nots in order to substantially narrow 
the gender pension gap.
Another relevant finding with regard to the gender pension gap is the importance of 
derived benefits in narrowing the inequality. None of the three pension systems are 
successful in bringing up women’s pensions to a comparable level to men’s without 
the help of derived benefits. This is especially the case with the Japanese pension 
system, which relies extensively on derived benefits to provide for women in old age. 
Ironically, however, the legitimacy of derived benefits has been most severely 
challenged in Japan. Nonetheless, considering these findings, caution should be 
exercised concerning the moves to remove or curtail derived benefits. Otherwise, the 
current dominant way of problematisation of women’s pensions in Japan -  gender 
neutralisation -  can lead to the continuation or even worsening of the gender pension 
gap in general.
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8.4 Policy implications
In Japan, as elsewhere, recent debates on pension reform are mostly focused on the 
issues of intergenerational equity and sustainability of the state pension system. 
Citing the improved economic situations of pensioners and further advancement of 
population ageing, the dominant discourses of public pension reforms have shifted to 
a fairer share of ‘burden’ between generations and smaller state welfare. Against this 
backdrop, pensioners’ economic security in general seems to be no longer a major 
concern in recent pension reforms in Japan. In the 2004 Reform, the benefit level 
was cut across the board without much effort to tackle inequality among pensioners. 
These recent moves are more likely to lead to a widening of the gender pension gap 
and threats to women’s economic security in old age.
In order to counter the worsening prospects of women’s pensions, more efforts 
should be made to attract general attention to the persisting gender pension gap as 
well as to women’s economic insecurity in old age. Given the limited prospect of 
increasing the average resources per pensioner due to their growing number and 
proportion, the most effective strategy to improve the pension prospects for women 
is to question the unequal distribution between women and men within generations. 
As noted above, the simulation results have implied the indispensability of derived 
rights for many women, at least under current situations and in the immediate future, 
in order to gain better gender equality in outcome and economic security in old age. 
Thus, rather than prioritising the redress of unfair distribution of resources among 
women through removing the derived benefits, it may be more fruitful to start with 
the question of why women should be systematically receiving a lower pensions than 
men under the existing pension system.
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However, in reality, this kind of question is not usually the one taken up by those 
who argue for gender equality. From the 1990s onwards in Japan, the most pressing 
problem for gender equality in pensions has often been depicted as the gender 
assumptions in the pension system rather than the gender gap in pension benefits. 
This way of framing the problem tends to emphasise the negative side of derived 
rights such as the gender reinforcing effects of these rights or inequality among 
women. Indeed, this has led some prominent feminists arguing for removing 
‘housewife privileges’ in the name of gender equality.
Here, the insights of discourse analysis of policy problems are useful (see chapter 1). 
What power relations are challenged and not challenged in this way of formulation of 
a pension problem? The answers are multiple. However, it would be difficult to 
include power relations between women and men as an answer, if economic 
inequality is taken as a sign of power inequality as many feminists historically did. 
In other words, neither removal of derived benefits nor inclusion of part-time 
working women in the pension system as wage earners would undermine men’s 
generally higher gains from the public pension system. Rather, the more the pension 
system becomes apparently gender neutral, the more legitimate the gender pension 
gap would appear to be.
If, on the other hand, the focus is shifted to gender inequality in outcome, the efforts 
to achieve gender equality in pensions would move to a different place. If the gender 
gap in pensions is problematised, a question why women’s pensions are 
systematically lower than men’s should arise. Rather than focusing on removing 
provisions based on the male breadwinner/ female homemaker model, therefore, 
more attention would be paid to reforming the norm based on male life courses
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embedded in the pension system. Without questioning the male-oriented norm 
embedded in the system, ‘gender neutralisation’ is in effect synonymous with 
assimilation with the male-centred norm. In the actual society where care work is 
predominantly shouldered by women, this means the legitimation of the status quo of 
gender inequality in outcome, or even aggravating it. As feminist scholarship on 
citizenship has revealed, the pursuit of ‘gender equality’ through assimilation to male 
model would result in women’s second-class position with a guise of gender 
neutrality.
On the other hand, theories on citizenship from a gender perspective also suggest that 
‘gender neutralisation’ can be a powerful companion to the movement for substantial 
gender equality, if it is based on critiques of men’s absence from care work. If based 
on a new norm of adult citizens as paid and unpaid workers, a resultant pension 
system could better accommodate contributions through care work as equivalent to 
paid work. For this direction, care credits in the German pension system offer a good 
example in the sense that they allow those who combine paid and unpaid work to 
accrue more pension rights than those who are engaged in only one of these. In order 
not to penalise various combinations of paid and unpaid work, disadvantages for 
non-full-time wage earners in the pension system should also be minimised.
In this context, derived benefits can be understood as a practical short- to mid-term 
measure to supplement benefits in one’s own right until the latter change into a more 
gender neutral form in order to achieve the main objective, that is, gender equality in 
economic power and economic welfare in old age. Indeed, if the inequality between 
wives of the No.l insured and those of the No.2 insured is perceived as unfair and 
thus problematic, the demand should be for an extension of derived benefits to the
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former rather than for their removal. Rather than removing an existing safety net 
from those who need one in one way or other, the effort should be focused on 
strengthening it and extending it to those who are also in need.
Considering the increasing job insecurity and diversity in working patterns as well as 
moral and practical imperatives to participate more in unpaid work for men, a 
pension system which can better accommodate workers with lower earnings, 
‘atypical’ working patterns and care responsibilities should benefit not only women 
but also men.
8.5 Contribution of the thesis and directions for further research
The contribution of this thesis is two-fold. One is its empirical contribution to the 
research body which emphasises the role of ideas in the policy making process. The 
examination of the pension history in Japan has demonstrated that the old-age 
pension system is a manifestation of dominant assumptions on relations between 
genders, between generations and between the state and individuals. The legitimacy 
of state welfare is strongly influenced by dominant perceptions of equality and 
fairness of the resource distribution, which is based on certain assumptions about the 
above relations. The study has confirmed that assumptions on these relations not 
only challenge the existing pension arrangements in the name of equality and 
fairness but also legitimise or obscure certain inequalities.
This thesis also seeks to contribute to critical studies from a gender perspective by 
exploring the dilemma of gender equality and difference played out in the debates on 
women’s pension problems in Japan. Feminists in Japan have long criticised the 
public pension system as gender unequal. However, the dominant proposals for
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gender equality are different before and after the 1985 Reform. Before the reform, 
advocates of gender equality problematised women’s weak pension rights. As a 
practical measure for redress, many argued for improving derived benefits for 
housewives to narrow the gender pension gap. By contrast, after the 1985 Reform, 
many prominent feminists problematised derived benefits for dependent spouses. 
They argued that those arrangements would in effect encourage the status quo of the 
gender division of labour and thus power inequality between women and men. Thus, 
their demand was usually centred on gender neutralisation of the pension system. 
Nonetheless, this strategy for gender equality also has a danger of perpetuating the 
status quo of gender power inequality because it does not necessarily distinguish 
between gender neutrality and assimilation to a male model.
The research has demonstrated the multi-faceted nature of the concept of gender 
equality by showing the contrasting and conflicting policy proposals in the name of 
gender equality. This study has also confirmed the importance for feminists to judge 
any policy proposals from a viewpoint of possible impact on resource distribution 
between women and men by pointing out the possibilities that some policies in the 
name of gender equality can actually further deprive women of resources. As 
material inequality has significant implications for power relations (Phillips 1999), 
policies which lack the viewpoint of equality in outcome may reinforce or even 
aggravate unequal power relations between women and men. In order to challenge 
the unequal distribution of resources between women and men in old age, more 
critical attention should be paid to any taken-for-granted assumptions, which 
legitimise and obscure power relations embedded in the pension system.
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In this sense, empirical research on the resource distribution within the elderly 
household in Japan and its relation with the intra-household power relations would 
help to further reveal the gender implications of pension policies.
Another research area which would contribute to discussions on pension equality in 
outcome is on those who are excluded from the public pension schemes for 
employees. With the growing casualisation of employment, increasing numbers of 
people, both women and men, are employed on a casual basis without being covered 
by public pension schemes as employees. Moreover, some of them do not pay the 
premium for compulsory National Pension and are thus excluded from any public 
pension schemes. Studies in this area would further reveal the underlying 
assumptions in the public pension system, with which fewer and fewer people can 
comply.
The third research area which would benefit discussions on pension outcomes is 
research based on longitudinal data. While simulations based on hypothetical 
individual life courses can illustrate the structural factors of the unequal outcome in 
the pension system, simulations based on actual longitudinal data can suggest better, 
albeit still limited, prediction of the pension prospect based on the actual life courses 
of the population. For this purpose, the new panel surveys started in 2001 have a 
great potential146.
Further research in these directions would be able to point a way forward to go 
beyond the dilemma between gender equality and difference and suggest pension
146 21 seiki Judan Chosa (21st Century Paney Surveys). For brief outlines, see 
http://www.mhlw.go.ip/toukei/itiran/gaivo/k-iinkou.html.
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policies which enable individuals, both women and men, to achieve autonomy in old 
age.
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Appendix 1 Pension adjustments in Britain, Germany and Japan 
Britain
The benefits are indexed to price inflation for Basic State Pension and to national 
production growth for State Second Pension in principle. When calculating the 
eamings-related pension, the value of earlier years’ contribution is adjusted in line 
with the growth in national production.
Germany
The benefits are indexed to gross wages. As a result of the 2001 Reform, the 
adjustment rate takes into account changes in the premium rate for pension insurance 
schemes (of both public pensions and newly established private pensions) and in the 
ratio of pensioners to contributors.
The legislation requires that the target pension level (before tax but after social 
insurance premium deduction) for the ‘standard’ pensioners should be 46 per cent of 
the average wage (before tax but after social insurance premium deduction) until 
2020, and 43 per cent until 2030.
Japan
The benefits are adjusted to the growth rate of net wages for the newly retired. For 
the pensioners aged 68 and over, the benefits are indexed to price inflation.
As a result of the 2004 reform, the adjustment rate takes into account the ratio of
pensioners to contributors and changes in life expectancy until 2023. According to
the government projections, this amounts to about 15 per cent reduction of benefits
in real value by 2030. The legislation requires, however, that the replacement rate of
304
the model pension147 should not fall below 50 per cent of the national average wage. 
The adjustment rate is obtained by the formula below:
Growth in net wages -  Rate of decrease in the insured x 0.997 (Fixed rate for life expectancy 
factor)
147 Unlike the conventional usage, this ratio is between the gross pension benefits o f a model couple 
and the male average earnings net o f tax and social insurance contributions.
Appendix 2 Taxation, Social Security Contributions and Net Wages 
Table A 2 .1 Tax and social insurance rates, Britain (2004)
Income Tax Allowances
Personal allowance £4,745
Personal allowance for people aged 65 -  74 £6,830
Personal allowance for people aged 75 and over £6,950
(Income limit for age-related allowances) £18,900
Taxable Bands
Starting rate - 10% £0 -  £2,020
Basic rate - 22% £2,021 -£31,400
Higher rate - 40% Over £31,400
Social Security Contributions (per week)
Up to lower earnings limit - 0% £79
Between lower earnings limit and primary threshold 
- 0% but counted in
£80-£90
Between primary threshold and upper earnings limit - 11% £91 -£610
Above upper earnings limit - 1% Over £610
Source: Taxing Wages (OECD 2005); Inland Revenue website
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Table A2. 2 The income and tax of employees in different circumstances, Britain
Wage level
(as per cent of male average 
earnings)
100% 65% 40% 20%
Average
(full-time)
1 Gross earnings (per annum) 24,236 15,753 9,694 4,847 22,060
2 Standard tax allowance 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745
Basic allowance 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745 4,745
3 Taxable income: 1-2 19,491 11,008 4,949 102 17,315
4 Tax liability 4,046 2,179 846 10 3,567
10% 202 202 202 10 202
22% 3,844 1,977 644 0 3,365
40% 0 0 0 0 0
5 Tax credit 0 0 0 0 0
Children 0 0 0 0 0
6 Income tax: 4-5 4,046 2,179 846 10 3,567
7 Compulsory social security contributions 2,666 1,733 1,066 533 2,427
8 Net earnings: 1-6-7 17,524 11,841 7,782 4,304 16,067
* The average earning is a median value of full-time workers.
Source for the male average earnings: Annual Survey o f Hours and Earnings, Office for National 
Statistics (2004)
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Table A2. 3 Tax and social insurance rates, Germany (2004)
Income Tax Allowances
Basic allowance None
Dependent spouse None, but joint assessment is possible
Dependent children €2,904 per child for single parents, 5,808 for couples
Work-related expenses €920
Special expenses €36
Deduction for social 
security contributions
1. Up to €3068: Deductible amount = contributions up 
to €3,068 -  Gross wage x 0.16
2. Remaining contributions up to €1,334
3. Half of the remaining expenses up to €667
Tax Credits
Dependent children €1,848/ child for the first 3 children, €2,148 for the 
fourth onwards. If the value of the tax credit is less than 
tax allowances, the tax allowances are used instead.
Taxable Bands: X = taxable income, Y  = (X -  7664)/ 10000, Z =  (X  -  12739)/ 10000
0% €7,664 or less
(793.10Y +1600)Y Between €7,665 and €12,739
(265.78Z + 2405)Z +1016 Between €12,740 and €52,151
0.48X - 8,845 €52,152 and above
Solidarity surcharge 5.5% of the income tax liability
Social Security Contributions: for those with annual earnings at least €4800
Employees Pensioners
Pension 9.75% (ceiling €61,800), 11% by 2030 N/A
Health 7% (ceiling €41,856) 7%
Long-term care 0.85% (ceiling €41,856) 1.7%
Unemployment 3.25% (ceiling €61,800) N/A
Source: Taxing Wages (OECD 2005)
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Table A2. 4 The income and tax of employees in different circumstances, 
Germany
Wage level
(as per cent of male average 
earnings)
100% 65% 40% 20% Average(insured)
1 Gross earnings 46,164 30,007 18,466 9,233 29,375
2 Standard tax allowances 2,957 2,957 2,082 2,547 2,957
Dependent children 0 0 0 0 0
Deduction for social security 
contributions
2,001 2,001 1,126 1,591 2,001
Em ploym ent incom e deduction 920 920 920 920 920
Other 36 36 36 36 36
3 Taxable income: 1-2 43,207 27,050 16,384 6,686 26,418
4 Income tax liability 10,811 5,002 1,928 0 4,803
5 Tax credit 0 0 0 0 0
6 Solidarity surcharge 595 275 106 0 264
7 Income tax: 4-5+6 11,405 5,277 2,034 0 5,067
8 Compulsory social security 
contributions (total)
9,864 6,631 4,081 2,040 6,492
Pension insurance (11%) 5,078 3,301 2,031 1,016 3,231
Sickness insurance (7%) 2,930 2,100 1,293 646 2,056
Long-term care insurance (0.85% ) 356 255 157 78 250
Unem ploym ent insurance (3.25% ) 1,500 975 600 300 955
9 Net earnings: 1-7-8 24,895 18,098 12,351 7,192 17,816
Source for the male average earnings: Statistisches Jahrbuch 2004
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Table A2. 5Tax and social insurance rates, Japan (2004)
Income Tax Allowances
Local Central
Basic allowance ¥330,000 ¥380,000
Dependent
spouse
¥330,000 ¥380,000
Dependents 
(per person)
Minimum of ¥330,000 
person
per Minimum of ¥380,000 per 
person
Social security 
contributions
All contributions
Earnings through 
employment
Allowance Income bands
¥650,000 ¥1.625 million or below
40% Above ¥1.625 million to ¥1.8 million
30% with tax credit 
¥180,000
Above ¥1.8 million to ¥3.6 million
20% with tax credit 
¥540,000
Above ¥3.6 million to ¥6.6 million
10% with tax credit ¥1.2 
million
Above ¥6.6 million to ¥10 million
5% with tax credit ¥1.7 
million
Above ¥10 million
Incomes through 
public pensions
Allowance Income bands
¥1.2 million ¥3.3 million or less
Pension income x 25% 
with tax credit ¥375,000
Above ¥3.3 million and below ¥4.1 
million
Pension income x 15% 
with tax credit ¥785,000
Above ¥4.1 million and below ¥7.7 
million
Pension income x 5% 
with tax credit 
¥1,555,000
Above ¥7.7 million
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Taxable Bands*
Local Tax Central Tax
5% ¥2 million or less 10% ¥3.3 million or less
10%, tax credit of 
¥100,000
¥7 million or less 20%, tax credit 
¥330,000
¥9 million or less
13%, tax credit 
¥310,000
Over ¥7 million 30%, tax credit 
¥1.23 million
¥18 million or less
37%, tax credit 
¥2.49 million
Over ¥18 million
Social Security Contributions
Employees Pensioners
Pension 9.15% (2017 onwards) N/A
Health 4.1% 15%**
Long-term care 0.555%
Unemployment 0.8% N/A
* The tax rate for each income band is applied to the total income.
**The rate differs across municipalities, thus, this rate is for illustration purpose only.
1. Those aged 65 and over with income o f ¥1.25 million or below after public pension income 
deduction are exempted from local tax.
2. Although the rate for the long-term care part o f National Health Insurance Tax is reduced by 25% if 
all of the household members are exempted from local income tax, the simulations ignore this 
reduction for simplification.
3. Contributions for National Health Insurance can be treated either as premium or as tax depending 
on the municipal regulations. In either case, however, the money paid is deductible for national 
income tax purposes.
4. Survivor’s benefits are exempt from income tax and National Health Insurance Tax.
Source: Taxing Wages (OECD 2005); National Tax Agency website
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Table A2. 6 Standard remuneration for pension contribution148, Japan (2004)
Grade Nominal
remuneration
Actual monthly 
remuneration
Grade Nominal
remuneration
Actual monthly 
remuneration
1 ¥98,000 Below ¥101,000 16 ¥260,000 ¥250,001¥270,000
2 ¥104,000 ¥101,001¥107,000
17 ¥280,000 ¥270,001¥290,000
3 ¥110,000 ¥107,001¥114,000
18 ¥300,000 ¥290,001¥310,000
4 ¥118,000 ¥114,001¥122,000
19 ¥320,000 ¥310,001¥330,000
5 ¥126,000 ¥122,001¥130,000
20 ¥340,000 ¥330,001¥350,000
6 ¥134,000 ¥130,001¥138,000
21 ¥360,000 ¥350,001¥370,000
7 ¥142,000 ¥138,001¥146,000
22 ¥380,000 ¥370,001¥395,000
8 ¥150,000 ¥146,001¥155,000
23 ¥410,000 ¥395,001¥425,000
9 ¥160,000 ¥155,001¥165,000
24 ¥440,000 ¥425,001¥455,000
10 ¥170,000 ¥165,001¥175,000
25 ¥470,000 ¥455,001¥485,000
11 ¥180,000 ¥175,001¥185,000
26 ¥500,000 ¥485,001¥515,000
12 ¥190,000 ¥185,001¥195,000
27 ¥530,000 ¥515,001¥545,000
13 ¥200,000 ¥195,001¥210,000
28 ¥560,000 ¥545,001¥575,000
14 ¥220,000 ¥210,001¥230,000
29 ¥590,000 ¥575,001¥605,000
15 ¥240,000 ¥230,001¥250,000
30 ¥620,000 ¥605,001 and over
148 In order to avoid frequent changes in the level o f monthly contributions, earnings are categorised 
into 30 bands or ‘grades’ and the amount of each grade shown in the table is used as a base for 
contribution calculations rather than actual amount of earnings.
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Table A2. 7 The income and tax of employees in different circumstances, Japan
Wage level (as per cent of 
male average earnings) 100% 65% 40% 20%*
Average
earnings**
1 Gross earnings 5,427,000 3,527,550 2,170,800 1,085,400 4,854,000
2 Standard tax allowances (central) 2,777,720 2,143,465 1,526,794 1,030,000 2,608,838
Basic allowance 380,000 380,000 380,000 380,000 380,000
Dependants 0 0 0 0 0
Deduction for social security 
contributions 772,320 525,200 315,554 0 718,038
Employment income 
deduction 1,625,400 1,238,265 831,240 650,000 1,510,800
3 Taxable income (central): 1-2 2,649,280 1,384,085 644,006 55,400 2,245,162
4 Income tax (central) 264,928 138,408 64,401 5,540 224,516
5 Standard tax allowances (local) 2,727,720 2,093,465 1,476,794 980,000 2,558,838
Basic allowance 330,000 330,000 330,000 330,000 330,000
Dependants 0 0 0 0 0
Deduction for social security 
contributions 772,320 525,200 315,554 0 718,038
Employment income 
deduction 1,625,400 1,238,265 831,240 650,000 1,510,800
6 Taxable income (local): 1-5 2,699,280 1,434,085 694,006 105,400 2,295,162
7 Local tax 169,928 71,704 34,700 5,270 129,516
8 Compulsory social security contributions (total) 772,320 525,200 315,554 0 718,038
Pension insurance 483,120 329,400 197,640 0 450,180
Health insurance 216,480 147,600 88,560 0 201,720
Long-term care insurance 29,304 19,980 11,988 0 27,306
Unemployment insurance 43,416 28,220 17,366 0 38,832
(Continues)
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(Continued)
9 Net earnings: 1-5-9-10 4,219,824 2,792,237 1,756,145 1,074,590 3,781,930
* In the calculations, they are considered as dependants of the employed partner, thus, they are exempt 
from social security contributions.
** The average earning is a mean value of full-time male and female workers.
Source for the wages: Basic Survey on Wage Structure (2004)
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Appendix 3 Examples of pension calculations (benchmark cases) 
Britain
Weekly basic pension benefits =
Full pension x  Q ualifying years*/ (44 -  (Years for Hom e Responsibilities Protection))
* Qualifying years ^  44
F ull b asic  p en sio n  is  £79 .60  in 2004. The benefit level is adjusted to price inflation. 
Annual earnings-related pension benefits:
The benefits are calculated in two steps. Firstly, the earnings for each qualifying 
year are broken down into earnings bands and multiplied by different rate as below. 
Then, the obtained values are added up and divided by 49.
Bandwidths for 2004/05 Percentage rate
Band 1 £ 4 ,1 0 8 -£ 1 1 ,6 0 0 40 per cent
Band 2 £11,601 -£ 2 6 ,6 0 0 10 per cent
Band 3 £26,601 -£ 3 1 ,7 2 0 20 per cent
In the simulations, the government projection of real production growth -  2 per cent 
per annum -  is used in order to determine the level of full basic pension benefits and 
earnings-related pension benefits in the monetary value of 2004. The benchmark 
model case has contributed for 45 years, although the contribution period is 
calculated as 44 years for Basic Pension due to the ceiling. Thus, the benefit level 
for the benchmark case is obtained as follows;
W eekly basic pension benefits = 79.60 x (1- 0 .02)45 x  44 /44  =  79.60 x  0.9845 x  1 #= 32.07
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Annual earnings-related pension benefits =
(45 (11.600 -  4.108")) x 0.4 + (45 (24.236 -  11.600)) x 0.1 + 0 x 0.2 4= 3,912.61 
49
Weekly earnings-related pension benefits = 3,912.61/ 52 =? 75.24
Thus, the pension benefits for benchmark case in Britain is:
Weekly pension benefits = 32.07 + 75.24 = 107.31 
Annual pension benefits = 107.31 x 52 =? 5,580
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Germany
Monthly pension benefits = PEP x Pension Type Factor x AR 
PEP: Personal Income Points (personliche Entgeltpunkte)
Personal income point of a year can be obtained by dividing one’s wage by the 
average wage of the insured people in the year. In 2004, one income point is 29,375. 
Thus, PEP of the benchmark case is:
PEP = 46,164 / 29,375 x 45 4= 70.72
Pension Type Factor: A value is given according to the type of the benefit. In the 
case of old-age pensions, the value is 1.0.
AR: Current Pension Value (aktueller Rentenwert)
Current Pension Value (AR) corresponds to the monthly pension paid to an average 
earner for each insured year. It is adjusted annually by a statutory formula. AR is 
calculated using the following formula:
ARt = ARt-i x BEm x 100 -  AVAt.i -  RVBt-i x ((1 - RQtT) x a +1)
BEt-2 100 -  A V A t.2 -  RVBt-2 RQt-2
Where:
ARt = new current pension value to be determined 
ARt-i = current pension value in effect (West)
BEt-i = average gross wage earned during the previous year 
BEt-2 = average gross wage earned two years before
RVBn = contribution rate to the statutory pension insurance in the previous year
RVBt-2  = contribution rate to the statutory pension insurance two years before
AVAt-i = share paid into additional private old-age scheme in the previous year = 4%
AVAt-2 = share paid into additional private old-age scheme two years before = 4%
RQt-i = pensioner quotient = equivalence pensioner/ equivalence contribution payer 
in the previous year
RQt-2 = pensioner quotient = equivalence pensioner/ equivalence contribution payer 
two years before
a = statutory determined distribution weight = 0.25
However, in this thesis, the officially recognised floor replacement rate of 43 per cent 
until the year 2030 is used149 for the base of calculation in order to determine AR of a 
certain year beyond 2030 in the monetary value of 2004. Thus, AR is:
Gross standard pension -  social insurance contributions______________________________= 0.43
Gross average w age -  (social insurance contributions +  private pension contributions)
45 x 1.0 x A R  x  12 -  (sickness + long-term care)__________________________________  =  0.43
29.375 -  (pension + unemployment +  sickness + long-term care +  private pension)
4 5 A R x  1 2 - 4 5 A R x  12 x  (0 .0 7 +  0.017)_______________  =  0.43
29.375 -  29,375 x (0.11 +  0.0325 + 0.07 + 0.0085 +  0.04)
4 9 3 .0 2 A R /21,708.125 =  0.43
149 For details on adjustment formula, see the report on the 2004 reform by German Social Advisory 
Council, http://www.sozialbeirat.de/englisch/home.html
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AR = 0.43 x 21,708.125 / 493.02 = 18.93...
Thus, the pension benefits for benchmark case in Germany is:
Monthly pension benefits = 70.72 x 1.0 x 18.93 =§= 1,338.73 
Annual pension benefits = 1,338.73 x 12 =? 16,065
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Japan
Annual basic pension benefits =
Full pension x (insured m onthsH fexem pted months x l/3)+(partlv exem pted m onths x 2/3)
480
Full basic pension is ¥780,900 in 2004. The benefit level is adjusted to wage growth.
Annual earnings-related pension benefits =
Average m onthly equivalent* x Insured months x  0.005481
* Annual earnings (including bonuses) is used for the base rather than monthly salary
Until 2030, both formulae are adjusted by ‘adjustment rate’, calculated from wage 
growth, life expectancy and the ratio between pensioners and contributors. In the 
simulation, the expected rate of resultant decrease in the benefits, 15 per cent, is used 
to determine the level of full basic pension benefits and earnings-related pension 
benefits in the monetary value of 2004. Thus, the benefit level for the benchmark 
case is obtained as follows:
Basic pension benefits =  780,900 x (1 -  0.15) =  663,765 ^ 663,800  
Earnings-related benefits =  440,000 x (45 x 12) x  0.005481 x (1 -  0 .15) ^ 1,106,900
Thus, the pension benefits for benchmark case in Japan is:
Annual pension benefits = 663,800 + 1,106,900 = 1,770,700 
Monthly pension benefits = 1,770,700 / 12 =§= 147,600
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Appendix 4 Taxation, Social Security Contributions and Net 
Pensions
Britain
Taxation for pensioners: Pensions are subject to taxation. Those aged 65 and over 
have higher personal allowance.
Social security contributions for pensioners: None
Germany
Taxation for pensioners: In principle, pensions are subject to taxation. The taxation 
is levied only on the returns on pensions, which is credited to the capital collected 
through the payment of contributions. The amount of the returns depends on the age 
of the beneficiary at the commencement of pension payments.
If there are no other earnings, pensions are often below the limit of taxation. Thus, in 
the simulations, taxation is not taken into account for net pensions.
Social security contributions for pensioners:
Sickness Insurance: The rate varies across funds. The average rate is 7.1%.
- Long-term care insurance: 1.7%.
Japan
Taxation for pensioners: In principle, pensions are subject to taxation. However, 
there is a special tax allowance for public pension income.
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Social security contributions for pensioners:
- Health Insurance and long-term care insurance: The rates as well as the base 
of the taxation vary significantly across municipalities. In the simulations, 15 
per cent of gross income from which public pension income allowance is 
deducted is used as a combined rate for both insurance schemes.
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Table A 4 .1 The income and tax of pensioners in different circumstances, 
Britain
Case Bench­
mark
Case 1 Case 2
Cases
3,4
Case 5 Case 6
1 Gross income 5,580 4,801 4,793 4,716 4,505 2,062
2 Standard tax allowances 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830
Basic allowance 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830
3 Taxable income (1-2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Tax liability 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Tax credit 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Income tax (1-4+5) 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Net income 5,580 4,801 4,793 4,716 4,505 2,062
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value of 2004.
Table A4. 2 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Britain
Pensions relative 
to (%):
Bench­
mark
Case
1
Case
2
Cases
3
Case
4
Case
5
Case
6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 86.0 85.9 84.5 84.5 80.7 36.9
Society average 25.3 21.8 21.7 21.4 21.4 20.4 9.3
Social minimum 101.8 87.6 87.4 86.0 86.0 82.1 37.6
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Table A4. 3 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Britain
Pensions relative Bench­ Case Case Case Case Case Case
to (%):
mark
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 86.0 85.9 84.5 84.5 80.7 36.9
Society average 34.7 29.9 29.8 29.4 29.4 28.0 12.8
Social minimum 101.8 87.6 87.4 86.0 86.0 82.1 37.6
Table A4. 4 The income and tax of widowed pensioners in different 
circumstances, Britain
Case widow 2 widow 3 widow 4 widow 5 widow 6
1 Gross income 6,749 6,673 6,673 6,461 4,687
2 Standard tax allowances 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830
Basic allowance 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830 6,830
3 Taxable income (1-2) 0 0 0 0 0
4 Tax liability 0 0 0 0 0
5 Tax credit 0 0 0 0 0
6 Income tax (1-4+5) 0 0 0 0 0
7 Net income 6,749 6,673 6,673 6,461 4,687
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value of 2004.
Table A4. 5 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Britain
Pensions relative 
to (%):
widow
2
widow
3
widow
4
widow
5
widow
6
Average male's 
pensions 120.9 119.6 119.6 115.8 84.0
Society average 30.6 30.2 30.2 29.3 21.2
Social minimum 123.1 121.7 121.7 117.8 85.5
Table A4. 6 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Britain
Pensions relative widow widow widow widow widow
to (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions 120.9 119.6 119.6 115.8 84.0
Society average 42.0 41.5 41.5 40.2 29.2
Social minimum 123.1 121.7 121.7 117.8 85.5
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Table A4. 7 The income and tax of pensioners in different circumstances,
Germany
Case Bench­
mark Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Gross income 16,065 10,442 10,892 9,660 9,232 7,000 3,002
Compulsory social 
security contributions 
(Health and Long­
term care insurance)
1,398 908 948 840 803 609 0
Net income 14,667 9,534 9,944 8,820 8,428 6,391 3,002
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value o f 2004.
Table A4. 8 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Germany
Pensions relative Bench­ Case Case Case Case Case Case
to (%):
mark
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 65.0 67.8 60.1 57.5 43.6 18.7
Society average 54.7 35.5 37.1 32.9 31.4 23.8 10.2
Social minimum 391.4 254.4 265.4 235.4 224.9 170.6 73.1
Table A4. 9 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Germany
Pensions relative Bench­ Case Case Case Case Case Case
to (%):
mark
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 65.0 67.8 60.1 57.5 43.6 20.5
Society average 82.3 53.5 55.8 49.5 47.3 35.9 16.8
Social minimum 357.4 232.3 242.3 214.9 205.4 155.7 73.1
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Table A 4 .10 The income and tax of widowed pensioners in different
circumstances, Germany
Case widow 2 widow 3 widow 4 widow 5 widow 6
Gross income 16,065 16,065 16,065 16,065 12,292
Compulsory social 
security contributions 
(Health and Long­
term care insurance)
1,398 1,398 1,398 1,398 1,069
Net income 15,319 15,319 15,319 15,319 11,222
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value of 2004.
Table A 4 .11 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Germany
Pensions relative widow widow widow widow widow
to (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 76.5pensions
Society average 54.7 54.7 54.7 54.7 41.8
Social minimum 391.4 391.4 391.4 391.4 299.5
Table A 4 .12 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Germany
Pensions relative widow widow widow widow widow
to (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 76.5pensions
Society average 86.0 86.0 86.0 86.0 63.0
Social minimum 373.3 373.3 373.3 373.3 273.5
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Table A 4 .13.1 The income and tax of pensioners in different circumstances,
Japan
Case Benchmark Cases 1 and 2 Case 3
1 Gross income 1,770,700 1,418,500 1,321,300
2 Standard tax allowances (central) 1,665,605 1,612,775 1,598,195
Basic allowance 380,000 380,000 380,000
Dependants 0 0 0
Deduction for social 
security contributions 85,605 32,775 18,195
Pension income 
deduction 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000
3 Taxable income (central) (1-2) 105,095 -194,275 -276,895
4 Income tax (central) 10,510 0 0
5 Standard tax allowances (local) 1,615,605 1,562,775 1,548,195
Basic allowance 330,000 330,000 330,000
Dependants 0 0 0
Deduction for social 
security contributions 85,605 32,775 18,195
Pension income 
deduction 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000
6 Taxable income (local) (1-5) 155,095 -144,275 -226,895
7 Tax (local) (9-10) 7,755 0 0
8
Compulsory social 
security contributions 
(Health insurance and 
long-term care (15%))
85,605 32,775 18,195
9 Net income 1,666,831 1,385,725 1,303,105
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value o f 2004. Contributions for Cases 5 and 6 are 
less likely to be nil in reality due to non-income-related components in most municipalities.
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Table A 4 .13.14 2 The income and tax of pensioners in different circumstances,
Japan
Case Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
1 Gross income 1,301,100 1,131,200 881,800
2 Standard tax allowances (central) 1,595,165 1,580,000 1,580,000
Basic allowance 380,000 380,000 380,000
Dependants 0 0 0
Deduction for social 
security contributions 15,165 0 0
Pension income 
deduction 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000
3 Taxable income (central) (1-2) -294,065 -448,800 -698,200
4 Income tax (central) 0 0 0
5 Standard tax allowances (local) 1,545,165 1,530,000 1,530,000
Basic allowance 330,000 330,000 330,000
Dependants 0 0 0
Deduction for social 
security contributions 15,165 0 0
Pension income 
deduction 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000
6 Taxable income (local) (1-5) -244,065 -398,800 -648,200
7 Tax (local) (9-10) 0 0 0
8
Compulsory social 
security contributions 
(Health insurance and 
long-term care (15%))
15,165 0 0
9 Net income 1,285,935 1,131,200 881,800
Note: Pension levels are shown in the monetary value o f 2004. Contributions for Cases 5 and 6 are 
less likely to be nil in reality due to non-income-related components in most municipalities.
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Table A 4 .154 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Japan
Pensions relative 
to (%):
Bench­
mark
Case
1
Case
2
Case
3
Case
4
Case
5
Case
6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 80.1 80.1 74.6 73.5 63.9 49.8
Society average 36.5 29.2 29.2 27.2 26.8 23.3 18.2
Social minimum 182.6 146.3 146.3 136.2 134.2 116.6 90.9
Table A 4 .16 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Japan
Pensions relative Bench­ Case Case Case Case Case Case
to (%):
mark
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions N/A 83.1 83.1 78.2 77.1 67.9 52.9
Society average 44.1 36.6 36.6 34.5 34.0 29.9 23.3
Social minimum 171.9 142.9 142.9 134.4 132.6 116.6 90.9
Table A 4 .1617 The income and tax of widowed pensioners in different 
circumstances, Japan
widow 2 widow 3 widow 4 widow 5 widow 6
Gross
income 1,594,600 1,546,000 1,535,900 1,494,000 1,494,000
Net
income* 1,561,825 1,527,805 1,520,735 1,494,000 1,494,000
*Survivors’ pensions are exempt from taxation. Thus, tax is levied only on pensions in one’s own 
right.
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Table A 4 .17 Pension results relative to three criteria (gross), Japan
Pensions relative widow widow widow widow widow
to (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions 90.1 87.3 86.7 84.4 84.4
Society average 32.9 31.9 31.6 30.8 30.8
Social minimum 
for the elderly 164.4 159.4 158.4 154.0 154.0
Table A 4 .18 Pension results relative to three criteria (net), Japan
Pensions relative widow widow widow widow widow
to (%): 2 3 4 5 6
Average male's 
pensions 93.7 91.7 91.2 89.6 89.6
Society average 41.3 40.4 40.2 39.5 39.5
Social minimum 
for the elderly 161.0 157.5 156.8 154.0 154.0
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Table A 4 .19 Social minimum for the elderly, Britain (2004)
Weekly Annually
For single person £105 £5,483
For couple £161 £8,369
Table A4. 20 Social minimum for the elderly, Germany (2004)
Monthly Annually
For single person €342 €4,104
For couple without children €618 €7,416
Table A4. 21 Social minimum for the elderly, Japan (2004)
> Monthly Annually
For single person living urban area ¥80,820 ¥969,840
For single person living in rural area ¥62,640 ¥751,680
For couple living in urban area ¥121,940 ¥1,463,280
For couple living in rural area ¥94,500 ¥1,134,000
Note: In the calculations in Chapter 7, benefit level for single person living in urban area is used.
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